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PREDICTING AGENCY SURVIVAL AS A FUNCTION OF CONSTITUENCY
SUPPORT IN THE MICHIGAN MENTAL HEALTH SYSTEM
R. Dee L. Woell, D.P.A
Western Michigan University, 1985
Two public facilities for the mentally ill, ·
Michigan Institute for Mental Health and Lafayette
Clinic were examined, using a framework provided by
Douglas R. Boulter (1983).

The basic research question

was, why did Lafayette Clinic survive while Michigan
Institute did not?
The following research propositions were explored:
1.

Organizations that receive strong constituency

and media support are more likely to survive than those
which do not.
2.

Program success or failure is dependent on the

decision-maker's perception of the sum of public
support.
3.

The media serves both as a carrier of opinion

and as an influential actor in its own right, and thus
impacts on mental health decisions.
4.

The decision to maintain or close an agency for

the mentally ill (particularly during crises) will,
therefore, be influenced by newspaper coverage.
Only the third proposition was not sustained.

A

content analysis of mental health newspaper articles for
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th~

years 1973 through 1983 showed minimal press cover-

age of institutional programs and negligible media
involvement with the two facilities.

Out of a total of

887 articles in the Detroit Free Press, Detroit News and
Lansing State Journal, 34 mentioned Lafayette Clinic and
28 named MIMH.
Additional research methods included a historical
review, administrative case studies, interviews and
document analysis.

These methods were undertaken to

validate and elaborate upon content analysis findings.
Using Boulter's (1983) framework, 17 key actors
were found to be initially supportive of Michigan
Institute.

Only six remained advocates throughout the

agency's history.

For Lafayette Clinic, in the years

before budget reductions, 20 actors or groups were
strongly supportive.

Fifteen continued to maintain

support.
What explains the difference between an agency that
remained open and managed to protect its programs during
a time of cutback management and one that closed?

The

conclusion is that decision makers changed their perception of utility and value as manifested by support
groups.

Therefore, the initial propositions were

sustained.
Decisions about agency survival appeared to be
politically, rather than programmatically, motivated.
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Through the use of the Boulter (1983) framework and
several alternative methods of gathering and verifying
data, an understanding and appreciation of this process
occurred.

../

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

INFORMATION TO USERS

This reproduction was made from a copy of a manuscript sent to us for publication
and microfilming. While the most advanced technology has been used to photograph and reproduce this manuscript, the quality of the reproduction is heavily
dependent upon the quality of the material submitted. Pages in any manuscript
may have indistinct print. In all cases the best available copy has been filmed.
The following explanation of techniques is provided to help clarify notations which
may appear on this reproduction.
1. Manuscripts may not always be complete. When it is not possible to obtain

missing pages, a note appears to indicate this.
2. When copyrighted materials are removed from the manuscript, a note appears to indicate this.
3. Oversize materials (maps, drawings, and charts) are photographed by sectioning the original, beginning at the upper left hand comer and continuing from left to right in equal sections with small overlaps. Each oversize
page is also filmed as one exposure and is available, for an additional
charge, as a standard 35mm slide or in black and white paper format. •
4. Most photographs reproduce acceptably on positive microfilm or microfiche but lack clarity on xerographic copies made from the microfilm. For
an additional charge, all photographs are available in black and white
standard 35mm slide format. •
*For more information about black and white slides or enlarged paper reproductions,
please contact the Dissertations Customer Services Departdlent.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

8604922

Woell, R. Dee Lee

PREDICTING AGENCY SURVIVAL AS A FUNCTION OF CONSTITUENCY
SUPPORT IN THE MICHIGAN MENTAL HEALTH SYSTEM

Western Michigan University

University
Microfilms
International

D.P.A. 1985

300 N. Zeeb Road, Ann Arbor, Ml48106

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I dedicate this dissertation to my parents, Melvin
and Eileen Woell, for their continued faith and assistance.

Their encouragement, creative ideas and flexi-

bility have served as my guideposts during these past
years.
Special thanks to Dr. Peter Kobrak, Dissertation
Chairman, for his willingness to be counselor, mentor
and teacher; to Dr. Lyke Thompson for his dedication to
academia and standards of excellence; and to Dr. Chet
Rogers for his cogent comments and insight.

Each has

offered invaluable support.
R. Dee L. Woell

ii

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
ACKNOWLEDG~1EN'rS..

•••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••

i i

LIS'!' OF TABLES... • . . • . . • . • • • • • • • • . • • • • • • • • • • • • . • . •

vi

LIST OF FIGURES •.••••••••••• ~·······••••••••••••••

vii

CHAP·l'ER
I.

I!.

II!.

INTRODUCTION.. . • . • • • . • • • • • • • • . . • • . . • . . • . .

1

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK •••••. ,.........

9

Level I - The Decision ...•.•......•..

14

Level !I - Politicans and Bureaucrats

15

Level 'rri - Media, Interest Groups
and Attentives........................

22

Level IV - Environment, Culcure and
Tradition.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

32

Level I - The Decision................

36

Propositions..........................

37

Surmnary.................. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

43

T~E

ME'l'HODS AND PROCEDURBS....................

45

Revie~......................

45

Historical

IV.

Case Studies..........................

46

Interviews............................

51

News9aper Content Analysis............

54

Document Analysis.....................

60

S wntnla r y • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . • . . . .

63

ENV HWN!V!EN'f, CUL'rORE AND 'l'RADI'l'lON.. • • • • •

65

The Background........................

65

Crises................................

8t3

iii

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Table of Contents--Continued
CHAP'rER

V.

VI.

VII.

VIII.

Discussion............................

124

Summary.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

126

A COMPARATIVE CASE STUDY.................

128

Lafayette Clinic......................

130

Michigan Institute for Mental Health..

185

Organized Advocacy Groups.............

255

S u.nuna r y . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

26 3

NEWSPAPER

ANALYSIS...............

266

1973 Through 1983.....................

268

Perceptions of the Medium.............

285

Decision-makers and the Media.........

287

Summary and Discussion................

290

Conclusion............................

293

A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS...................

297

A Summary of Positions................

298

Lafayette Clinic......................

299

Michigan Institute for Mental Health..

312

A Campa rison . . . . . . . . • • . . . • . . . • . . • • . • . .

32 4

Sununary...............................

326

SUMHARY Al'IJD COL\ICLUSIONS..................

330

Results: Case Studies.................

334

Propositions..........................

338

•rhe E·raJnewori<............. . . . . . . . . . • . • .

342

CONTEN~

iv

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Table of Contents--Continued
CHAP·rER
Recommendations and Future Research...

348

Conclusions...........................

352

APPENDICES... • • • • . • • • • • . . . • • • • • • • . . • • • • • • • • . . • • • • •

354

A.

Newspaper Clippin3s......................

354

B.

Michigan Mental Health Chronology.........

379

BIBLIOGRAPilt......................................

3H9

v

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

LI S'1' OF 'rABLES
1.

Actor Positions Toward Agencies During
And After Crisis.............................

12

A Comparison of Michigan Mental Health
Facilities for FY 1978.......................

47

Patients and Residents in State of
Michigan Facilities .•.••••••••••••.•••••••...

122

Agencies Providin3 Inpatient Psychiatric
Treatment for Wayne County and DetroitArea Residents...............................

143

5.

Lafayette Clinic Decision-Making Matrix ••••••

325

6.

Michigan Institute for Mental Health
Decision-Making Matrix •.•.•••.•••.••••••.•••.

327

2.
3.
4.

vi

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

LIST OF FIGURES

1.

Boulter's (1903) Policy-Making Ladder ••••••••

5

2.

Boulter's (1983) Policy-Making Ladder ••••••••

11

3.

A Conceptualization of the DecisionMaking Process ••••••••••••••••.••••••••••••.••

38

A Modification of Boulter's Decisionl-1aking Ladder....... • • • • • • • • • . • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

40

Michigan County Map Showing State
Psychiatric Hospi t:~.ls....................... •.

13B

Map of Department of Mental Health
Commmunity Placements by County in 1975 •.•••.

147

Michigan Institute for Mental Health
Admission and Discharge Rates in 1979 .•••••••

214

Michigan Institute for Mental Health
Length of Stay Comparing In-House
Patients to Those Discharged Each Month
in 1979......................................

214

Michigan Institute for Mental Health
Admission and Discharge Rates for 1980 ••••••.

216

Michigan Institute for Mental He~lth
Length of Stay for 19UO ...•.•...•.•.••......•

217

Unusual Incidents and Seclusions at
Michigan Institute for Mental Health
Before and After the Open Door Policy ••.•.•••

240

12.

Lafayette Clinic Decision-Making Ladder •.••.•

300

13.

Michigan Institute for Mental Health
Decision-Making Ladder ••••••••••••••••••.••••

313

4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

9.
10.

11.

vii

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
One fundamental question serves to drive the
research that follows.

How are decisions regarding

public policy issues made?

Although it is usually

possible to pinpoint key actors involved in policymaking, the "why?" of specific decisions is harder to
trace.

Without knowledge of the process, it is diffi-

cult to understand the outcome.
We like to think of ourselves as rational human
beings.

We operate under the pervasive, everyday

assumption that what other people do is purposeful, goal
directed and at least "intendedly rational" (Allison,
1971, p. 28).

Rationality presumes that behaviors can

be predicted with certainty and specificity if goals are
known.
Public policy decisions, especially in human
service areas, are often believed to be based on an
exhaustive gathering of information, leading to a final
decision selected from constrained alternatives, that is
value maximizing.

Why then would two different policies

be adopted in similar situations?

That question becomes

especially problematic when, to the observer at least,
outcomes differ even when decision makers appear to be
1
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facing similar constraints, embedded in the same
situational milieu, operating with equally limited
resources within the same system.
The rational actor model presumes that information
and value-maximization dictate choice.

The political

model presumes that parochial interest and preferences
control choice (Pfeffer, 1981, p. 22).

The following

study considers these possibilities as well as the
argument that organizations operate under a layer of
rationality which cloaks the interplay of power and
politics among a variety of key actors, knowledgeables
and interest groups.

Under this model, decisions

ultimately rest upon bureaucratic and politician
perceptions of public interest and support.
Decision making is almost universally defined as
choosing between alternatives through a series of
dynamically related steps.

Public policy making is

broader in scope but incorporates decision-making
activities.

Thomas R. Dye (1978), in Understanding

Public Policy, defines public policy as "whatever
governments choose to do or not to do 11 (p.3).

Dye

(1978) adds that "today the focus of political science
is shifting to public policy -- to the description and
explanation of the causes and consequences of government
activity" (p.S).

Decisions are outcomes of public

policy.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

3

There is a rich history of public policy and
decision theory.

It is appealing to simplify research

by concentrating on one or two of the more distinct
models, such as rational versus political man.

Yet, it

is generally acknowledged that decision-making processes
occur in complex and multi-faceted environments.

As a

result, they are rarely reducible to such a degree.

Nor

can any one theory be expected to explain fully the
diversity of governmental activities.
As Dye (1978) makes clear, "These models are not
competitive, in the sense that any one of them could be
judged 'best.'

Each one provides a separate focus on

political life, and each can help us to understand
different things about public policy (p. 19)."

He goes

on to say that, while on the surface it may appear that
a given policy or decision outcome can be explained by
one model, most policies are a combination of "rational
planning, incrementalism, interest group activity, elite
preferences, systemic forces, competition and
institutional influences" (p. 20).
Douglas R. Boulter (1983) in his essay in Applied
Political Inquiry: Reading and Research Methodology,
offers one structure which can be used to incorporate a
variety of policy theories, while allowing examination
of a specific decision.
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Boulter (1983) conceptualizes the policy-making
process according to Figure 1, which shows that policy
is made by politicians and bureaucrats as influenced by
interest groups and the media, as well as attentives and
the general public.

He also suggests that decisions are

shaped by the environment, culture, tradition and institutions in which they are embedded.
Boulter's (1983) framework will be used to focus
case material while exploring a single decision, closing
or retaining a Michigan mental health facility.

By

developing information within the parameters of this
policy ladder, it becomes possible to further assess its
utility for public sector administrators.
Specifically, the framework will be examined in a
comparative study of differing decisions regarding two
similar public Michigan mental health institutions:
Lafayette Clinic, located in Detroit, and Michigan
Institute for Mental Health in Lansing.

Both agencies

operated under the auspices of the Michigan Department
of Mental Health; both served the acutely mentally ill
in a short-term, intensive treatment program; both had
strong affiliations with a local University; both seemed
to be meeting community needs and were providing services efficiently and effectively; both operated within
the fiscal constraints of a recessionary period.

Yet
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LEVEL I.

POLICY

· made by

LEVEL II
(Proximate
Policy-makers)

POLITICIANS
AND

BUREAUCRATS

influenced by

LEVEL III
(Influential
Actors)

MEDIA, INTEREST GROUPS,
ATTENTIVES, GENERAL PUBLIC

shaped by

LEVEL IV

Figure 1.

ENVIRONMENT, INSTITUTIONS,
CULTURE, HISTORY, TRADITION

Boulter's (1983) policy-making ladder.
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the decision was to retain one facility and close the
other.
Research will explore the decision process using a
case study methodology.

Traditionally, case studies

offer a variety of in-depth materials about total agency
operations.

The research that follows, however,

attempts to narrow that view and look at a series of
interactions in relationship to a single decision:
whether or not the agency should survive.
Chapter II offers a closer look at Boulter's (1983)
decision model and a review of the literature within
that structure.

Discussion of how Boulter's (1983)

framework may be used to examine the layers of interaction within Michigan institutions for the mentally
ill, is also provided.
Based on available literature, a conceptualization
of the decision ladder, and relevant assumptions, a
series of propositions are set forth.

These will be

studied in subsequent chapters.
Chapter III discusses research methods and
procedures.

Newspaper content analysis, interviews and

document analysis all serve to flesh out the case
studies and establish a foundation for comparison.
Chapter IV offers an overview of Michigan's mental
health system.

Environmental contingencies, inputs and

outputs are considered integral to a number of decision-
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making theories.

In the literature, purveyors of mental

health care (especially governmental providers) are
often considered purveyors of the moral and socioeconomic interests of the state as well (Kitsuse, 1968;
Szasz, 1970; Weinberg, 1978).

Both state hospitals

resided in the same culture, both were serving a
potentially volatile population about whom community
opinions were seldom neutral.

It is useful to under-

stand this milieu, which provides the background for
case studies to follow.
Chapter IV also delineates the crisis period, providing an understanding of the Michigan mental health
system and an appreciation of the significance of actor
positions.
Chapter V provides in-depth studies of two speci=ic
treatment facilities, Lafayette Clinic and Michigan
Institute for Mental Health.

Again, Boulter's (1983)

decision ladder is used as an overlay to delineate key
actors, stakes and stands in each of the programs and at
a variety of levels.

This exploration of key issues and

decisions paves the way for a comparative analysis of
the two facilities in Chapter VII.
Chapter VI explores media influence regarding these
two institutions and its effect on the policy-making
process.
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Chapter VII ties together the mental health
history, case studies and discussion of media influence
by offering an analytical comparison of the positions of
constituents involved in the decision processes at each
agency.

A check sheet is used to show graphically actor

positions toward the facilities both before and after
the crisis period. using this outline, the years 1977-79
will be compared to 1980-81 at several levels.
The resultant information will assist in demonstrating why institutional survival outcomes differed,
even though programs appeared similar and were part of
the same environment.
With this application of Boulter's (1983) framework, it becomes possible to assess its utility for the
public sector administrator.

Its value as a decision-

making tool can be examined.

The final chapter offers

conclusions, recommendations, plans for future research
and suggestions for revising Boulter's (1983) decision
ladder to make it more useful for both the researcher
and practitioner.
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CHAPTER II
THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
When decisions are made by public figures, there is
a tendency to attribute outcomes to specific policymaking processes.

Two such conceptualizations have

already been mentioned briefly, the rational actor and
political process models.

They by no means provide the

boundaries of explanatory theory.
There is a long and rich history of research
regarding public policy and decision-making.

Leadership

and ambition theories, group process and environmental
impact models are all useful conceptualizations of what
occurs when a decision is made.

How then can we sort

among a variety of theories and models to examine a
specific decision?
Graham T. Allison (1971), in Essence of Decision:
Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, reveals the difficulties of this task.

He details how a single decision

can be viewed from three distinct perspectives. The
rational actor, organizational process, and governmental
(bureaucratic) politics paradigms are equally plausible
explanations for events surrounding the Cuban missile
crisis.
Different models can be used to explain the same
decision.

Our question then becomes even more prob-

9
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lematic.

How can we predict different outcomes given

similar decision-making situations?
Douglas R. Boulter (1983) offers one form of
integrative framework which allows examination of a
variety of theories and models.

He also provides a

first step toward attempting to predict policy
decisions, rather than simply observing or explaining
them.
In his essay in Applied Political Inquiry: Reading
and Research Methodology, Boulter (1983) begins by postulating a policy ladder.

Figure 2 shows that, accord-

ing to this conceptualization, decisions are made by
politicians and bureaucrats.

They, in turn, are

influenced by interest groups and the media, as well as
attentives and the general public.

Attentives are con-

sidered by Boulter (1983) to be ..... those members of
Gabriel Almond's attentive public who follow a particular issue and possess some expertise on the subject.
They participate in the policy debate by taking a public
position on the issue, most frequently in the news
media 11 (p.252).
Boulter (1983) uses a score sheet to rate each of
the major actor's positions toward a policy outcome
during and after the crisis period.

A modified version

of this rating form can be seen in Table 1.

The resul-

tant check sheet, marked according to the involved
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LEVEL I

POLICY

made by

LEVEL II
(Proximate
Policy-makers)

POLITICIANS
AND
BUREAUCRATS

influenced by

LEVEL III
(Influential
Actors)

MEDIA, INTEREST GROUPS,
ATTENTIVES, GENERAL PUBLIC

shaped by

LEVEL IV

Figure 2.

ENVIRONMENT, INSTI·rUTIONS,
CULTURE, HISTORY, TRADITION

Boulter's (1983) policy-making ladder.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

12
Table 1
Actor Positions Toward Agencies During and After Crisis

Majority
Against

Serious
Split

Majority
For

Majority
Against

Serious
Split

Majority
For

Bureaucrats
MIMH
Lafayette
Legislators
MIMH
Lafayette
University
Officials
MIMH
Lafayette
Conununity
Officials
MIMH
Lafayette
Staff
MIMH
Lafayette
Interest Groups
MIMH
Lafayette
Attentives
MIMH
Lafayette
Media
MIMH
Lafayette
Public
MIMH
Lafayette
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actors' public expressions of opinion, is expected to
show clear support for (or against) the policy as a sum
of individual positions.
Using this framework, Boulter (1983) compared three
countries on a single decision, setting highway speed
limits in response to anticipated world oil shortages.
He was able to trace the inevitable policy outputs,
which were different in each country.
During the study, American policy makers received
strongly favorable signals for their position to retain
the 55 mile-per-hour speed limit after the gas shortage
crisis had ended.

The general public, attentive elites,

the media and many interest groups supported the policy.
With that support, the decision to retain the lowered
limit in the

u.s.

was an easy one to predict.

In

Britain and Germany the final tabulation showed strong
negative feelings toward the existing policy.

As a

result, speed limits were allowed to return to precrisis levels.
That same type of analysis can be used to show
public support for or against a given mental health
institution.
Boulter (1983) considers policy output to be a
factor of actor positions during and after the decision
period, as defined by conflict and crises.

In order to

study these issues and gather data, two different public
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mental health decisions concerning the survival of comparable institutions will be examined.
With additional application of Boulter's (1983)
framework, it should then be possible to step back and
assess its usefulness for further research.
But, how does this structure mesh with other
decision-making theories?

Let us examine Boulter's

(1983) conceptualization in light of existing
literature.
Level I

The Decision

Clearly, few key decisions are simple "go" or "no
go" problems for policy-makers.

Decisions are generally

the outcome of a number of impinging contingencies.
Boulter (1983) sees decisions as the outgrowth of at
least three levels of influence, all of which impact in
a number of ways.
"given".

However, there is one acknowledged

If the base of support for a decision is

perceived by the policy maker to be missing or deteriorating, the astute actor will generally begin to reevaluate his own position and/or modify the decision
outcome.
Although there is a wide variety of possible
paradigms under which politicians and bureaucrats may be
seen as operating, one early theory has inherent appeal
for governmental observers -- the rational actor model.
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Level II -- Politicians and Bureaucrats
The Rational Actor Model
Although the rational model was originally
postulated by such scholars as Max Weber (1947) in The
Theory of Social and Economic Organization, Talcott
Parsons (1949) in The Structure of Social Action and
Herbert A. Simon (1957) in Models of Man, this theory
remains one of the most studied, albeit in a variety of
modernized forms.
Many types of rational decision models are found in
the literature of economics, political science, management, administrative science and budgeting.

Generally

it is agreed that a truly rational person selects the
best possible decision based on an exhaustive gathering
of information and a careful evaluation of alternatives.
The outcome choice is value maximizing, offering the
greatest value within situational constraints.
Rationalists would argue that in order to improve
public administration, one need only take an economic
approach (Quade, 1979, p. 22).

Many Chief Executive

Officers (CEOs) at Level II of Boulter's (1983) policy
ladder perceive themselves as operating under this
paradigm, equating quality service with lowered costs to
the taxpayer.

In the mental health field, for instance,

the rationalist is guided by costs per patient day.
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Systematic efforts to quantify costs and benefits
for the care and treatment of the mentally ill are an
example of the rational, scientific management approach.
Does a given policy save money?

Is it more efficient

and/or more beneficial to place a person in an institution than in a community home?

Most such studies in

the field of mental health look at patient aggregates to
determine how best to structure state-wide services
(Herman, 1981, 1982, 1983; Intagliata, Wilder, & Cooley,
1979; Krowinski & Fitt, 1978; Murphy & Datel, 1976).
Of course, these concerns are not confined to the
mental health field.

There is ongoing discussion in the

literature regarding such topics as zero-based budgeting
(Dillon, 1979) and cost-benefit analyses (Bernard, 1979;
Brown, Pratt, & Luszcz, 1980; Doelker, 1979; Frank,
Klein, & Jacobs, 1982; Hellinger, 1980).
An organization can be considered a technical
instrument for mobilizing human energies and directing
them toward set aims. It may be seen as a rational tool
designed to perform a job efficiently.

But, it is

generally acknowledged that despite our best attempts at
rationality, agency output is still the product of
individuals with their own needs and goals.
Martin Landau (1969) attacked what he considered a
limited approach in "Redundancy, Rationality and the
Problem of Duplication and Overlap," published in the

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

17
Public Administration Review.

Herbert A. Simon (1957)

coined the term "satisficing" to refer to decisions that
are "good enough" as opposed to those that meet all of
the requirements of "perfect rationality".
In its purest form rational decision-making is
difficult to reconcile with the exigencies of daily
activities.

Yet, the concept itself remains valuable.

The following research examines the theory that
public administrators make rational choices based on
what they perceive as the balance of constituency
support.

A modified form of Boulter's (1983) check-

sheet will be used to quantify actor positions and
stands so that outcomes are predictable as an arithmetic
sum of behaviors.
One obvious drawback is the requirement that
opinion be quantified by reduction to a plus or minus
rating.

Seldom are our positions that clear-cut; seldom

are weights and strengths of opinions directly comparable.

Nevertheless, the attempt to incorporate a

rational component in what may be considered an inherently irrational process, serves to clarify the decision
process and outcome.
The Political Actor Model
Boulter (1983) aggregates the effects of politicians and bureaucrats, totaling their support toward a
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specific decision.

We know, however, that such

decision-making bodies as the Legislature and Executive
Office are comprised of individuals.
In the public sector, Levinson and Klerman (1972)
consider leadership to be an inherently political
process.

They tell us that:

The executive operating on the boundary between his
organization and numerous others has no authority
to give orders as he sees fit.
Instead he is
engaged in a complex process of negotiations with
other parties who have different constituencies,
formal and informal affiliations, control over
resources and bargaining leverage. (pp. 52-67)
Authors such as Richard Neustadt (1960), Gabriel
Almond (1950) and Charles Lindblom (1959) argue that as
a result of the complicity of human involvement, outcomes are generally unpredictable and difficult to trace
through the system.

The final product, in this case a

single decision, is a blend of individual and group
impacts through key decision makers.
According to Allison's (1971) governmental
(bureaucratic) politics paradigm, outcomes are not
chosen as solutions to problems so much as result from
compromise, conflict and confusion of officials with
diverse interests and unequal influence.
Although Ritchie (1971) was referring to the
Canadian government in his discussion of organizational
policy-making, his insight is applicable:
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The common pattern is for information to be
inadequate, alternatives to be unidentified or
unappraised. More often than not, we appear to
drift into solutions or expedients •••• A pessimist
might say that we react to crisis by sowing the
seed of new crisis as yet unforeseen. (p. 12)
Politics involves how differing preferences are
resolved in conflicts over the allocation of scarce
resources.

Thus, as Pfeffer (1981) adds, "politics

involves activities which attempt to influence decisions
over critical issues that are not readily resolved
through the introduction

o~

new data and in which there

are differing points of view" {p. 6).
Political models view organizations as pluralistic
and divided into various interdependent interests, units
and subcultures (Baldridge, 1971). Conflict is considered to be normal or at least customary {p. 25).
Power follows from conflict.
Budget becomes the battleground.

"If politics is

regarded as the conflict over whose preferences are to
prevail, then the budget records the outcome of this
struggle", according to Wildavsky {1979, p. 193).

He

defines budgets ultimately as attempts to allocate
financial resources through political processes.
Lasswell and Kaplan {1950) consider politics to be
a "study of influence and the influential" (p. 240).

It

is this definition that will serve as a guide for
Chapter V, case studies of two mental health facilities.
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Self (1975) adds an additional dimension.

He

believes that organizational politicians want to be
perceived as rational actors.
illusory.

However, the effort is

While the actions of administrators may

generally be regarded by politicians, the public and
even themselves as the result of the simple application
of rational, legal, economic or technical criteria to
questions of policy, generally that is not the case.
Such thinking simply tends to make otherwise
unacceptable

decisio~s

more palatable to both decision

makers and their constituents (Self, 1975).
Elite Theory
One decision-making theory that meshes poorly with
Boulter's (1983) structure is that of elitism.

While

Boulter agrees that decisions are made by politicians
and bureaucrats, elite theory argues that the average
citizen is unconcerned, uninvolved and uninformed about
public policy.

Therefore, decisions reflect the pref-

erences of elites and are imposed from the top down.
Boulter (1983) sees a much richer conceptualization
of policy-making, one that is more traditionally pluralistic and which acknowledges a variety of factors and
inputs that shape the final outcome.

Politicians and

bureaucrats are expected to be aware of, and influenced
by, their constituents.
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It is acknowledged, however, that those outside the
system may wield inordinate power.

In the case studies

presented in Chapter V, it is apparent that University
officials and institutional directors can be power
brokers whose opinions and influence are important to
decision makers.

While Boulter's (1983) model does not

allow us to weigh the value of support, clearly support
from some quarters is of greater utility than from
others.

Wallace

s.

Sayre and Herbert Kaufman (1960) in

Governing New York City say it well:
In a manner of speaking, many group le~ders become
intimate parts of the city's machinery of governmental decision in certain spheres. They are nongovernmental in the sense that they cannot promulgate binding orders and rules the way officeholders
clothed with public authority can, but they often
have as much to say about what officeholders
promulgate as the officeholders themselves .
••• Officeholders feel compelled to cooperate with
them because they have so much influence, knowledge
and interest. (p. 511)
Organization implies the tendency to oligarchy,
according to Michels (1958):

"In every organization,

whether it be a political party, a professional union,
or any other association of the kind, the aristocratic
tendency manifests itself very clearly" (p. 37).
Michels (1958) argues that an elite stratum necessarily
exists because of the large numbers of people involved
in governmental issues and the need to decide matters of
dispute among members.

This naturally leads to a system
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of delegation, and inevitably to an elite that no longer
represents the masses.
In the slightly modified "theory of democratic
elitism", appointed politicians are expected to
represent the mass of members and execute their wi"ll.
The explicit task of the voters, therefore, according to
Campbell (1964) is not to decide what the government
should do, but rather who should make decisions on
political matters (p. 281).
Level III -- Media, Interest Groups and Attentives
The question of "who really governs" is not only
interesting, but has considerable potential impact
throughout the public sector.

Almond (1958), in his

comparative study of interest groups and the political
process, was one of the first to expand the scope of
decision-making to include interest group impacts on
outcomes.

Others peripherally addressed the same issues

(Bowers & Ochs, 1971; Cobb & Elder, 1972).

A thought-

provoking book by Vogel (1978) provides insight into how
citizens increasingly are lobbying corporations and, as
a result, are mounting a growing challenge to business
authority.
As America is transformed from an industrial to an
information-electronic society, the public administrator
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will also have to change.

Participatory, rather than

representative, democracy has become more of a reality
in this era of instantaneously shared information.
Increasing levels of education and involvement have
led to renewed awareness of the ability of groups to
influence public decisions and heightened belief in
their impact.

Harris (1982), for instance, identified

organizations actively involved in attempting to influence the Mental Health Systems Act of 1980 (PL 96-398),
how they functioned and the major issues with which they
were concerned.
Cigler and Loomis (1983) call it a "participation
revolution" as large numbers of citizens become active
in ever-increasing numbers of protest groups, citizen's
organizations and special interest groups (p. 11).

They

add that major technological developments in information
processing promote more sophisticated, timely and
specialized grass roots lobbying (p. 1).
Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) in The External Control
of Organizations: A Resource Dependence Perspective
argue that, "Organizations are not so much concrete
social entities as a process of organizing support
sufficient to continue existence" (p. 24).

Such a

perspective is particularly valid in the mental health
field, where programs operate in a turbulent, ever-
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changing environment of new techniques, technologies and
philosophies.
Thompson (1965) had already observed that administrative action in the modern world "is not the product
of one person's mind or heart.

It reflects the concerns

of all legitimate interests in the appropriate administrative constituency" (p. 205-206).
As a result of a variety of societal changes,
characterized by increasing social complexity, economic
specialization and social differentiation (Truman, 1971,
p. 57), today's public administrators are forced to deal
with an increasingly educated, knowledgeable, and even
militant immediate constituency.

They are forced to be

more open to social, political and economic concerns.
They must negotiate with a wide variety of divergent and
frequently conflicting groups including employees,
stockholders, unions, various government agencies and
the general public.
At the same time, there are growing numbers of
people who remain outside the system.

Public constit-

uencies can be divided into three basic groups: activists, attentives and the apathetic.

Declining voter

turnouts and a multiplicity of public agencies serving
disenfranchised populations are evidence of the changing
role of public administrators.
Decisions in the public sector affect a large
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number of people.

The public leader is more visible,

more vulnerable and makes an easier target than his
business counterpart.

Chandler and Plano (1982) have

observed that, "A public administrator's life is lived
in the bright light of publicity and in response to the
public's right to know" (p. 25).
The necessity to provide public mental health
services, combined with this substantive area's high
visibility, community salience and potential volatility,
insures that decision-makers are sensitive to interest
groups, the media and attentives.
Pluralism
One major difference between public and private
administration relates to two distinct but similar
issues.

The public sector, by definition, includes

every citizen.

Its audience is immense, its scope and

scale of operation potentially ever increasing.
Citizens are both the owners (through taxation and
political participation) and consumers.

Acknowledgement

of ownership and increased awareness and involvement in
public sector activities by this irnmense group have
steadily grown.
Truman (1971) notes the "multiplicity of coordinate or nearly co-ordinate points of access to
governmental decisions," and concludes that:
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The significance of these many points of access and
of the complicated texture of relationships among
them is great. This diversity assures various ways
for interest group3 to participate in the formation
of policy, and this variety is a flexible,
stabilizing element. (p. 519)
"Participation as a technique", according to
Luthans (1981), "means that individuals or groups are
involved in the decision-making process" (p. 490).
With this increasing involvement, however, comes
increasing complexity and growing pressures on decision
makers.

Cigler and Loomis .(1983) view the major chal-

lenge to the American political system in the 1980s as
"its ability to respond to a demanding electorate in a
political environment that supports numerous diverse
interests -- often passionately expressed."
While Lowi (1969) talks about a growing network of
alliances between interest groups, he considers them
subversive of the legislature, and, concurrently, of
democracy.

His opinion is that this network favors

discretionary authority so that it may make accommodations as problems arise without going back to decision
makers (p. 96).

Interest-group liberalism, argues Lowi

(1979), is an attitude that produces ambiguous legislation, facilitating the efforts of interest groups to
define public policy (Chapter 3).
Although government has in recent years devoted a
growing share of the nation's resources to policies and

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

27

programs for meeting societal needs, dissatisfaction has
never been more widespread, according to Nachmias
(1979).

"Manifestation of this discontent", he writes,

"can be seen in complaints about inefficiency,
ineffectiveness and waste." (p. 1).
Taxpayers are becoming more demanding, more willing
to express dissatisfaction and more willing to act on
that expression because of increasing concerns about
program costs and a growing awareness of their own
responsibilities.
A relatively new concern of this constituency is
that public employees be aware of the legitimacy of
political demands, understanding that an organization
must be held accountable for its actions to the public
and its elected and appointed leaders.

Thompson (1965)

writes, "Occasionally some participants in organizations
(or participants in some organizations) lose sight of
their social moorings and come to believe they are
untouchable -- part of an autonomous community independent of outside evaluation, power and control
independent of outside 'ownership'" (p. 44).

The media

are playing an integral part in this awakening process.
Media involvement in shaping policy decisions is
considered an important facet by Boulter (1983).
Compared to other aspects of the political process,
there have been relatively few studies of pressure
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groups and their relationship to the media.

Gabriel

Almond (1958) in "A Comparative Study of Interest Groups
and the Political Process" published in American Political Science Review, was among the first to explore this
issue.
Not having formal legitimacy obviously reduces the
acceptability of some special-interest influence on
policy.

Nor can public acceptance be won unless the

larger public can become aware of the issues.

Publicity

becomes the tool for ad-hoc groups searching for some
measure of control.

Peters (1978) mentions that it is

particularly useful in dealing with bureaucratic actions

(p. 208).
According to Peters (1978), when officials are
reluctant to do as they are told, publicity spurs
execution.

But, Richard Neustadt (1960, p. 19) in

Presidential Power adds that publicity does so at the
risk of turning private reluctance into public defiance.
Cobb and Elder (1972) also note that the greater
the· size of the audience to which an issue can be enlarged, the greater the likelihood that it will attain
systematic agenda standing and thus access to the formal
agenda (p. 110).

Rumor is another effective weapon.

In Boulter's (1983) model, the question then
becomes, how does the decision maker locate the true
expression of the public will?

How does he know which
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groups or individuals to count and which to discount?
Is it the group or person that is the most persistent,
the loudest, the one which appears to garner the most
support?
~etermining

Cigler and Loomis (1983) find the question of
impact a difficult one, "The difficulty is,

in fact, compounded by groups' claims of impact and
decision makers' equally vociferous claims of freedom
from any outside influence" (p. 25).
The corollary for the researcher is, how do we know
that we are measuring and aggregating community opinion
in the same way that the decision maker is?

If a deci-

sion is determined by the sum of perceived community
support, how do we know perceptions are similar?
Boulter (1983) counters these concerns by recording
publicly stated opinions.

Therefore, only those who are

involved in a given issue or policy and act as public
spokespersons would tend to be included.

Nevertheless,

in an attempt to score accurately opinion on a check
sheet, we are hampered by the concept of delineating the
component parts that constitute the sum of support.
Group Theory:

Policy as Group Equilibrium

An interest group is seen by David Truman (1971, p.
37) as "a shared-attitude group that makes certain
claims upon other groups in the society."

Politics

then, becomes the struggle between coalitions attempting
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to influence public decisions.

According to group

theorists, as explained by Dye (1978, p. 23-24), public
policy at any given time is the equilibrium reached in
this struggle and is partially determined by the relative influence of involved groups.
Virtually all political systems encompass pressure
groups intent on swaying outcomes in their favor.

"The

minority faction theorists," according to Andrew
McFarland (1983), "tend to see American government as a
collection of such coalitions, each controlling its own
'turf', public policy making in a particular area of
economic interest" (p. 335).

This appears to hold true

in the mental health field as well, as will be shown in
Chapter IV.
Harmon Zeigler (1964) in Interest Groups in American Society talks about the power of such alliances:
Organization represents a concentration of
resources toward the realization of political
influence. Organized structures of power can wield
a predominant force when confronted by diffuse,
unorganized interests. Therefore, if one could
equalize all other factors it could be said that
interests which are supported by organizations have
a better chance of success than interests which do
not enjoy the participation of organizations. (p.
32)
Latham (1952) adds: "They (organized groups) are
structures of power because they concentrate human wit,
energy, and muscle for the achievement of a given
~Ironse"

(p. 12).

As a result, Olson (1965) finds that
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the few tend to defeat the many because the few tend to
be better organized.
Even development of agencies and institutions can
be considered an outgrowth of such processes.

Medeiros

and Schmitt (1977) find that "public organizations are
usually created in response to a problem perceived or
articulated by a salient interest group within the
political environment" (p. 15).
While Boulter (1983) embraces part of group theory,
he expands it to include individuals (bureaucrats and
politicians) as well as the groups of which they are a
part (organizations, legislature).

He looks beyond

pressure groups to incorporate media influence, the
general public and attentive involvement.

Each faction

helps to weigh the balance of public opinion.
Politicians are influenced by the outcome of group
struggles, but not exclusively.
As the House Select Committee on Lobbying
Activities (1950) has noted, "No public policy could
ever be the mere sum of the demands of organized special
interests, for there are vital common interests that
cannot be organized by pressure groups" (p.99).
Boulter (1983) suggests consideration of both
external and internal organizational forces.

Institu-

tions can be described as structured patterns of
behavior of individuals and groups.

••structured" means
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that patterns of behavior tend to persist over time
(Dye, 1978, p. 21).
Level IV -- Environment, culture and Tradition
Institutionalism
Selznick (1957) differentiates between
organizations -- "technical instruments designed as
means to definite goals", and institutions -- "products
of interaction and adaptation ••. receptacles of group
idealism" (p. 21-22).
It is possible to view an institution as a unitary
actor.

It can acquire an image, a perception of purpose

and standard patterns of behavior conditioned by longestablished practices.
This unitary institutional actor may not be
perceived, however, as operating in an entirely rational
manner because it is molded by people who do not always
make decisions based on the greater good, what is best
for the institution.

Rather, individuals are concerned

with what they believe are the best alternatives for
them.

Decisions become the results of value-maximizing

choices which, by necessity, must be negotiated through
others in the agency.

Such maneuvering implies action

as political output, rather than action as choice.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

33
Systems Theory
In contrast to the basic ideas of the rationalistic
tradition, the systems perspective does not consider the
decision maker as primarily an instrument for the realization of specific goals.

Rather, he is perceived as

responding to, and adjusting himself to, a multitude of
claims.

He is engaged in ongoing attempts to maintain

balance by reconciling divergent demands.
One of the most significant characteristics of a
system is that changes in one part of it affect other
parts as well.
dependent.

Components are interrelated and inter-

Among the general environmental conditions

that may be considered part of this relationship are
technology; legal precedents; and political, economic
and cultural impacts.
The organization as a system is continuously
involved in exchange with the environment.

Abrahamsson

(1977) adds that, "The character of the exchange varies
with the different needs of the organization, and consequently, the set of stakeholders also differs from time
to time and between organizations" (p. 93).
Even the most traditional public organizations are
thought to be open to outside influences, dependent on
the environment for both legitimacy and needed
resources.

"The indeterminateness and uncertainty
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created by this dependency," wrote Miles (1980), "so
contribute to the tensions that must be managed from
within" (p. 6).

According to Dye (1978, P. 38), "The

system can respond to forces in its environment, and •••
it will do so in order to preserve itself.

Inputs are

received into the political system in the form of both
demands and support."
This concept is fully accepted by Boulter (1983)
who tells us that policy is shaped by external contingencies, a response of the political system to forces
brought to bear upon it by the environment (Easton,
1957).

Chapter IV will show that institutional survival

is dependent upon environmental inputs (money, community
resources, patients) and environmental acceptance of
outputs (ex-patients).
Modern authors, including Miles (1980) and Pfeffer
and Salancik (1978), describe ways of helping organiations to become aware of environmental impacts on the
agency and thereby make strategic choices in managing
contingencies.

However, these theories assume that the

organization is a rational actor in the decision-making
process.

Instead, what is being postulated here is that

the organization, and even its formal internal leadership, are single factors in a larger system.
Legislators hold the purse-strings for public
agencies.

It has been argued that, as a result, they
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may carry the weight of the final decision.

In the

mental health field, perhaps alliances established
between conservative legislators who favor institutionalization (because it is less

dis~uptive

to their

constituents and district) and hospital professionals
defending the last bastions of the medical model serve
to arbitrate community needs.
Such an approach, however, ignores the richness of
the decision process.

The environment, as well as

organizational culture and tradition, are all part of
the system.

Clearly, "government decisions are not all

made in the hallowed halls of the legislature; rather, a
good number of them are made in the less impressive but
more numerous halls of administrative office buildings"
(Peters, 1978, p. 4).
This less visible group of attentives and affiliated associations are a natural part of the organizational system.

Zeigler (1964) clarifies their role:

The clientele of an agency --"groups whose
interests (are) strongly affected by an agency's
activities (and provide) the principal sources of
political support and opposition" (Simon,
Smithburg, & Thompson, 1950, p. 461) -- may have
great impact on the way the agency's programs are
enforced. If the clientele of the agency is large
and heterogeneous, the agency will function in a
climate of greater potential conflict than if the
clientele is limited and relatively united. (p.
280)
As will be discussed more thoroughly in Chapter IV,
however, recipients of mental health services are gener-·
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ally less a part of the policy-making system than are
service providers, who are also considered agency
clients by Zeigler (1964).
Level I -- The Decision
As is often the case, we find that the discussion
has come full circle.

Clearly there are a variety of

models and theories that can account for a given decision outcome.

We see that Boulter's (1983) framework

incorporates a number of them into a manageable
structure.
Boulter (1983) argues that decision makers are
faced with a sum of public opinion that weighs on the
final decision.

As Shils (1961) tells us, a Congressman

has to be "hypersensitive to the faintest whisper of a
constituent's voice" if he is to survive.
operation, including economy and

While agency

effic~ency,

should not

be discounted, a more important aspect is decision-maker
perception of agency viability as a sum of its continued
value.

Only peripherally can the agency itself, because

of its obvious vested interest, do much to manage its
constituencies.
In the public sector the organization, as an
entity, remains a bystander, perhaps not an "innocent"
bystander but one whose fate is most often decided by
external pressures brought to bear on key decision
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makers.

One conduit through which this pressure flows

is the media, specifically newspapers.
Propositions
The foundation for this revised theory of public
decision-making rests on the assumption that public
programs are highly dependent on constituency involvement and support.

Survival becomes contingent on

awareness and acknowledgement of community-based power
interests.

A simplified conceptualization of this

process is provided in Figure 3.
Based on this model, and Boulter's (1983) framework, it is proposed that:
1.

Those organizations that receive strong public

constituency and media support are more likely to survive than those which receive less support.
2.

Program success or failure is dependent on the

decision-maker's perception of the sum of constituency
support (symbolized by solid lines of influence).

Part

of this perception of public concern is obtained from
the media, particularly newspapers.
A study by the American Society of Newspaper
Editors states that the majority (53%) of readers
believe that newspapers are usually inaccurate.

Key

decision makers, nevertheless, have few other gauges
with which to measure public opinion ("Editors
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Decision

Politician•s
Bureaucrat•s
Perception

______ primary lines of influence
secondary lines of influence

Figure 3.

A conceptualization of the decision-making
process.
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Learn, ••• " 1984).

Polls, advisors, and commissions

offer only limited and circumscribed insight into a
myriad of issues confronting the policy analyst.
3.

As a result of this decision-maker interest,

the media impacts on mental health policy.

It serves

both as a carrier of opinion and as an influential actor
in its own right.
This last proposition is clarified by modifying
Boulter's {1983) policy ladder (see Figure 4) to differentiate interest groups and the media from attentives
and the general public, since Level III groups would be
expected to have relatively more influence than Level IV
groups.
4.

The decision to maintain or close an institu-

tion for the mentally ill (particularly in a time of
crisis) will be influenced by newspaper coverage.
Secondary Propositions
Interest group beliefs in both the efficacy of
media coverage and their own ability to sway opinion
through publicity will lead naturally to the development
of strategies for managing issues and events.
Based on these assumptions, two additional ideas
are worth exploring.

Strategies regarding the media

will tend to gravitate toward one of two polar opposites, depending upon the pressure group's position
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DECISION

made by

LEVEL II

POLITICIANS
AND
BUREAUCRATS

influenced by

LEVEL III

LEVEL IV

MEDIA AND INTEREST GROUPS

ATTENTIVES AND GENERAL PUBLIC

shaped by

LEVEL V

Figure 4.

ENVIRONMENT, INSTITUTIONS,
CULTURE, HISTORY, TRADITION

A Modification of Boulter's (1983) decisionmaking ladder.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

41

in the system.

Stakeholders can either deliberately

seek support and publicity for a position in an attempt
to sway decision makers by revealing the depth of public
interest or they can try to minimize potentially
negative risks by avoiding publicity.
It is expected that risk seeking behavior will
occur more often in less powerful groups and by those
outside the formal decision-making hierarchy.

Leaders

of institutions and organizations generally have more to
lose if strategies backfire.

Their strength often lies

in the ability to insulate programs within the
bureaucracy.

Therefore, those who are firmly entrenched

in the mental health system will seek to minimize risks
by avoiding media attention.
A second issue is more specific to the institutions
under study.

Crises, almost by definition, threaten

basic values or one's way of life (Boulter, 1983,
p. 273).

It could be argued that, with two strong

interest groups competing within the Michigan Institute
for Mental Health (DMH and MSU bureaucrats), power
brokers were so busy supporting their own needs during
crises that they failed to support the agency.

Why

would that occur in one facility and not the other?
What were the issues involved in the crisis?
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Perhaps influentials, interest groups and attentives creatively managed certain elements of the
"crisis" such as staff-to-patient ratios and perceived
patient dangerousness, using the media or other
strategies to weigh public opinion more heavily on
various sides of the issue.
There remain a number of interesting questions to
be explored, including the usefulness of Boulter's
(1983) policy ladder for the public administrator.

A

variety of contemporary theories attempt to explain
public policy decisions, but few try to predict them.
While post hoc explanations can be valuable, Boulter
(1983) attempts to move one step further and provide a
predictive tool which is incorporated in his check
sheet.
There are acknowledged limitations to Boulter's
(1983) framework, which will be discussed in Chapters
VII and VIII, when check-sheets are provided for the two
facilities under study.

Perhaps one of the greatest

weaknesses of this framework is that, in its
applications to date, decision outcomes were known.
With the inherent subjectivity involved in rating actor
and group stands on a dichotomous scale, the final sum
of ratings becomes suspect.

Nor is there any weighting

of the strength of opinions or the potential for greater

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

43

impact on the final decision based on greater power in
the system.

These issues will be explored more thor-

oughly in the following chapters.
Summary
Douglas R. Boulter (1983) postulates a policy
ladder which can be used to incorporate a variety of
theories.

This same ladder provides structure for the

following research.
Boulter (1983) describes policy as occurring at
several levels, each of which impacts on the decision
maker.

To broaden the research, a review of literature

focused on models that are integral to this conceptualization and that can strengthen the study.

The

rational actor and political actor models, elite theory,
pluralism, policy as group equilibrium, institutionalism
and systems theory are each pieces of the larger framework which will be used to consider the issue of survival in two public mental health facilities:

Michigan

Institute for Mental Health and Lafayette Clinic.
It is suggested, based on this enlarged framework,
that politicians and bureaucrats make decisions according to what they see as the sum of constituency support
for a given outcome.

In this instance, the decision is

one of institutional survival.

Perceptions of public

interest and support are obtained, at least in part,
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from the media.

Therefore, it is further suggested that

the media serves both as a carrier of opinion and as a
public actor in its own right.
By assessing the positions of key groups toward
these two mental health facilities, decision outcomes
regarding survival can be studied.
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CHAPTER III
METHODS AND PROCEDURES
Historical Review
Research should begin by laying a foundation upon
which theory can build. Michigan mental health decisionmaking resided within a historical framework.

If

decisions are ultimately shaped by their environment,
culture and traditions, as -Boulter (1983) suggests, then
we need to know what those factors were.

In order to

understand the forces that shaped attitudes and actions,
it is first necessary to understand the milieu which
created them or at least, according to Boulter (1983),
shaped them.

Chapter IV will provide that background in

an overview of the Michigan mental health system and the
people who shaped it.
Although cultural, historical and environmental
forces are placed at.the bottom of the policy ladder,
this does not mean to imply they are insignificant.

On

the contrary, critical decisions revolve around crisis
periods.

In Michigan, mental health services were

deeply affected by what has been variously described as
a fiscal downturn, economic recession or depression.
Limited funds impacted on programs, as did such philosophical issues as deinstitutionalization.

While

45
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individuals will argue about which forces drove which
events, it is nevertheless important to outline the
events.
Michigan's mental health experience was in many
ways typical of what occurred in other midwest states.
It also had a unique set of experiences that served to
shape responses and, ultimately, reactions to crises.
Case Studies
In Chapter V the research focus will narrow to
examine in greater detail two mental health facilities
operating within this milieu -- one that was forced to
close during the crisis period, and one that was able to
survive.

A comparative case study approach is used to

gather information within Boulter's (1983) framework in
order to be able to discuss further the propositions, as
well as the framework's applicability to this kind of
public decision-making situation.
Because Boulter (1983) postulates that decisions
are shaped by cultural factors, Table 2 matches eight
Michigan mental health institutions along several
critical environmental dimensions.

Of these eight

programs, six treated the mentally ill, one cared for
geriatric patients, and one worked with developmentally
disabled clients.

Five were classified as urban, two

rural.
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Despite the differences, Table 2 shows that
Lafayette Clinic and Michigan Institute for Mental
Health (MIMH) are the most directly comparable.

Both

were small (budgets of $5.4 and $4.1 million respectively); both were able to draw upon the resources of
metropolitan areas; and both had a stated research and
training orientation, with the apparent advantage of a
unique relationship with a major university.
While these two agencies appear to have much in
common, they varied along one critical dimension.
Michigan Institute for Mental Health closed shortly
after opening; Lafayette Clinic continues to thrive.

It

is this outcome difference within the context of the
environmental similarity that will be explored.
Comparative case studies of Lafayette Clinic and
Michigan Institute for Mental Health will be developed
in Chapter V, in order to delineate key actors and relevant issues at each of the five policy levels.

By

structuring research within the framework of a modified
decision ladder, the process and interplay between
levels becomes clearer.
This in-depth look is less an attempt to explicate
daily program operations than to offer renewed understanding of the various decision layers within the
mental health system.

Direct comparison will clarify
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so
Boulter's (1983) policy ladder.

It will also provide

the basis for rating various actor and interest group
stands that may ultimately have affected survival outcomes.

Finally, by examining the agencies more closely,

we can eliminate issues that by their nature might cause
the decision to close a state hospital to be the only
feasible alternative.
Formal organization charts, operational philosophies and agency environments are used to outline critical issues and responses to them.

Information was

gathered from such sources as annual reports, speeches,
minutes of meetings, correspondence, public hearings,
court depositions, audits, interviews, program policy
reviews, legislative committee hearings and enacted
legislation.
The case study method has been criticized as not
being a specific research technique.

Rather, Williams

(1979, p. 2) calls it a way of collecting data with no
inherent or intrinsic limit to the quality or quantity
of information desired except for that established by
the researcher.

Here the purpose is not merely to

collect information, but to outline specific aspects of
the decision process in an effort to draw conclusions
about our central question: What factors predict
organizational survival?

Case studies lay the faun-
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dation for the next research step in an iterative
process.
The study also serves as a tool for exploring the
operations and functional relationships involved in
political institutions and events.

As mentioned, this

approach is subject to criticism: "Data resources, e.g.,
official documents and newspaper accounts, are superficial or misleading.

Information is often haphazardly

selected and laced with imaginative reconstructions.
Impressionistic and 'inside dopester' evidence, too, may
be employed quite freely"

(Davis and Weinbaum, 1969, p.

4) •

Some of these pitfalls can be successfully avoided
through "parallel verification" of information.

Mul-

tiple methods of gathering data, including interviews
and newspaper content analyses, serve to ameliorate
concerns.
Interviews
Open-ended interviews supplement both the historical background and case studies.

They also serve as a

source of ratings for comparing decision outcomes
between the Lafayette Clinic and MIMH.
Forty-five people key to Michigan's mental health
system were interviewed using questions that focused on
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relationships, budgetary and policy decision-making
processes, awareness and use of the media, knowledge of
institutions and other central issues.

All but five

interviews were taped and transcribed, supplementing
extensive notes.
Initial consideration was given to interviewing
individuals who would be identified in a formal organizational chart as key decision makers, such as Department of Mental Health (DMH) Directors.

Although many of

these people are no longer part of the formal system
(including the Governor, MIMH Director, Lafayette Clinic
Director, Department of Mental Health Directors, Community Mental Health Director and Regional Directors),
many remain accessible.

In addition, there is some

evidence that people outside a system feel more free to
express critical opinions.

The fact that the Michigan

Institute had been closed for four years might also have
served to eliminate inhibitions about expressing
opinions, both positive and negative.
If policy can be considered the result of a series
of activities by concerned and involved constituency
groups, how do we know which groups and which people to
include?

During each interview an attempt was made to

elicit names of other influentials, knowledgeables and
attentives.
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Interviews of those people, in turn, lead to identification of other actors in a "snowball" effect.

Mention

of a name or referral to an influential group served as
an additional resource.
In-depth interviews with a variety of people, both
inside and outside the system, provided a glimpse of the
more informal decision-making process.

Parents, advo-

cacy and other interest groups, both formal and
informal, were also included as valuable sources of
data, since agency attentives could be expected to
provide information from a different perspective than
political leaders.
One group of knowledgeables not often considered in
the interview process is newspaper reporters.

City desk

writers are generally more aware of community trends,
concerns and issues than the average citizen.

They are

interested in, and understand, local events.
Information obtained by interviewing several news
observers served to counterbalance the inherent
subjectivity of other, more involved actors.
By acknowledging the role of the media in the
public information process, an enriched understanding of
Level III impact on decision making can occur.

In

addition, the distinction between the media as an
influential actor and the media as a conduit of public
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opinion can be examined, thereby strengthening the
study's theoretical base.
Although an attempt was made to contact individuals
involved in mental health issues between 1977 and 1981,
research was not confined to that period.

Institutional

history clearly did not begin or end during those years.
With the case study as a guide to interviews and
analyses, other critical events could also be explored.
Through information gained from interviews and case
studies, it became possible to begin mapping lines of
power.

By outlining agency histories, cultural and

crisis events, power holders and brokers emerged.

Actor

affiliations and positions during crises became clearer.
At this stage initial propositions regarding constituency support and the evolution of decision making were
developed.
Newspaper Content Analysis
The newspaper medium's role in this decision-making
process has been mentioned several times.
two types of involvement are proposed.
as a conduit for information.

Specifically,

Newspapers serve

They are communications

devices through which much of our awareness of the
larger world around us is filtered.

Of necessity, there

is selective sorting of material based on what editors
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perceive as interesting to readers.

It is within this

selection process that additional value may be added to
newspaper articles and editorials casually scanned by
the agency attentive.

Awareness of, and interest in,

issues may be shaped by how they are treated by news
writers and editors.
We are less interested in the "how" of newspaper
influence than the "what".

Although Boulter (1983)

considers interest groups, .attentives, the media and
general public as a unit that influences decisions at
Level III, it is suggested that newspapers have a
greater impact by virtue of their dual role.

Therefore,

the decision ladder was modified to differentiate
between the media (Level III) and attentives (Level IV).
As that line between news reporting and investigative journalism becomes finer, it would be expected
that the focus of media attention will set the agenda
for the general public, while pinpointing constituency
concerns for politicians and bureaucrats.
A newspaper content analysis was performed using
articles from the three local papers most likely to
focus attention on occurrences at either the Michigan
Institute or Lafayette Clinic.

Covering an eleven-year

period (1973 through 1983), the unit of analysis was the
hospital, with coding based on the Lansing State
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Journal, Detroit Free Press and Detroit News.

Results

are presented in Chapter VI.
The Lansing State Journal is a Gannett newspaper
serving the MIMH area.
approximately 76,500.

It has a daily circulation of
Other area newspapers, such as

the Charlotte Republican Tribune, are weeklies with
relatively small readership.
Detroit is served by both the Detroit News and
Detroit Free Press.

Because they have larger daily

circulations, 634,000 and 609,000 respectively in 1984,
it was expected that either newspaper would tend to
limit continued coverage of a particular story.

Local

newspapers, unlike major metropolitan dailies, carry
fewer wire service reports and tend to serve as primary
sources of local information but supplementary sources
of national news (M. Lane, personal communication,
Fehruary 17, 1985).

Therefore, stories may have to be

either considerably more volatile or important to
receive Detroit exposure.
Access was gained to both Lansing State Journal and
Detroit Free Press Lansing-based files.

Topic headings

were Mental Disorders, Michigan Government - Department
of Mental Health, Michigan Mental Institutions, and
Michigan Mental Health.

The newspapers filed articles

somewhat differently, including separate categories for
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some institutions which had generated widespread media
interest in 1978.

No separate files on either Lafayette

Clinic or MIMH were available.
In order to assure that as many articles as
possible were included, clipping files maintained by
Michigan State University and the State of Michigan
libraries were also reviewed, using the same general
headings.
The Detroit News Lansing morgue was not accessible.
Therefore, the Bell and Howell Newspaper Index to the
Detroit News (1982) was used as reference.

Each article

generally described under the appropriate category
heading was read and logged.

In addition, The Free

Press Index and Michigan Newspaper Index by Diversified
Business Systems, Inc. of Kalamazoo Michigan (1983)
cover all three papers and were surveyed to assure
completeness of records.
Eight-hundred-and-eighty-seven newspaper articles
spanning the years 1973 through 1983, were read.
Appendix A.)

(See

A total of 149 Lansing State Journal, 207

Detroit Free Press and 531 Detroit News articles were
reviewed.
The number for the Detroit News is almost double
what might be expected, because of a newspaper peculiarity.

The News, unlike other local papers, publishes
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separate editions for its various metropolitan regions
including Detroit, Oakland, West and North.

Front pages

and inside sections, particularly section B which tends
to feature the mental health news of importance, often
vary considerably between editions.

It is not unusual

to find the same article on different days, with
different headlines and somewhat different copy, in
different editions.

For example, on March 23, 1983 page

GD6 of the Detroit-area issue of the News featured a
story headlined "Group Points With Pride Over Its Help
For the Retarded."

Almost two months later (May 22,

1983), essentially the same article appeared in the
northern edition page HN6, "Group Points Proudly to Its
Help For the Retarded."
Clippings from any single issue were included.
There are instances when similar articles in different
editions were counted several times, but, whenever
possible, duplication was eliminated.
Articles concerning either the retarded or mentally
ill were included.

Although initially it may seem

inappropriate to consider articles about the developmentally disabled when research is focused on the
mentally ill, the two types of services are often tied
inextricably together in Michigan's mental health
system.

This is especially true when budget and quality
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of service issues are under discussion.

Both MIMH and

Lafayette Clinic were mentioned in articles about the
retarded.
However, there is a deeper philosophical reason for
considering the entire range of mental health programs.
Our interest lies in community perception of specific
public agencies.

Not only are the mentally retarded and

mentally ill often considered as one in the public mind,
but so are such seemingly diverse problems as plea
bargaining for the "insane" criminal and community
foster home development.

Readers consider this news in

light of its impact upon the neighborhood and
themselves.
Responsibility for mental health service is
perceived to rest within a single system.

The

Department of Mental Health becomes a monolithic
bureaucracy, embodied by the Director, making decisions
affecting thousands of lives, including those most
helpless within institutions and the community.
From a research perspective, the newspaper article
about horticulture therapy for the developmentally
disabled offers as much information about public
attention and interest as that on involuntary sterilization.

Positions, stakes and stands of the general

public, as reflected within and by the media, offer
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important insights.

Each article helps us more clearly

define the environment and culture during that period.
It also presents and clarifies Level III issues.
We must first know where attention is focused; we
must know what Level III constituency concerns are, as
reflected in the newspaper, in order to ascertain where
Level II attention (i.e., the decision maker's) is
turned.

If we wish to predict public policy outcomes,

we must know what inputs are and how perceptions of them
are shaped by the media to form a public view of the
larger mental health system.

We cannot know one without

examining the other.
Document Analysis
A number of data sources regarding mental health
programs and facility issues have already been mentioned.

Most bureaucracies are sustained by a hearty

flow of documentation.

Agency policy manuals, Appro-

priations and Mental Health Committee hearings, DMH
guidelines, archival records, audit reports, Communication Council and patient advocacy group minutes each
offer insights into total systems operation.
Integrating such a diversity of materials into a
larger study can pose problems, especially since many of
the biases attributable to the case study methodology
are also inherent in document analysis.

Nevertheless,
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an attempt was made to consider every source of information in an effort to ground firmly findings in available data.
One method of incorporating such documentation is
to "interview the data" during different time periods,
using the model already established.

Consider 1977, the

year that the Michigan Institute for Mental Health
opened.

Through legislative reports, speeches, inter-

views, news releases and other sources, it is possible
to fill in the outline of Boulter's (1983) decisionmaking ladder for each agency during that year, in order
to better compare the Lafayette Clinic with MIMH.
At a minimum key actors, decision or crises points,
environmental issues and concerns can be identified.
But, even more intriguing, such a format offers the
opportunity to compare 1977 with 1981, the year the
facility closed, at each of the various decision-making
levels.

Chapter VII presents this comparison.

In using the decision ladder framework we are
forced to consider a broad variety of factors that may
impinge upon institutional survival.

What, for

instance, is the role of the legislature in relationship
to other first-order actors?

While it would be far too

complicated to delineate total system dynamics, it
remains possible to draw attention to critical areas of
the framework.
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This process will clarify constituency opinions
regarding each agency at each level, while serving as a
source for developing rating charts of actor positions.
Comparative ratings, in turn, will provide the basis for
analyzing both the decision process and its outcomes.
Document analysis clarifies and expands the interviews by offering additional data on who makes decisions
and how policy is influenced and shaped.
With information gathered from similar agencies, it
should be possible to strengthen the study in the future
by incorporating other facilities that differ in other
ways.

For instance, Alpine Center in Gaylord, a DMH

program for the mentally retarded, was recently closed.
It was a single ownership agency (not affiliated with a
University), which seemed to have considerable community
support.

It was small and served the mentally retarded

in a more isolated area of the state.

It seemed to be

meeting the needs of the Department, the community and
its patients.

Why was it closed when other, less inno-

vative, facilities continue to survive?

Ypsilanti

Regional Psychiatric Center, for instance, is a large,
old-fashioned institution that is perpetually overcrowded.

It has never managed to win accreditation.

In examining the strategies and tactics used by
constituency groups, as well as expressions of intended
effect versus actual outcome, the broader issue of
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public organizational survival will be explored.

It is

hoped that such information will lead to a more comprehensive theory of this relationship and its reliance
upon the media, both as a source of information and as a
political actor.
Summary
A variety of research methods will be utilized to
examine the propositions set forth in Chapter II.

Case

studies supplemented by historical review, open-ended
unstructured interviews, document analysis and newspaper
content analysis should show many of the same types of
issues and concerns extant in the community.

Each

source of information serves to build upon and verify
previous findings in an iterative process which allows
exploration of issues and a clearer definition of
decision makers and constituents who impact on them.
Case studies and open-ended interviews have been
criticized because they can be manipulated, or at least
selectively winnowed, to build a strong case.

Such

problems are of special concern when the theory and
theoretical outcome are clearly outlined.

Check sheets,

cross-verified using archival information, interviews,
and newspaper content analysis, are developed in Chapter
VII as one method of strengthening the study and avoiding such criticism.
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To further narrow the research focus, Table 2
matches 8 Michigan mental health agencies along 15
organizational dimensions.

Michigan Institute for

Mental Health and Lafayette Clinic were found to be the
most directly comparable.
crucial dimension.

Yet, they differed along one

Michigan Institute for Mental Health

closed soon after opening.

Lafayette Clinic continues

to serve mentally ill clients from the Detroit area.
This critical difference provides the foundation for
examining constituency support for the two agencies both
before and after the crisis period.
It is acknowledged that public mental health policy
in Michigan may not be representative of other sectors
and issues.

As a result, findings may have only limited

generalizability.

The purpose, however, is less to

offer definitive theory than to validate the utility of
a particular framework in the public sector.
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CHAPTER IV
ENVIRONMENT, CULTURE AND TRADITION
The Background
Policy decisions are shaped by the milieu in which
they are embedded.

Decisions, particularly in the

public sector, are constrained by a myriad of external
contingencies including resource availability, organizational culture, history, tradition, legal and
legislative mandates.

As was noted in Chapter II, to be

immersed in a system means, at least minimally, to be
responsive to it.
While some might argue that decisions are resultants predictable by the weight of history, or that
external forces can be selectively managed and tuned to
fit organizational needs, Boulter (1983) offers a more
dynamic approach.

Critical historical periods, philo-

sophical trends and environmental factors serve to shape
current policy decisions.
In order to understand the evolution of decisions
in the public mental health sector, we must begin by
examining the influence of 150 years of institutional
history within this larger framework.

(See Chronology,

Appendix B.)
65
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Administrative issues concerning treatment and care
of Michigan's mentally disabled population can generally
be classified in four interrelated areas:
1.

Organization, including coordination of a

unified service system.
2.

Laws and statutes.

3.

Budget, allocated through the legislature and

dependent upon the state's fiscal health and ability to
generate revenue.
4.

Personnel.

With the exception of capital reno-

vations, staffing requires the largest single expenditure of mental health resources.

More than 80 percent

of the operating cost of inpatient care is attributable
to personal staff services.
In addition, personalities of such key actors as
Department of Mental Health Directors, legislators and
other central figures create impacts that ripple
throughout the system.
Much of Michigan's early mental health history is
available as a result of the Michigan Writer's Project,
sponsored in 1941 by the State Administrative Board and
Federal Works Project Administration.

The Mentally Ill

in Michigan traces the first years of what was to become
a comprehensive state-wide system of institutional
services.
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In Michigan, as elsewhere, mental health programs
began as a way of relieving communities and families
from the pressures of coping with essentially uncontrollable and bizarre behavior.

Out of necessity, the

most violently insane were confined to poor houses or
jails.

Often mentally ill persons were intermixed with

incorrigibles, addicts, senile elderly or those with
such medical problems as epilepsy and tuberculosis.
Michigan's first institution was an outgrowth of
increasing urban pressures.

In 1834 a local ordinance

was passed in Wayne County creating a Board of Superintendents for the Poor and converting the "Pest House"
(established in 1832 for cholera victims) into a poorhouse accepting "lunatic persons".
Conditions were barely humane and the concept of
treatment unknown.

Inmates were considered incurable.

Cells and chains confined the most violent in a rude
shelter known as the "crazy house".

In 1841 the facil-

ity received the first person in Michigan adjudged
legally insane.

The Board of Superintendent's 1858

annual report showed 29 insane persons admitted during
the year with 17 remaining, 12 in constant confinement.
One of the first advocates of the mentally ill was
Dorothea Dix of Boston.

Her concern about abuses of

this vulnerable population was a new concept in the
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mid-1800s.

She contended that care of the hopelessly

insane was a public responsibility.

For the first time

mental illness became a public, as opposed to family,
problem.
Largely as a result of Dix's efforts, hospitals
were established in many states, including Michigan.

In

1848, the Michigan Legislature provided for
establishment of a state asylum for the insane.
However, because of the increasing costs of public
programs and a limited tax base, no money was
appropriated.
Institution opponents argued that there were
insufficient numbers of people needing care to warrant
"the expenditure of sums which the state could ill
afford to raise for any purpose" (Michigan Writer's
Project, 1941, p. 4).
Because of this opposition, the Legislature
requested that the Secretary of State survey the population.

The census showed that there were 120 insane in

Michigan -- 24 from birth and ten described as idiotic.
The board of trustees for the proposed institution
estimated one i~sane person for every 1,000 population,
or 426 insane or idiotic persons.
Despite continued budget pressures, inadequate
appropriations and a destructive fire during construction, the Michigan Asylum for the Insane in Kalamazoo
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finally accepted its first patient on April 29, 1859,
eleven years after the enabling legislation.

With an

allowed bed capacity of 400, the facility was soon
overcrowded, limiting admissions to "curable cases"
only.
Like other facilities that followed, the Michigan
Asylum (later to be known as Kalamazoo Regional Psychiatric Hospital) was an independent farm colony operated
by a local board of trustees.

It immediately began a

massive building program that lasted ten years.
The increasing need for space was generally blamed
on growing numbers of insane or defective immigrants
arriving in the United States in the late 1840s and
early 1850s.

Between 1891 and 1924 a series of federal

laws restricting immigrants helped curb the problem,
although language difficulties, ill health, culture
shock and poverty continued to exert pressures on
immigrants and the public system.
In 1873 the legislature appropriated monies for the
Eastern Michigan Asylum (Clinton Valley Center) at
Pontiac.

Five years later the building opened with a

bed capacity of 400. By 1880, almost 1,100 patients were
under care in the two Michigan facilities, with a
waiting list of about 200.
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As a result, the legislature authorized the
Northern Michigan Asylum (Traverse City Regional
Psychiatric Hospital) in 1881, with an appropriation of
$400,000.

In November 1885, .after several delays and

further appropriations, the new facility admitted 445
patients.

The governing board immediately began a

construction program that ended in 1906 with 11 new
patient buildings.
The year 1883 marked the first time thought was
given to segregation of violent criminals and sexual
offenders from the general mental health population.
The concern was two-fold.

Asylums were highly dependent

upon labor performed by "inmates" who tended farms,
cared for herds and performed other necessary duties of
day-to-day operations.

Unknowingly, through work

programs, the way was being paved for more humane
treatment and even some effort at "rehabilitation" of
the mentally ill.

Clearly, however, consensus was that

the criminal needed to be locked up.

Only secondarily

was there a new awareness of the need for different
types of services for different populations.
The Michigan Asylum for Insane Criminals (Ionia
State Hospital) opened in 1885, two years after legislative authorization.

The 100-bed facility immediately

developed a waiting list.
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The first facility for the "feebleminded and
epileptic", now known as Oakdale Regional Center for
Developmental Disabilities, opened in Lapeer in 1895
with a capacity of 200. Within months the waiting list
reached 600.
On November 1, 1895 the Upper Peninsula Asylum for
Insane (Newberry Regional Mental Health Center) opened
in Traverse City.
We can see that state institutions in Michigan were
a response to growing community pressures, the 19th and
20th century creation of a rather curious coalition
comprised of advocates of humanity-toward-all on the one
. hand, and segregationists on the other.

Moved with

compassion and sincerity the "humanists" witnessed the
abuses of society toward the mentally handicapped and
earnestly believed the disabled could obtain better care
and acceptance in self-contained quasi-communities
(institutions) with "their own kind".

These advocates

were motivated by their perception of what was best for
the disabled individual.
The other side of this coalition consisted of
segregationists who wanted the mentally handicapped
removed from the community in the best interest of
society.

Thus, the institutional system was born and

with it a philosophy of life-time care apart from
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society at large.

State hospitals were built to be

self-contained communities, remote from the general
population.

Not only did patients live their lives

within the confines of the hospital grounds, but so did
many of the staff.

It was generally believed that the

local community could not, and would not, provide appropriate care.
Over the years, institutions have typically been
the target of claims that minimal custodial care did not
serve the needs of the populations residing in them.
Reforms and suggestions for improved treatment began to
occur.
According to the Michigan Writer's Project (1941),
Michigan was the first state in the Union to provide
special facilities for instruction of medical students
in treating the mentally ill.

In 1906 the State Psycho-

pathic hospital at the University of Michigan (Ann Arbor
Neuropsychiatric Institute) was established, specializing in research.
In 1906 mechanical restraints were abolished and in
1911 Michigan's legislature changed the name of asylums
to state hospitals.

However, each facility remained an

autonomous state agency with a separate board of trustees and individually negotiated legislative appropriations.
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In 1914 the Michigan Farm Colony for Epileptics was
established in Wahjamega (Caro Regional Center).

While

additional building projects were halted until 1929,
there were 7,448 patients in state institutions with a
rated capacity of 6,254.
These overcrowded conditions were exacerbated by
World War I, and increasing numbers of individuals
"whose sanity had been shaken by wartime and postwar
experiences.

The tempo of social change was further

accelerated by Michigan's rapid development as an
industrial state" (Michigan Department of Mental Health
(MDMH), 1962, p. 11).
Mental health services continued to lag and, in
fact, worsened:
While the state's population mounted and mental
problems multiplied, the number of beds per hundred
thousand of population available in the state
hospitals actually decreased. From 1915 to 1919
only 390 new beds were provided by additions made
at Newberry, Kalamazoo and Pontiac. The state
hospitals in 1920 were 17.5 percent overcrowded,
according to space requirements accepted as most
satisfactory by hospital superintendents the
country over. (p. 12)
Because of increasing concerns regarding treatment
of veterans and the resulting renewal of interest in
mental health issues, three Michigan outpatient clinics
were established in 1916.

In the early 1920's Depart-

ments of Social Service were developed.
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The first State Hospital Commission, an advisory
board, was authorized within the Welfare Department in
1923.

Public Act 151 of 1923 was the most comprehensive

mental health legislation to_ date and was established
to:
revise and consolidate the laws organizing
hospitals for the insane, homes and schools for the
feeble-minded and epileptic, institutions for the
discovery and treatment of mental disorders; to
regulate and provide for the care, management and
use thereof; to provide for the licensing,
visitation and supervision of privately owned
hospitals, homes and institutions for the care and
treatment of such mentally defective persons. (p.
218)
The law carefully laid out terms of voluntary and
involuntary admissions and gave the Hospital Commission
oversight control of all state institutions.

In addi-

tion, it mandated that county Departments of Social
Welfare care for senile persons not found to be psychotic.

However, no funds were appropriated and the

Commission was given no authority to hire staff.
In 1926, total bed capacity was 6,723.
totalled 9,558.

Admissions

In 1928, approximately 213 patients out

of every 100,000 of population were admitted and there
was a waiting list of 2,050.

In 1929, the seven admit-

ting facilities provided 190 beds per 100,000 in population.

There were 10,365 patients in facilities

designed for 6,749.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

75

With the onset of the Depression, overcrowding
became even more severe:
The story of additions to the state hospital system
had up to this time never been one of planning and
preparing against need~.each step was taken as a
compulsory relief of conditions that had been
neglected until they appalled an indifferent public
and compelled action from legislators inclined to
ignore a group made up of persons who were neither
taxpayers or voters.
(Michigan Department of
Mental Health, 1962, p. 13)
In 1929 the Hartmann Act provided $19,517,200 for
hospital construction for the next four years.

In 1931

the program was reviewed and funds subsequently cut.
Between 1915 and 1932 Michigan's population rose by
82 percent while state hospital capacity increased 42
percent.

When the Hartmann Act was repealed in 1933,

construction stopped.
There was no lack of critics, even within the
system.

"The first state-wide program launched by

Michigan had not only failed to meet the new emergencies
occasioned by the economic crisis but also fell short of
meeting needs which had existed for thirty-five years"
(Michigan Department of Mental Health, 1962, p. 14).
Two new facilities were opened in 1931 and 1935,
Ypsilanti State Hospital (Ypsilanti Regional Psychiatric
Hospital) and Coldwater State Home and Training School
(Coldwater Regional Center for Developmental
Disabilities).
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By 1937, the number of people in state hospitals
had risen to 14,842 while capacity remained at the 1934
figure of 8,885. Because of these conditions, Public Act
104 of 1937 separated the State Hospital Commission from
the State Welfare Department.

A Central Office,

consisting of a director and clerical staff, was
established with authority for operating the state
hospitals.
The 1930's saw the beginning of a network of community clinics, partially in response to this renewed
emphasis on mental health programs.

There was growing

recognition of the need to serve friends and neighbors
coping with mounting economic pressures.

But emphasis

and funds remained focused on state institutions.
With the assistance of Federal Public Works Administration grants in 1938, 11.3 million dollars were made
available for hospital construction.

Total numbers of

patients in either public or private facilities under
the auspices of the Hospital Commission increased to
24,153 or a ratio of 474 for each 100,000 persons in the
state's population.

Included were psychotics, feeble-

minded, epileptics, alcoholics, drug addicts,
mal-adjusted and personality disorders.

The number of

people classified as psychotic and epileptic in Michigan's 8 state hospitals totaled 16,012 (2,768
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epileptic).
515.

Private institutions accounted for another

Overcrowding exceeded 21.5 percent.
The next major administrative change occurred when

Public Act 271 of 1945 abolished the State Hospital
Commission.

Instead, a Department of Mental Health

(DMH) was created and an advisory commission, appointed
by the Governor, established within the department.

The

Commission and Governor jointly appointed the Director
of Mental Health for a six-year term, "who shall be the
chief executive officer of the department and shall
administer the policies, rules and regulations as
established by the commission."

The Director had to be

a physician with ten years of psychiatric experience.
He, in turn, appointed state hospital superintendents
who were required to be physicians with three years of
experience.
Among the new duties mandated to the Department was
authority to undertake and encourage studies of the
causes, nature and methods of care, treatment, and
prevention of mental illness, mental deficiency and
epilepsy; and to develop and conduct a state-wide mental
hygiene program with emphasis on promoting mental health
and preventing mental illness, mental deficiency and
epilepsy.

The Department was also given responsibility

for licensing private hospitals for the mentally ill.
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Michigan proved to be at the forefront of a growing
national movement, and Central Office staff expanded
dramatically.

In 1946, partially as a result of

increasing numbers of mental health issues arising out
of World War II, the

u.s.

Congress passed the National

Mental Health Act and offered federal assistance in
supporting community services, research, and training of
mental health professionals.

For the first time, mental

illness was acknowledged as a national public problem.
Michigan was one of the first states to recognize
the importance of providing psychiatric clinic
facilities:
It is evident that there is no problem with respect
to the eagerness with which these facilities have
been accepted •••• About one-quarter of all cases
for which help was sought came from the parents,
and another quarter from the schools. The remaining cases came from sources which indicate a widespread knowledge of the existence of the clinics
and a well-distributed body of people willing to
make use of their facilities. (Englisher, Lund, &
Ricketts, 1956, p. 33)
Even with increasing community support, Michigan
found itself chronically short of hospital beds for the
mentally ill.

Approximately one person out of every 180

was receiving some form of care from the department
either in an institution, on extramural care, or under
the auspices of a mental health clinic.

Yet, according

to a report for Senator Elmer A. Porter, Chairman of the
Senate Appropriations Committee in 1953, there were

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

79

exactly twice as many patients per 1,000 occupying beds
in public mental hospitals in New York as in Michigan.
In 1950, DMH Director Charles Wagg presented the
legislature with a comprehensive plan for

expandi~g

facilities by more than 14,000 beds during the next ten
years.

Half the funds would be obtained through a $60

million bond issue.
As the inpatient population continued to rise
throughout the fifties, physical plants were improved
and buildings added at existing facilities to meet what
appeared to be a never-ending need.

Despite continued

construction, hospitals were chronically overcrowded and
understaffed.
Northville State Hospital (Northville Regional
Psychiatric Hospital) was the first institution to be
financed by the bond issue.

It opened in 1952 with

2,400 beds.
Between 1950 and 1955 total expenditures for the
mentally ill in Michigan doubled.

Expenditures per

patient, per year, were $1,271 in 1953, above average
for the United States.

In 1954, county payments toward

the cost of hospital programs added more than $3
million, with $2.25 million collected from patients or
relatives.

In 1955 a total of $58 million was spent for

services for Michigan patients, with approximately 50
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percent of residents discharged within a year of
admission.

Significantly, only about 13 percent of

total admissions were voluntary.
Another set of statistics, however, tell a
different type of story.

Almost 21 percent of all

patients in state hospitals on June 30, 1954 had spent
20 years or more in state institutions and 64 percent,
or about 12,800 patients, had spent five or more years
in a state hospital.
The Michigan Legislature met twice in extra
sessions to authorize contractual hospitalization space
in temporary facilities, including the Army Station
Hospital at Fort Custer.
Nationwide, state hospital populations reached
their peak in 1955.

Approximately 559,000 people were

institutionalized, occupying half of all hospital beds
in the United States.

At that time the

u.s.

Congress

passed the Mental Health Study Act which formed a Joint
Commission on Mental Illness and Health to examine the
issues of institutional care.
1955 was an important year in other ways for services to the mentally ill.

Psychotropic medications

were introduced for the first time on a large scale.
With increasing use of medications the need for physical
restraint and seclusion dropped.

These advances were
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closely followed by a variety of new programs which
encouraged community outreach.

Such federal programs as

Social Security provided the financial assistance:
The arrangement in mind is that which consists of
encouraging, by technical assistance and money, the
creation of facilities for out-patient clinics and
acute in-patient care for mental illness in the
general hospital •••• It (the small psychiatric
clinic) is a place that he (the patient) may know
about, he may have passed by several times a week
on his way to work, he may even know some of the
doctors who practice there. It is not a big,
sprawling, distant and strange place that he is
sent to. He is in an environment which is much
more familiar to him and therefore less forbidding.
(Englisher, et al., 1956, p. 34)
In response to these initiatives, Lafayette Clinic
was established in Detroit as a research and training
facility, jointly operated by the Department of Mental
Health and Wayne State University.

Admissions and

length of stay in state hospitals began a gradual,
steady decline.
In 1956, Central Office staff included 39 people.
Four were assigned to the research section.

Total

appropriations for Central Office functions were approximately $250,000.
That same year the legislature saw completion of
the Hawthorn Center, Northville and appropriated funds
for the Plymouth State Home and Training School, Northville (Plymouth Center for Human Development).
officially opened in 1960 with 1,000 beds.

Plymouth

A smaller
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unit, the Alpine Regional Center for Developmental
Disabilities, Gaylord opened in 1960 as part of the
state-wide planning process.
However, even in 1956 it was recognized thatcone
implication of improved and increasingly successful
treatment programs was a change in the distribution of
the burden of costs from the state to the county:
As the number of long-term patients in state
hospitals decreases and an accelerated discharge
program based on effective treatment techniques
succeeds in reducing the average length of hospital
stay, the financial costs will begin to shift more
and more to the county level. Since the type of
care needed to effect such a change in the length
of hospitalization is known and expected to be more
expensive than a custodial care program, it must
inevitably also push the per diem costs higher.
(Englisher, et al., 1956, p. 32)
During 1956 there were 17 children's and 5 adult
clinics, serving 8,000 persons.

The cost to the state

was approximately a million dollars, half contributed by
communities.

In addition, almost 20,000 people were

being served in 6 large hospitals, all but 2 located in
the lower part of the state, as defined by an east-west
line through Lansing, Michigan.

One hospital was in the

Upper Peninsula.
A report to the head of the Senate Appropriations
Committee ends with the following comment:
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The State of Michigan ranks rather low among states
••• in its efforts and success in preventing and
treating mental illness. It is only in the expenditures per patient that Michigan ranks near the
top, a position that would seem to indicate the
presence of greater than average interest in the
problems of mental illness and a willingness to ·
match that interest with expenditures. At the same
time, it is evident that, in terms of the number of
persons served as measured by admissions and discharges, in proportion to patient population and
general population, the record is poor.
This situation is attributable in part to less
than fully satisfactory staff-patient ratios.
Remedial action must include as a further major
feature a greater degree of technical, professional, and administrative direction at the state
level. Without such direction the hospitals will
continue to be relatively autonomous and
independent in character. (Englisher, et al., 1956,
p. 83)
Between 1948 and 1958 admissions to state hospitals increased by 73 percent.

From 1950 to 1962 about

7,000 additional beds were added to state hospitals,
bringing total capacity to more than 35,000.

With the

bond issue and other legislative appropriations for
capital outlay, $96 million was allocated for construetion, renovation and remodeling.

The total departmental

budget for 1961-62 (excluding capital outlay) was $76
million, compared to $36.4 million for fiscal year
1950-51.

By 1972-73 that figure rose to $218.9 million.

"One of the big issues I recognized personally,"
stated Joe Snyder (personal communication, February 4,
1985) a Michigan Representative for 12 years and Senator
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for 4, "was the concept in the old days of institutionalization for any reason whatsoever."

He went on to

say:
It was the old "out of sight, out of mind" idea.
That way the community could get out from under the
financial burden of caring for these people. When
these people were in the communities you had to
take care of them. The institutions were a great
alternative because then you could forget about
them. There were an awful lot of people in
institutions who didn't belong there.
In 1960 members of the Joint Commission on Mental
Illness and Health released the findings of their sixyear study.

They called for greater utilization of

community programs in response to humanitarian, clinical
and economic concerns.

President John F. Kennedy accep-

ted the mandate and in a February 1963 speech before the
United States Congress, urged a more comprehensive,
community-based approach to care and treatment of the
mentally disabled.
Kennedy's plan was to divide the country into
catchment areas and establish, with federal funds, a
national network of community mental health centers.
The U.S. Congress responded by passing the Mental
Retardation Facilities and Community Mental Health
Centers Construction Act of 1963 (P.L. 88-164) which
created a funding mechanism for such centers.
But the title of the Act ultimately proved more
comprehensive than the funding. "I think the one thing I
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worried about," added former DMH Director William A.
Anderson, M.D.

(personal communication, January 29,

1985), "and there's some evidence that it did happen,
was that the Feds really put out seed money.

They made

these grants and got a lot of things started and they
never had any intention, probably never had the ability,
to fund them permanently."
In the 1960's the number of residents in mental
hospitals and state schools began a precipitous drop as
more and more people were placed in alternative community homes and programs.
New medications, increasing awareness of available
sources of funds for patients (including Social Security, Veterans Administration, Railroad Retirement,
Supplemental Security Income and Aid to the Disabled),
and the diversion of funds from state to community
programs left inordinate numbers of excess hospital beds
classified for long-term care.
Available services were not suited to meet the
needs of this changing population.

Short-term intensive

treatment required improved levels of psychiatric care
and increased sophistication in medical and behavioral
treatment.

It also signalled a move away from the

traditional medical model and toward greater reliance on
mental health practitioners and counselors.
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Ironically, as more and more of the burden of care
was being accepted as a public mandate, responsibility
was being shifted back to the local level.
Michigan P.A. 54 of 1963 provided the mechanism for
concerted development of community mental health programs.

The law allowed the Department of Mental Health

to match local funds for city or county units to operate
mental health services on a 75% state, 25% local basis.
Outpatient diagnosis, treatment, consultation,
development of programs for prevention and education in
cooperation with other public health groups would become
available, in addition to local inpatient services.
However, no program monies were appropriated.

A year

later (FY 1964-65) $1.5 million was appropriated for the
five established boards which met funding guidelines.
In that same year, the Michigan Department of
Mental Health applied for, and was granted, National
Institute of Mental Health funds for comprehensive
mental health planning.

Two reports were produced in

collaboration with the Department of Health:

Michigan

State Plan for Construction of Community Mental Health
Facilities, 1965-1966 and The Development of a
Comprehensive Mental Health Program in Michigan.
Public Law 89-105 of 1965 provided matching funds
for initial staffing of mental health centers.

Medicaid
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and Medicare programs offered another way to shift the
burden of costs away from the state and on to the federal government by moving people out of state hospitals.
By 1973 twenty-two communities in Michigan had received
more than $22 million in federal funds.
Nationwide between 1963 and 1976, census in state
hospitals dropped from 504,000 to 216,000.

It is argued

that the majority of these patients were simply moved to
general hospital beds or in'to nursing homes (Merwin
o~hberg,

1983, p. 102).

&

The federal government would

pay, through the Medicaid program, for patients in
nursing homes but not for those in noninstitutionalized
community placements.
Administratively, Michigan's Executive Organization
Act of 1965, which implemented the Constitution of 1963,
retained the Department of Mental Health without change.
A 1970 amendment reinstated the State Advisory Council
on Mental Health Services.
In 1966 the Michigan Society for Mental Health
issued its second Directory of Michigan's Psychiatric
Services.

The study reported significant growth in

public and private services for the mentally handicapped.

In 1960, when the first directory was

published, 61 agencies were listed.

In 1966, 111

agencies were listed, providing 185 different services.
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According to Norman W. Bully, President, and Harold G.
Webster, Executive Director, perhaps most encouraging
was the fact that 22 community general hospitals offered
psychiatric services.

"In 1960 this type of service was

so little developed outside the metropolitan Detroit
area that we did not include it in the directory"
(Michigan Society for Mental Health, 1966, p. i).
Crises
We have already defined four areas of environmental
concern that ultimately impacted on Michigan's mental
health system and which help us to delineate the crisis
period, a critical component of Boulter's (1983) framework.

Briefly these areas are:
1.

Organization.

The establishment of parallel

public service systems -- state institutions and
community mental health -- served to intensify the
struggle over definitions of power and authority.

It

also highlighted fiscal issues and perceptions of
resource scarcity.
2.

Laws and Statutes.

We have looked at a few of

the laws, both Federal and State, that pertained to such
philosophical issues as deinstitutionalization and the
appropriate role for community mental health boards.
These public acts continued to make an impact throughout
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the 1970's and 1980's.

In addition, new laws created

their own repercussions.
3.

Budget.

It has been stated that when the rest

of the country experiences recession, Michigan goes into
depression.

Governor William Milliken said in his 1981

State of the State message, "The national economy, with
seemingly chronic double-digit inflation and a simultaneous recession, has caught the proverbial severe
economic cold.

result~

As a

Michigan, as has been the

case through so much of our history, has caught economic
pneumonia."
Fiscal crises and continuous budget reductions
exacerbated struggles already occurring in the mental
health field.

It has been argued that a budget deficit

was the single crisis that motivated mental health
decisions.

That explanation remains too simplistic.

we

will explore, nevertheless, how budget problems were
intimately involved with both organizational and
personnel issues.
4. Personnel.

Michigan leaders impacted on the

mental health system.

The Governor and appointed heads

of Executive Offices in their ongoing relationships with
legislators, constituents and each other provide an
interesting piece of the puzzle.
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Crisis is most often defined by the people who live
through it.

Therefore, it is both more meaningful and

insightful to look at these issues through the experiences and opinions of participants.

At the same time,

in examining the interplay of these four factors on
decision making in Michigan, we will continue to lay the
groundwork for a closer look at two specific facilities.
Organization
For a time, scholarly literature and the media
reported that the move from institutions to communitybased facilities was a positive, more humane approach to
long-term care for the severely disabled.

In the late

1970's reports began to emerge which questioned whether
the pendulum might have swung too far in the direction
of community care (Halpern, Sackett, Binner & Kurtz,
1980).
New York and California were the first to experiment with community placement.

Massive deinstitution-

alization programs offered true horror stories of
insufficient preplanning and inadequate service
integration (Herman, 1979).

Some observers felt that

deinstitutionalization or community placement was not a
bad idea, just poorly executed (Etzioni, 1975).
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Many of these same problems occurred in Michigan.
Little concern for coordinating local and state mental
health services was evidenced by DMH decision makers.
As community mental health centers began to establish
their program components, much of this work occurred
independently of state hospital efforts (Johnson, 1979).
The focus was on funding, and local governments faced
one budget crisis after another.
Johnson (1979), who was herself involved in
treating Michigan's mentally ill population, would later
add:
This lack of coordinated planning for the total
provision of service contributed greatly to
widening the gap between the two types of agencies
and preventing the critical linkage essential for
continuity of patient care. This mistake would
later prove to be catastrophic as the concept of
deinstitutionalization took shape and eventually
prevailed as the new mental health principle.
(p. 4)
Other Michigan practitioners supported this view:
One of the primary failures of the deinstitutionalization movement has been that it did not
designate a point of authority and ultimate
responsibility for the coordination of services to
this population. Today, the needs of most deinstitutionalized and uninstitutionalized people are not
being met in the communities. (Merwin & Ochberg,
1983, p. 105)
Former DMH Director, Frank Ochberg, M.D. (personal
communication, January 17, 1985) calls this population
in continued need the "unserved under-served."
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From July 1967 to May 1969, psychiatric inpatient
numbers continued to decline, from 14,505 to 12,667.
Admissions and discharges both increased, with discharges exceeding admissions for the first time in 1968.
Expressed as a function of population, bed utilization
fell from 169/100,000 to 147/100,000, compared to a rate
of 251/100,000 in 1957.

Staffing was close to the

national average of one employee for every 1.9 patients.
Stuart Lindzey (personal communication, February
21, 1985}, Emergency Services Supervisor for a local
mental health board, saw community services forced to
change focus.

Instead of providing outpatient programs

for a broad range of community members, resources were
redirected to "maintaining, stabilizing and housing the
recovered or recovering person who was being
deinstitutionalized."
In 1968, DMH Director Anderson (1969} presented
Governor William Milliken with recommendations for a
major legislative program to study and extensively
rewrite Michigan's mental health laws.

Existing law was

archaic, a complex patchwork of amendments and statutory
requirements.

Four major departmental goals were

identified:
1.

To define state-wide clusters of services,

including projection of program requirements from
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demographic data in order to apply uniform standards in
treatment, personnel and equipment.
2.

To improve data collection and processing.

Little provision had been made for internal inspection
and audits, "and the Director is in the position of
having totally inadequate sources of information"
(Anderson, 1969, p. 9).
3.

To reorganize administrative services.

4.

To modernize statutes and rules affecting the

Department in order to bring commitment laws into
conformity with existing theory; to provide better
coordination between state and local programs; and to
develop a financial structure which supports program
objectives.
Anderson's (1969) concerns were that:
We are working with a system, built up over several
decades, in which there are at least seven kinds of
mental health regions or districts into which the
state is divided, each overlapping the others.
Each of the major programs (mentally ill, mentally
retarded and community services) is separately
administered through this maze of districts and the
first point of convergence is the Director of the
Department. (p. 9)
The Central Office of the Department of Mental
Health was partially or totally responsible for 6
consultation centers, 7 state-local clinics, 11 residential facilities, 57 day training centers, 4 adult
activity centers, and 503 family care homes throughout
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the state.

In addition, there were 18 institutions and

33 community mental health boards.
The Governor appointed a Mental Health Program and
Statute Review Commission in May, 1969.
In that year, expenditures for mental health as a
fraction of total state expenditures were declining.
But, according to Anderson (1969):
In absolute terms there have been consistent gains
measured both in dollars and personnel ratios. The
question is how much of this gain reaches the ward
level in state hospitals where, except for a few
islands of excellence, standards are far too low.
Much of the new money goes into clinic activities,
Act 54 (community mental health board) placement
programs, new programs for children and employee
benefits. (p. 14)
A year later, and seven years after the federal
legislation, deinstitutionalization became a DMH program
goal under Director E. Gordon Yudashkin, M.D.

This

formed the basis for systematic changes in mental health
care delivery and, more significantly, reordered the
thinking of relevant actors regarding how services
should be provided and by whom.
According to one Michigan Legislative Fiscal
Analyst, it "was a very haphazard approach, not terribly
responsible.

A lot of people were dumped out of

institutions and into the street and suffered a great
deal."

His criticisms focused primarily on the lack of

planning within the Department:

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

95

There wasn't the community support system, and
there wasn't a lot of very good resources, even
government resources. But, the time was ready •
••• Federal monies had become available and
psychotropic drugs were available, and these things
made it more "doable" to achieve that transition.
There were no licensing laws in effect at that time
for adult foster care. ·We weren't really ready
with after care and community based services to
deinstitutionalize people. So a lot was done
haphazardly and to the detriment of people.
"There were some good people in there who did some
of the planning work," added a project director for
Governor Milliken's Human Services Cabinet, "but when I
got there it just seems as if planning never got carried
through too many times:"
There was no uniform consensus that planning has a
role in the overall function •••• I think in part
that's because of the history of the Department,
the history being that the facilities were always
on their own. And I think the Department's still
got a very hard time breaking away from where
everybody does their own thing, even to this day.
State fund appropriations for establishment of
mental health boards went from approximately $7 million
in 1967-68 to more than $14 million in 1969-70.

It was

the Department's position that all budgeted services
would be considered part of an integrated whole, subject
to state-wide priorities.

However, the community mental

health boards, according to one Director, remained
concerned: "There is a difference between community
placement programs, putting clients in the community,
and the willingness to transfer both the budget and
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authority as well as the planning function to the local
level for these services."
A Mental Health Program Budget Analyst for the
Department of Management and Budget (DMB) during the
past ten years, found that while it appeared communities
were spending adequate funds for the mentally ill, "They
were simply going for community mental health services
for individuals needing crisis counseling, outpatient
counseling ••• There was an.unwillingness on the part of
the community mental health boards to serve the more
severely impaired."

This tendency was encouraged by the

fact that "you can deliver outpatient services out of
any hole in the wall, but if you're going to have day
treatment programs and residential programs you have to
get involved in some kind of capital outlay."
The Clinton-Eaton-Ingham Community Mental Health
board, for instance, was primarily funded by a federal
grant.

The federal concept remained

11

more of a broad-

based outpatient, consultation, education, kind of
model" (B. Allen, personal communication, February 21,
1985).
Throughout this difficult period, Governor Milliken
remained loyal to the concept of deinstitutionalization,
according to his staff:

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

!

97

He was firm all along that community placement,
having people in the community, was a much better
method of care. He had enough political savvy so
he didn't use it to kill himself politically. But,
he never waivered •••• The administration itself had
enough savvy to make sure that it got enough
positive publicities through the press to offset
any negatives that may be created by a few groups.
Laws And Statutes
In 1972 the Mental Health Review Commission
submitted to the Governor an integrated mental health
code which would recognize patient rights, tighten
admission restrictions and firmly establish community
managed programs.
Passage of Michigan's Mandatory Special Education
Law in 1973, further diffused state service responsibility by affirming a person's right to a public education until the age of 26.

This meant that even the most

severely mentally retarded individual had the right to
receive schooling from the Department of Education.

As

a result, authority for day care centers for the developmentally disabled was transferred.
Sharon Miller (personal communication, March 19,
1985), Director of the Monroe County Community Mental
Health Service Board, saw services for the
developmentally disabled and mentally ill begin to
diverge because of differences in advocacy regarding
education:
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The Associations for Retarded Children were very
adamant that as many as possible of their
population be served outside the facility •••• For
the mentally ill, however, there was the insistence
that educational services be part of milieu
therapy. This meant that education was integrated
into the total institutional program •••• I can say
without much hesitancy that that difference has
been a primary contributor to slowing down the
development of community mental health services,
particularly for the mentally ill population.
Given the increasing visibility of the mentally
disabled in local communities, DMH Director E. Gordon
Yudashkin found himself surrounded by controversy.

His

approach, according to one legislator, was confrontational:

"I didn't like Yudashkin's methods, but I

appreciated his results.

He shoved patients out into

the community, perhaps in a deliberate policy with the
knowledge that once they were out there people would pay
attention."
Many of Yudashkin's contemporaries felt that his
resignation carne as a result of increasing legislative
opposition to deinstitutionalization and community
placement movements.

Some of his most vehement oppon-

ents were legislators in southeastern Michigan districts
where state institutions remained large employers.

At

the same time, there were growing citizen complaints
about ex-patients creating ghetto communities in down
town Detroit -- what experts would call institutions
without walls.
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One gubernatorial aide summarized the program by
saying, "Probably, when all was said and done, they (the
mentally ill) would have been far better off remaining
in an institution than surrounded by people who were
equally disturbed but on busy streets with no programs,
no after care and no monitoring ...
The final blow was struck by the courts, which
declared Michigan's involuntary commitment laws illegal.
At a minimum this meant that the state would have to
release all involuntary clients or face legal action.
While there was tacit agreement that the legislature
would immediately pass a comprehensive Mental Health
code to respond to this crisis, increasing pressures
forced Yudashkin to resign.
Governor Milliken appointed an Executive Search
Committee to recommend a new Director, chaired by Dr.
Donald Smith, a pediatrician.

11

Unfortunately, 11 said

Governor Milliken's Special Assistant for Human
Services,

11

the outcome of the committee was the

recommendation that Smith was the best man for the job •
••• At least in the first six months there was a lot of
pressure from advocacy groups to get action from the
Department of Mental Health and a lot of concern about
Smith's appointment ...
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The State of Michigan legislature enacted the new
Mantal Health Code, Public Act 258 in 1974, two months
after Smith's appointment.

Admissions chapters 4, 5 and

8 took effect immediately.

This comprehensive legisla-

tion embodied much of the contemporary thinking about
treatment and strengthened standards of care for
mentally ill and developmentally disabled individuals.
The code gives the Michigan Department of Mental
Health statutory responsibility for public mental health
services.
1.

The Department is directed to:
Provide care, treatment, and rehabilitation for

seriously mentally handicapped individuals by promoting
and maintaining a system of community mental health
services throughout the state.
2.

Shift the primary responsibility for direct

delivery of public mental health programs from the state
to the county whenever the county demonstrates willingness and the capability to provide such services.
Commenting on the new law, the DMH Director of the
Office of Legislative Liaison, said:
Without question that brought in a lot of new
direction, established very concretely the
community mental health board system, gave
authority to the Department to develop contracts
and to ensure continuity of care in the community
as well .••• I think it caught the Department by
surprise, frankly.
They had three months to
implement a major, totally new codification of
mental health statute and they were really caught
by surprise.
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While statutory responsibility for public mental
health rested within the Department, statute also provided that county boards of commissioners determine
applicable county procedures and regulations.

According

to Johnson (1979) this signalled additional problems for
Michigan's mental health system:
The Department of Mental Health has responsibility
for the service delivery and the funding, but cannot regulate (through policy and procedure) the
implementation of that authority unless the county
governing board is also in agreement.
It is difficult to believe that the legislature intended to
delegate responsibility to the Department without
commensurate authority. (p. 6)
But, Milliken's special assistant felt that,
although there was a service component to the code;
Chapters 4 and 5 in particular:
implemented what was already a court edict, which
was that institutions were warehouses, that the
inmates who were there on an involuntary basis were
inappropriately placed there.
And so the Mental
Health Code, even though there was a lot of political hue and cry about it and it was often the
scapegoat for all the problems to come in the '70s,
the Mental Health Code was really not much more
than the implementation of what courts had already
decided was the law of the land, not just in Michigan but every place else.
One Michigan Legislative Research Analyst, agrees
with that assessment:
The Mental Health Code was a very ambitious
undertaking. Unfortunately, it had to be kind of
rushed through the legislature. They took their
time writing it, but ordinarily it would have been
quite a lengthy legislative process to adopt it.
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But, because the court said, "Look, if you get this
done in a hurry we won't tell you you can't commit
anyone," the courts put pressure on the legislature
because they felt our existing laws were
unconstitutional.
As a result, she added, no one accurately estimated the cost of properly implementing the code.
The legislature continued its involvement in mental
health issues.

In addition to passing Michigan's first

Adult Foster Care Licensing Act in 1974, a series of
zoning acts in 1976, "really clearly spelled out the
fact that people had the right to live in the community
and that you do not need a Special Use Permit for homes
if there are six or less individuals," according to
State Representative Debbie Stabenow (personal
communication, February 20, 1985), Chair of the House
Mental Health Committee.
Budget
At the same time, the State was beginning to feel
the first rumblings of recession.

In order to comply

with the constitutional requirement that the budget be
balanced, Gerald Miller, State Budget Director, resorted
to "creative financing".

The 1975-76 Fiscal Year was

extended to include a total of 15 months.

The Fiscal

Year began on June 30, 1975 and ended on September 30,
1976.
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It was clear that Gerald Miller's hold on Michigan's budget was a strong one, according to a Milliken
staff member:
What happened in the '70s was that DMB became a
budget bureaucracy •••• What happened starting about
'74-'75, which I think was a catastrophe, was that
budget staff within DMB stayed on year after year
doing the same programmatic budgets. After about
three years what happened was that, both good and
bad alike, the analysts thought they controlled the
programmatic budgets of the Department •••• The
Department Directors would go through the perfunctory exercise of saying, "Dr. Miller's wrong when
he says this program can be cut back by $10 million." But leaving t~e meeting Dr. Miller would
whisper in the Governor's ear and the deal would be
cut.
Another change that would profoundly effect Michigan's mental health budget and, therefore, program mix
had its roots in the 1973 Social Security Act which
established funds for patients in Intermediate Care
Facilities for the Mentally Retarded (AIS-MR).
The final regulations went into effect on June 3,
1977. But, according to Ben Censoni (personal communication, March 4, 1985), DMH Director of the Office of
Community Residential Services:
We actually began to get into the program in 1975 •
••• The regulations are very institutional- based,
they really apply to state institutions. We accumulate a bill of charges for people who qualify who
live in buildings of institutions that qualify and
we bill Medicaid through the Medicaid system of DSS
and are reimbursed for those services. It's just
like the Medicaid system, we are the provider.
In 1976, during its first year of eligibility, the
Michigan Department of Mental Health collected $80
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million for services to the developmentally disabled
through the ICF-MR program.
There was some legitimate concern that this sudden
influx of funds would create a disincentive for placing
the mentally retarded in the community.

"We argued, as

some other states did finally successfully, that regulations did not preclude small community homes that were
not on campus but rather on scattered sites throughout
the communities.

And that's what we call AIS-MR, Alter-

native Intermediate Services for the Mentally Retarded"
(B. Censoni, personal communication, March 4, 1985).
Both the Mental Health Code and the ICF-t-lR program
necessitated rapid system changes with little forewarning.

Their implementation was symptomatic of a

recurring inability on the part of providers, primarily
the Department of Mental Health, to develop and implement plans.

One DMH program director commented: "To say

that we ever had the luxury of saying,

'Here's where we

want to head'; 'Here's what we want to do';

'Here's how

we're going to get there' ••.• It was just not in the
cards.

Somebody suddenly says, everything you're doing

is illegal.

So you've got to do something else."

In 1976 the Michigan deinstitutionalization program
was still under fire.

"It should come as no great

surprise," a Detroit Free Press editorial stated, "that
the Joint Legislative Committee that studied community
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placement in Michigan found the program marred by confusion and lack of fundin3, and more concerned
cost-aavin3 than patient welfare"

~ith

("Study Paints, ••• "

1976).
~he

Executive Office found itself embroiled in a

battle over provision of services:
There was a ton of trauma, obviously, between the
co1nmunities \'lho felt they were being under funded,
the Department which felt a rather hurried demand
by state government to empty the institutions
without adequate placement mechanisms available,
and tension between OtiS and Mental Healch over
who's responsible for after care.
Nor

~1/as

Dr. Smith seen as much of an advocate for

the Departmental budget by Milliken aides:
Dr. Miller found out early that he could severely
cut the DMH budget and when he'd present that to
the Governor, Smith would say, "~ell, I can live
with that." I don't know whether he thought he
could gain points by tryin3 to worK with what waH
offered or w·hat.
But sometimes Dr. L~.1iller would
offer tremenaous cutbac~s.
The DMB Director of the Office of Legislative
Liaison seconded that opinion, "Under Gover nor
Gerry Miller was the driving force.

~-lill

i ken,

And I know back

then, Gerry C.liller used to make some arbitrary decisions
that this should die or this should stay and that sort
of tning.

We always had some problems with that."

What many people didn't understand, according to
r~iiller

(personal communication, ivlarch 19, 19US), was

that "Milliken's budget function was his coordination
function.

He expected the Budget·oirector to

ma~e
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integrative decisions •••• Milliken couldn't look at
every line item.

He had to depend on others that the

budget all fit together and that services were thereby
coordinated."
In partial answer to its critics, systematic
regionalization of the mental health system was implemented according to a 1976 DMH reorganization plan. The
state was divided into six geographic areas or regions,
each managed by a mental

he~lth

deputy director with

line authority over state hospital superintendents.

Joe

Farrell (personal communication, February 11, 1985), DMH
Chief Deputy was appointed Southeastern Regional Director:

"The regions were the mechanism to facilitate the

transition from a dual system where people were admitted
either to a facility or were accepted in the community."
Sharon Miller (personal communication, March 19,
1985), DMH Planning Coordinator, saw the move as a way
"to place high ranking, authoritative departmental
people out in the regions and thereby place authority
out in the fields.

The regional offices would serve the

Department by forcing integration of services at the
community level, at least in planning ...
At the same time the Department set forth three
primary goals as outlined by the Michigan Mental Health
code.

They are:
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condition~

1.

Treatment appropriate to

2.

Unific'ation and integration of mental health

services~

3.

and
Quality patient care.

With this impetus, Department of Mental Health
staff were encouraged to establish community-based
inpatient treatment centers to complement local services.

The first such agency was the natural outgrowth

of a plan to transfer Ionia. Riverside Center to the
Department of Corrections for a prison.

The Ionia

institution had originally been built to handle a large
forensic population and the move would alleviate serious
overcrowding in the system.

It would also pave the way

for development of a small mental health program in its
place.

Michigan Institute for Mental Health, originally

known as the New Riverside Treatment Center, opened in
1977 near Lansing with facilities for 100 acutely
mentally ill clients.
The Governor's Committee on Unification of the Public Mental Health System called for a renewed commitment
to an integrated state-wide program during its October,
1979 meeting.

The concern was that every client be

served by a single agency which would accept responsibility for assuring that all needs basic to that
person's welfare and development were met.

The organi-
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zation would be supported by interagency agreements and
other coordinating mechanisms.
Personnel
Horrifying allegations of physical and sexual abuse
of mentally retarded children at Plymouth Center for
Developmental Disabilities rocked the mental health
system in February, 1978.

According to a Milliken aide:

I think it would be most honest to say that the
triggering mechanism was the Free Press series.
But there had been some undercurrents that should
have been red flags to the problem. There were
letters that we discovered in the files of the
Department after the investigation began from
citizen's groups •••• My guess is that they felt,
"Let's go public. Let's go to the Free Press or
the News or some other media vehicle and bring some
public attention to this terrible problem."
Vern Stehman (personal communication, February 27,
1985), who earlier served as Acting DMH Director, said
the two Detroit Free Press reporters, Paul Magnuson and
Susan Watson, "weren't looking for any prize.

They felt

quite concerned, felt that the Department was very lax
in moving vigorously and finally broke the story."
Governor Milliken had just survived another political scandal prior to elections, when PBB was accidentally mixed into animal feed and began to appear in
Michigan's food chain.

He could not afford any further

evidence of inaction on the part of the Executive Office
according to staff aides:
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One of the problems with or. Smith was that he was
very reluctant to do anything. The more serious
the problem became, the more he would deny that
there was a problem •••• so, in this case, Smith was
a direct appointee and although the Governor supported him as long as he possibly could, it became
obvious that Smith was not part of the solution
that needed to come out of the whole mess.
Although Director of the Department of Labor at the
time,

c.

Patrick Babcock (personal communication, March

25, 1985) remained a gubernatorial advisor:
What happened at Plymouth was the Governor got
caught by surprise •••• I think the worse thing
happened to him that could happen to any Governor
or any political person -- that is that his appointees were not being candid. That happened to us in
PBB, but we had also staffed that issue so well
that we knew where problems were occurring and you
could anticipate them.
Plymouth hit us -- totally
blind sided. Plus, we were so preoccupied with PBB
at that point.
The DMH Legislative Liaison, offers a somewhat
different perspective:
There was a problem at Plymouth and the Department
recognized that. The Department's funding was not
the best at the time •••• At first they thought
maybe this would be a good opportunity because they
can present this sort of thing to the Appropriations people. But it just backfired is what
happened. Ya, just blew up. Really once the press
ran with it, well, we would have to say that the
Department appeared in the newspapers to be an
adversary.
Because of the apparent lack of Department of
Mental Health action, the Governor appointed a task
force headed by Wilbur Cohen to investigate the allegations.

Dr. Vern Stehman was asked to step in as

Acting DMH Director.
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If the 1970's could be considered a time of value
clarification, improvement of services and quality of
care for the mentally ill; the 1980's were characterized
as a time of retrenchment by one gubernatorial aide:
The changes in the mental health system did not
take place necessarily because of Oakdale (Oakdale
Center for the Developmentally Disabled, Lapeer
carne under investigation regarding allegations of
patient abuse in November, 1977), because of
Plymouth, because of unification. The changes took
place because the budget and the environment at
that time forced these changes to be made •••• What
really broke the darn and changed the system was the
cutbacks in state budget and the change in budget •
••• You reduce staff by 5,000, your levels of care
went from 90 to 100% standard down to 60% of standard. Those were the things that really forced
changes in the system.
After a comprehensive, nation-wide search, Dr.
Frank Ochberg was appointed Department of Mental Health
Director.

A reporter from the Booth Newspapers Capitol

Bureau found him to be articulate and charming:
He was, I think, an attempt on Governor Milliken's
part to bring in somebody that had that combination
that the legislature, and probably the Governor
really likes too, of being very bright, excellent
professional credentials, a good administrator and
somebody who could also relate well to the legislature and get along with them.
The DMH Legislative Liaison characterized Ochberg
as naive and in trouble with the legislature from the
very beginning:
I think Dr. Ochberg got off to a bad start because
he'd only been here a very few weeks and carne
charging over one night to the legislature because
there was some legislation, budget-type stuff, that
was corning up and he went sailing right out onto
the floor of the House. I was there, and it was
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simply a matter of he misjudged •••• You know, here
was the Director of a major State Department out
here, glad handing right on the floor certain key
legislators. And they thought that was a no-no.
And so they ordered him off the floor. And as a
result of him having to be escorted off, it was a
little embarrassing for him because he didn't
understand the process •••• It appeared to be a very
egotistical thing to do.
One of Governor Milliken's staff members thought
that, "part of Frank's problem was that he came out of
the Washington hierarchy system •••• He didn't know and
he came off looking foolish at times.

And he would try

to cover up with a soft shoe which just made them {the
legislature) more angry really."
The Budget Crisis
Ochberg was not reticent about bringing the issues
directly to the public.

For example, in the case of a

controversial referendum, he exhibited little concern
for the legislative supporters:

"One of the proposals

on the ballot, usually identified as the Tisch amendment, would radically alter the way state government is
conducted, and its effect on mental health services
would be devastating" {"Mental Health Cuts Set," October
3, 1980).

Under the Department of Management and Budget plan,
funds for mental health would be cut by 48 percent,
representing a $243 million budget reduction.

According

to Ochberg this would force the Department to close most
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state hospitals, return 7,000 of the 9,600 people in
state facilities to the community, and lay off an estimated 9,000 employees (Parks, 1981).
The former DMH Planning Coordinator later would say
about Ochberg, "He was a lover of crises, many of which
he created himself".

She went on to say:

I can remember him meeting with eve (Clinton Valley
Center) people and telling them, out of the blue,
that he was going to be closing the place.
It was
incredible because we had never talked about it.
And worse, I had just met the day before with the
eve people and we had _talked strategies and
policies and there just was never any indication
that such a thing might happen.
As staff we felt
brutalized by that style.
Others would agree with that assessment, with the
same types of problems occurring in relationships with
the Governor's Office.

A former DMB Budget Director

added, "There was more than a little bit of the Washington in him, which gave him the feeling he could create a
coup on the Executive Office through the legislature.
Of course in Michigan it's too visible to work and
Milliken and his staff didn't operate that way so it
didn't work at all."
For the 1979-80 fiscal year, the Michigan Legislature appropriated $494 million for mental health
services.

Economic conditions required reductions

during the year to $470 million, and $7 million was
transferred to the Department of Social Services for
nursing home care for mentally retarded persons.
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During this period four pilot community mental
health clinics were established in Washtenaw, Marquette/
Alger, Kent and St. Clair counties:
We saw those four pilot programs as pilots for what
a full management board should be like, what types
of services it should offer, budgetary arrangements ••• defining standards to be evaluated for
the establishment of other full management boards.
The pilot program began in 1979 and was intended to
last three years. But in 1980 there was a concerted effort to extend the contractual process to make
other boards full management. There was also an
intention to put pressures on communities to develop full contract boards through establishment of
funding mechanisms that appropriated operating
monies to the boards instead of institutions. (S.
Miller, personal communication, March 19, 1985)
In 1980 $479 million was allocated by the legislature to the Department of Mental Health.

However, this

included $10.8 million for unemployment benefits and
worker compensation, budget items which had not previously been part of the mental health appropriation;
$30 million for mandatory pay increases, negotiated by
public employee unions; and $20 million for full-year
continuation of community programs started the year
before.

The budget also included a general inflation

factor of approximately 10 percent.

Ochberg (198la)

expressed concern that the appropriation was at least
$60 million short of the funding necessary for continuation of the 1979-80 level of mental health services.
There were also concerns within the legislature,
but they tended to center around treatment priorities.
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According to one legislator, "In '80-'81 the funding
shifts were very dramatic: more to the community, the
push for contract boards with the community mental
health system, full management boards.

It was mainly

legislated through the budget."
She went on to say that, regardless of philosophical differences, legislators appreciated ongoing
gubernatorial involvement in mental health issues:
I think in general the Governor was very
supportive.
I don't think Management and Budget
was that supportive and that's the problem. And
Gerry Miller had the Governor's ear, much more than
Frank Ochberg did. So that's where mental health
lost in that process, was Management and Budget.
Planning a comprehensive state-wide program is
difficult at best.

The Department's problems were

highlighted by budget deficits and exacerbated by the
massiveness of the system in which it was entrenched:
The growing constraints placed upon the mental
health system by escalating costs, antiquated
physical plants, a shrinking inpatient population,
tougher building accreditation standards and the
demand for expanded community services pose a
variety of major, and at times conflicting,
planning problems for the state mental health
authorities in shaping public policy on mental
disability. (Provost, 1980, p. 7)
During such times, leadership styles and skills
become important.

One useful strategy is to call upon

the support of other leaders, especially those responsible for budget allocations.

As seen by one Legis-

lative Fiscal Analyst, however, Ochberg's relationship
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with the legislature remained poor:
I think that it took a while to catch up with him,
but it did. He seemed to completely misread
Michigan's political scene. He thought that
everyone would follow him without a second thought,
perhaps because of his articulateness, perhaps
because of his personal charisma. But, in
actuality, he alienated more than he won his
constituency.
That opinion was seconded by legislators.

"In

terms of the State legislative process he was a neophyte.

He was a good man, competent in many areas.

He

just didn't know •••• But unfortunately he interacted
with some pretty big egos that didn't care that he
didn't know."
Another gubernatorial staff member would later
comment:
Mental Health was a recurring set of pressures from
the Community Mental Health Association, the board
members of community mental health boards, from the
protection and advocacy groups. Generally it was a
fight for more dollars. But to some extent, it also
was a fight for more local accountability and responsibility and protection from this state department which was viewed by the locals as an octopus
attempting to extend itself too far into the
community.
The Director of a Michigan mental health association found considerable friction between community
mental health boards and the Department, mostly as a
result of funding and control issues.

She calls it "a

spoken battle" caused by local boards asked to take on
growing responsibilities without adequately improved
funding:
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The Department of Mental Health is still hanging on
to the budget, which limits the system. More and
more boards are becoming full management but they
remain dependent on the Department. The money
should be allocated directly to the local level.
Such changes are needed to let us grow up. There
still remains so much political wrangling, trying
to sort out who does what. I don't think the
legislature would want to take that job on.
Babcock (personal communication, March 25, 1985)
sees many of the same problems, but places them in a
different perspective.

When asked what some major

mental health issues are, his reply was:
Instability has always been a key issue from a management point of view and I've tracked the system
back to the late '60s when Anderson was Director.
The frequent change of Directorships and the
inability of the leadership of the Department to
relate with the reality of trying to run a volatile
agency in a very political sense.
In 1979 there were 613 Central Office employees
responsible for rights services, training, data collection, money collection and quality control.

In 1980 the

Office of Recipient Rights increased its staff by 39 to
a total of 124, under a legislative mandate to expand
services.
As cutbacks in the state's budget forced layoffs,
the American Federation of State, County and Municipal
Employees (AFSCME) charged that Michigan's 23 mental
health institutions were becoming increasingly
dangerous:

"Reports have steadily increased of aggres-

sive acts among the facilities' 10,000 residents and
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charges that insufficient care violate their rights.
Employees are more frequently seeking psychiatric
counseling." ("Cutbacks, ••• " 1980).
Ochberg proposed the idea of "domiciles" to help
reduce populations in the state's 15 institutions for
adult mentally ill.

He suggested moving 300 to 400

patients out of hospitals and into facilities (some on
the grounds of state institutions), where they would be
housed, not treated.

Because of massive layoffs

throughout the system, Ochberg felt the state could no
longer maintain adequate standards of care in hospitals:
"We have in the facilities for the adult mentally ill a
lot of patients who will receive shelter rather than
hospital services •••• It's an alternative to discharging
people into the community" (Cote, 1981, p. Al8).
The Kalamazoo Gazette described the proposal by
saying, "Michigan's mental health system, plunged into
crisis by deep budget cuts, is using controversial and
innovative policies to keep above water -- and proceed
with 'deinstitutionalization' •••• Persistent rumors that
some institutions soon will be shut circulate through
the approximately 15,000-member mental health workforce"
(Cote, 1981, p. Al8).
One of the first casualties of this ongoing fiscal
crisis was Michigan Institute for Mental Health (MIMH).
Although money was appropriated for MIMH operating
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expenses, the legislature recessed prior to finalizing
the State budget.

This gave Governor William Milliken

unprecedented spending powers and responsibility for
balancing the total budget.

During a televised address

urging voters to reject the Tisch amendment which would
cut funds even more, Milliken announced the closing of
MIMH as a cost-saving measure.

Chapter V examines this

period by detailing the Institute's history.
Added to this budget controversy was a report by
the Office of the Auditor General (1981) that mismanagement and possible fraud in the community placement
program could cost the state up to $35 million a year.
According to the report, the program lacked accountability, used favoritism, and encouraged potential
conflicts of interest by permitting state employees to
operate homes leased by the state.
The real problem, however, according to Chris Parks
(1981) of the Petosky News Review, was Ochberg's highprofile support for developing neighborhood homes for
patients able to live outside of institutions.
The program ran up against a growing siege mentality among state residents determined to hang on to
what they have and increasing hostile demands that
they share it with minorities, the poor and other
disadvantaged groups.
A recent audit uncovering a number of miscues
in community placement merely provided ammunition
for lawmakers eager for an excuse to attack the
unpopular program.
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••• The recent audits of community placement
and travel are damaging, not because they uncover
shocking abuses but because they depict a department seeming adrift and neglected.
Travel by department officials actually
increased at a time when the governor was pleading
for restraint, and the auditor general's office
detected a "general attitude" of laxness toward
such expenses. (p. 4)
The current DMH Director, C. Patrick Babcock
(personal communication, March 25, 1985), mentions that
these concerns brought him back to accept what he saw as
a challenging position:
We were getting killed on the tangents, on community notice, on contracting policy, leasing. We
had opened ourselves up so that people who couldn't
take on the issue of community placement, (it was a
damn hard thing to take on because it works) could
take us on on mismanagement questions.
Babcock went on to explain Ochberg's resignation,
"He just got aced out of the action because of his lack
of credibility with the front office and the legislature •••• And in those days DMB was a very omnipresent
force, much more than it is today."
Milliken appointed Babcock Acting DMH Director.
Babcock had served on the Governor's Executive staff,
headed the Department of Labor and had an excellent
working relationship with the legislature.

He offered

the stabilizing influence in coping with a volatile
department that Milliken was seeking.

Snyder (personal

communication, February 4, 1985) calls Babcock one of
the finest advocates for the mentally ill, "primarily
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because he knows the system and developed a tremendous
following in the legislature."
While it is clear that treatment issues were
gaining the public eye, budget matters continued to be
the dominant issue. In March, 1982 Babcock stated that
state budget cutbacks made it difficult to provide
adequate institutional care, outpatient care, or community mental health services.

He added that the "depart-

ment is hanging on by its fingernails, dependent on the
willingness of the staff to go the extra mile to help
people who desperately need it"
1982).

("Breaking Point, .•• "

"At the present funding levels," he continued,

"the department cannot meet all of its legislated
responsibilities.

The governor and legislature are

aware of that, but they are trapped between the agonizing need of the mental health system's clients and the
agonizing reality of the state deficit."
In total, the Department reduced its work force
from 17,314 persons on January 5, 1980 to 11,772 on July
3, 1982, almost the same figure as 17 years earlier.

In

November 1965, Department facilities employed 11,157
persons.
11,230.

The comparable figure for July 1982, was
Babcock observed that:

The loss of 5,542 men and women from our work force
has seriously damaged the state's ability to
provide appropriate care for those who look to us
for help. The big losers are our patients.
However, the impact on employees cannot, and should
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not be minimized.
1982).

("Mentally Handicapped, ••• "

Populations in state-operated facilities reached a
high point of over 30,000 people in 1960, as can be seen
in Table 3.

Of that group, approximately 19,000 resided

in psychiatric hospitals and 11,000 in centers for the
developmentally disabled.
Between 1970 and 1975, the number of residents in
psychiatric hospitals was cut in half.

This is par-

tially attributable to new .treatment programs, following
the introduction of psychotropic medications, in conjunction with the nationwide emphasis on deinstitutionalization.
As of September 30 1982, total facility population
was reduced to 7,205, including 3,038 persons in centers
for the developmentally disabled, 3,683 adult mentally
ill and 484 mentally ill children.

In addition, it is

estimated by the Michigan Department of Mental Health
that 5,700 persons reside in specialized homes; approimately 7,000 developmentally disabled and 6,500 mentally ill adults live in general foster care homes; and
another 1,039 mentally disabled live in specialized
nursing facilities.
While the patient population in Michigan has continued to decline, staffing has remained fairly stable.
Total employees in state facilities in 1982 was 10,799,
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Table 3
Patients and residents in state of Michigan facilities
with number of employees, FY 1955 through 1983

End of
Fiscal
Year
1955
1960
1965
1970
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983

Patients
in State
Psychiatric
Hospitals
17,075
19,059
17,053
11,134
4,925
·1,354
4,405
4, 779
4, 712
4,527
4,481
4,303
4,235

Employees
in State
Psychiatric
Hospitals .
4,997
5,656
6,275
7,690
7,399
6,620
7,098
7,657
7,904
7,003
6,113
6,158
6,401

Residents in
· Centers for
Developmental
Disnbilities
9,025
11,261
12,516
11,044
6,537
6,191
6,047
5, 728
5,142
4,371
3,574
2,973
2,594

Employees in
Centers for
Developmental
Disabilities
2,475
3,913
4,082
6,330
5,902
6,434
7,196
7,850
8,474
7,153
5,561
4,641
4,330

..

Total
Patients
and
Residents
26,100
30,320
29,569
22,978
11,462
10,545
10,452
10,507
9,854
8,890
8,055
7,356
6,829

Total
Employees
in State
Facilities
. 7,472
9,569
11,157
14,036
13,301
13,054
14,294
15,507
16,378
14,956
11,67 4
10,799
10,811

Staff
to
Patient
Ratio
.286
.316
.377
.611
1.16
1.24
1.37
1.48
1.66
1.68
1.45
1.47
1.58

.....
f\.)
f\.)
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about the same as in 1960 (9,569).
patients in 1960, and 7,356 in 1982.

There were 30,320
When only psychi-

atric programs are considered, there were 19,059
patients and 5,656 employees in state psychiatric hos·pitals in 1960; in 1982 there were 4,383 patients and
6,158 employees.

Thus, we see an increase in the staff-

to-patient ratio without a significant increase in total
staffing costs.
Currently in Michigan there are 55 community mental
health boards and 25 state hospitals divided into six
geographic regions.

By statute, the boards may receive

up to 90 percent of the cost of programs from the
Department of Mental Health.

It is estimated that

community mental health agencies provided services for
nearly 150,000 people in 1982.
Yet, organizational issues continue to surface
between the state funded and locally operated programs.
The Supervisor of Community Placement Services for the
Clinton-Eaton-Ingham Community Mental Health Board
(C-E-I CMH), says:
I don't think the Department does a very good job
right now in terms of process.
I think there is a
big gap between people in Central Office and community mental health boards. I don't think it's on
purpose, but sort of like divide and conquer.
You've got all of these mental health boards scattered around and there isn't any formal mechanisms
for them to get together and plan together, to process decisions, to set priorities.
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Discussion
In one sense, Michigan's mental health system seems
to have come full circle.

A century ago people who did

not fit into the community, who were unable to live
independently or were considered unmanageable, were
moved into institutions.

The first asylums served the

function their names implied.
food and security.
concept.

They offered shelter,

Domiciliary care is much the same

The increasing co.sts of intensive treatment

programs and the demonstrated lack of benefits for some
patients have forced mental health officials to explore
alternatives to institutionalization.
One-hundred-and-fifty years ago mental illness was
considered a private problem.
were offered at home.
issue.

Services, when available,

Today mental illness is a public

In fact, it has been argued that increasing

criticism of mental health programs comes less from the
lack of funding -- since shortages of money, space and
staff remain a chronic problem -- than from increased
visibility of the mentally disabled in the community.
Traditionally policy was developed slowly, in
response to legislative mandates or constituency pressures.

The need for a comprehensive, unified system was

recognized.

The problem was implementation exacerbated

by budgetary deficits.
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During the past century there have been innumerable
advances in the care and treatment of the mentally disabled.

While the numbers of people receiving services

have stabilized, the type of patient is changing.

Indi-

viduals in state psychiatric hospitals today can generally be divided into two distinct groups. First, there
is the acute care patient who needs immediate assistance
during a crisis period.

Such individuals generally

remain within their communities but need emergency or
short-term, intensive treatment.

The second group of

patients is unable to live independently, perhaps
because of disabilities such as retardation, physical
handicaps, senility or medical problems.

These are the

new chronic patients.
At one time individuals admitted to mental health
hospitals would be expected to live out their lives
there.

That is no longer an expectation.

Yet, some

people, unable to handle independent living, move from
one treatment program to another in a "revolving door"
syndrome.

They spend more time in institutions than

out.
Clearly Michigan's in-house psychiatric population,
as well as that of other states, consists more and more
of the latter type of individual.

This "new chronic"

patient uses more resources, costs more to serve, and
generally requires longer hospitalization in a variety
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of settings.

This population is more often character-

ized by slow turnover and multiple admissions.
Summary
Decisions are shaped by the milieu which surrounds
them.

This chapter examined the forces at Level IV of

Boulter's (1983) policy ladder.

The two facilities to

be studied, Michigan Institute for Mental Health and
Lafayette Clinic, were embedded within a unique culture
and environment.

Historical data provides a key to the

reactions of decision makers toward the agencies,
particularly during a time of crisis.
The crisis period has been defined.

A state-wide

recession caused budgetary cutbacks throughout the
mental health system.

Management problems, including

allegations of institutional abuse, community placement
issues and uncoordinated deinstitutionalization
programs, exacerbated the crisis.
The history of mental health in Michigan parallels
experiences in other states, with some critical differences.

With the acceptance of mental illness as a

public problem, a massive service industry was established.

Advances in psychotropic medications, new

treatment concepts and evidence of the crippling effects
of "institutionalization" added a second layer of
service providers -- community mental health.

The Mich-

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

127
igan Department of Mental Health has, over the years,
tried to pull this dual system together with limited
success.
Fiscal issues heightened concerns about institutional priorities and the ability to provide adequate
treatment within a complex, multi-layered system.
State-funded agencies were coming under increasing
scrutiny regarding quality of care.

Allegations of

abuse only served to spotlight these problems.
Public programs for the developmentally disabled
and mentally ill were often a limited response to
pressures that were building to a level of intolerability.

Some of those pressures were economic; some

were the force of constituency concern.

This turbulent,

complex environment clearly impacted on types of mental
health institutions and programs developed, as well as
on services provided.
In order to understand this process more fully, let
us move on to examine other levels of Boulter's
decision-making ladder in relationship to two specific
Michigan mental health institutions.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

CHAPTER V
A COMPARATIVE CASE STUDY
Boulter (1983) tells us that decisions are made by
politicians and bureaucrats.

But, they are influenced

by interest groups and the media; attentives and the
general public; and are ultimately shaped by the
environment, institutions, culture and the traditions in
which they are embedded.
Elected officials are expected to be representatives of the people they serve.

The implication is

that, while there are some issues of conscience rather
than consensus, most often legislators serve as
delegates of the public interest rather than trustees of
the public good.

It was proposed in Chapter II that, by

the very nature of their jobs, public decision makers
are attuned to the concerns of their constituents and
ultimately base decisions on what they perceive as the
sum of support for a given outcome.
Two different decisions occurred in much the same
context.

Michigan Institute for Mental Health was a

state operated, acute-care facility for the mentally
ill.

It opened in 1977.

The decision was to close it

four years later, ostensibly because of the need to
economize during a recessionary period.

Lafayette

128
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Clinic is also a state operated, acute-care facility for
the mentally ill.

It opened in 1955.

Despite a serious

setback in achieving its mandate, the decision was to
continue allocating operating funds.
By using Boulter's (1983) framework to explore each
level of decision processes within the agency context,
it becomes possible to trace these different outcomes.
Traditionally case studies have attempted to
provide insight into the wo_rkings of a program through
details about daily operations.
somewhat different.

The approach here is

System dynamics, rather than

organizational operations, are of primary interest.
Examination of specific events and their impact on the
program and its constituency will clarify the focus of
decision-maker attention.
Chapter IV provided the historical context,
delineating crises and the crisis period as perceived by
relevant actors.

This chapter builds upon that base by

further developing Boulter's (1983) policy ladder for
two specific institutions.

It will look at various

levels of agency operations, as well as interactions
among key individuals, their stakes and stands.

Chapter

VI goes on to examine more closely media attention and
influence.
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Each of these pieces, in conjunction with document
analysis and interviews, serves as the basis for completing check sheets in Chapter VII that will help to
clarify the decision outcome.

While it is possible to

fill in the check sheet and weigh the balance of constituency support less rigorously, ratings should also be
based upon available, documented data.

Admittedly, it

is difficult to tread that narrow line between an
intrinsically interesting case study presented for its
own merits and the urge finally to weigh the sum of
constituency support (including political and bureaucratic) based on known outcomes.

Cross verification of

data and careful explication of important factors at
each level should serve to counteract these inherent
biases.
Lafayette Clinic
Politicians and Bureaucrats: The Legislature
Lafayette Clinic is a 128-bed psychiatric treatment
center located in downtown Detroit.

Act 217 of 1954

provided for the establishment of a facility under the
jurisdiction and control of the Michigan Department of
Mental Health.

As the last enacted law of the session,

P.A. 217 passed only after considerable negotiation, in
part because of some unusual provisions.

While the
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Clinic was authorized as a combined psychiatric hospital
and outpatient clinic for inner city Detroit, the
program was:
especially designed to train personnel for the
field of mental health, including such specialties
as psychiatry, psychiatric social work, clinical
psychology, psychiatric nursing and others~ and to
conduct studies and research into the nature and
cause as well as methods of care, treatment and
prevention of emotional and mental disorders and
disturbances. (State of Michigan Public Act 217,
1954, p. 595)
The Act went on to reiterate that "such inpatient
service shall at no time be used for the care of long
term custodial cases, and no patient shall remain in
continuous residence for more than two years."
One other provision was added that served to
emphasize the program's unique charge:
To more fully implement the objectives of said
clinic and to provide an effective utilization of
the combined resources of the department and Wayne
university, the department of mental health and
Wayne university shall jointly appoint and control
a director of the Lafayette clinic who shall be a
qualified psychiatrist with demonstrated ability as
a teacher and administrator, who shall have
complete supervision and control of the operation
and personnel of the clinic. (State of Michigan
Public Act 217, 1954, p. 597)
Wayne State University
Although Lafayette Clinic was established as a
State-funded program, Wayne State University had an
early vested interest.

As part of its commitment, the
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University agreed to provide land, space and initial
staffing.

In addition, all operating money was to

filter through the University, strengthening faculty
involvement in program success and guaranteeing initial
acceptance by DMH officials of the clinical teaching
component.

A total of $100,000 was appropriated for the

fiscal year ending June 30, 1954 of which $75,000 was
designated for salaries and wages.
The enabling legislation, as well as original
position papers, established that Clinic research would
focus on schizophrenia and the new "miracle" drugs that
promised alleviation of symptoms, if not a cure.

There

was widespread conviction within the Department of
Mental Health, directed by Charles F. Wagg, and Wayne
State University faculty that schizophrenia had a
biological base.
With this argument Lafayette received strong
support, not only from the Executive and Legislative
branches of government, but also from local advocacy
groups.

According to a Detroit area legislator in a

1954 letter to colleague Joe Snyder (personal
communication, February 4, 1985), "It is only a matter
of time, patience and money before we will see an end to
this devastating disease.

And that time will come

because of our support of this facility."
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Interest Groups
The Michigan Society for Mental Health, a client
advocacy group, helped to finance and pass a bond issue
to raise the initial operating funds.

Beth Leeson

(personal communication, February 4, 1985), Director of
the Mental Health Association in Michigan (formerly the
Michigan Society for Mental Health), adds, "There was
tremendous local interest in the agency.

When Lafayette

was being built and developed our Mental Health Association was 100% behind the effort.

We pushed the bonds

and helped develop the financing and concepts of
Lafayette Clinic."

She went on to say that the Clinic

was initially conceived as a training and research
center, not a treatment facility:
There was a lot of community involvement, partly
because of the nature of the Detroit area itself.
I think Detroit prided itself on being in the forefront and there were some tremendously powerful
legislators who saw it as a feather in their caps.
It was a natural -- prestige, money and an important social problem. As far as elected officials
were concerned, nothing but good could come of
supporting it. (B. Leeson, personal communication, February 4, 1985)
Lafayette Clinic could be characterized as a second
generation mental health facility.

First generation

programs were the large, specialty institutions that
isolated clients from the community for the majority of
their lives.

Not only were patients divorced from the
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community, but so were staff who generally lived on the
grounds.
This new program was being developed in one of the
most populous areas of the country and was dedicated to
an era of research and prevention in the field of mental
health.

Evangeline Sheibley, Chair of the Mental Health

Commission, commented during opening ceremonies:
We have founded this Lafayette Clinic because we
know that the answer lies in two major fields: one,
research into the causes, treatment and prevention
of mental illness, and secondly, training of personnel to care for the afflicted so that we may
look towards rapid discharge of patients from our
existing hospitals and clinics.
(Lafayette Clinic,
1956, p. 4)
Lafayette was one of the first facilities of its
kind, oriented not toward rehabilitation or isolation of
a disturbed population, but to a "cure" for mental
illness.
Location was an important component of the facility
and contributed to the perception of its value held by
decision makers.

Adjacent to Wayne State University's

School of Medicine and part of the Detroit Medical
Center Complex, the Clinic joined a tight knit community
of mental health services and professionals in an urban
and cosmopolitan setting.
Two other sets of relationships served to shape the
Clinic, as well as its internal and external linkages:
leadership and mandate.

Each was a distinct aspect of
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the organization that Selznick (1957) would characterize
as critical to its institutional core.
Location: The Environment
Interactions with the community, clients and other
service providers were deeply affected by the immediate
environment.
The facility was next door to the Detroit Receiving
Hospital and the Health Care Institute.

Staff from

these other hospitals comprised the teaching faculty of
Wayne State University's School of Medicine and served
as Lafayette Clinic consultants.

Many senior Clinic

professionals also held joint faculty appointments with
the University.
According to a June 20, 1954 recruitment letter,
Lafayette would

11

serve as a focal point for the total

training program of the Michigan Department of Mental
Health and ••• include a broad program of instruction
and training at all professional levels.

11

Legislative intent was that the Clinic would
augment and amplify training already occurring at
various state hospitals of the Department, as well as
develop its own educational programs for residents in
psychiatry, interns in psychology, students in social
work, psychiatric nurses and occupational therapy
students.
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~The

first Annual Report for 1955-56 mentions that:

Integration of the professional staff of the
lLafayette Clinic with Wayne State University has
·iproceeded without difficulty because of the
Jexcellent cooperation of Dr. Clarence B. Hilberry,
EPresident of the University, Dr. Gordon H. Scott,
Dean of the College of Medicine and many other
iadministrative officers. (Lafayette Clinic, 1956,
p. 1)
in addition to relationships with affiliated state
programs, close teaching ties were established with the
Depar,tment of Psychiatry of the University of Michigan
and its clinical facilities.

"Key linkages" also

occurred with the Schools of Nursing and Social Work at
both the University of Michigan and Wayne State
University in order to develop "social work and
psychdatric nursing programs designed to focus on
underserved and unserved populations" (Lafayette Clinic,
1980, p. 71).
Two general hospitals in metropolitan Detroit,
Detro;it Memorial and Sinai, began to assign residents in
internal medicine to Lafayette for training in
psychiatry.

Since 1957, resident physicians from

Pontiac, Traverse City and Northville State Hospitals
have iiOtated through the Clinic's services in child
psychiatry and neurology.

Even dental students from the

University of Detroit were incorporated into the
program.
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Educational programs were further strengthened by
totating Clinic physicians through the Children's Center
of Wayne County, the psychiatric services of Detroit
Memorial Hospital, and Harper Hospital.
John F. Myett, the Clinic's first Business Manager,
said, "Because the Lafayette Clinic intends to become a
significant center for both research and training in the
area of mental health for the state of Michigan, we feel
very keenly our obligations with respect to community
participation and support" (Lafayette Clinic, 1956, p.
12).

Annual Continuing Medical Education sessions were

developed for general practitioners in the community who
wished to improve their knowledge and skills in
psychiatry.
Along with the newly established Lafayette program,
four other public agencies continued to provide adult
inpatient psychiatric services to residents in Wayne
County.

They are Detroit Psychiatric Institute (DPI -

Herman Keifer Hospital), Northville State Hospital,
~ayne

County General Hospital and Ypsilanti State

Hospital.

Only Wayne County General was not fully

supported by State funds.

(See Figure 5.)

Community and Interest Groups
A physical location near other medical services,
and the unique relationship this engendered, proved
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advantageous to Lafayette Clinic.

Not only was there

ready access to a variety of experts and special
programs, but the downtown location in a medical complex
mitigated many of the concerns such a facility might
ordinarily encounter in a rural or suburban setting.
Insertion in an existing medical community serves a
protective function.

The Clinic's neighbors were all

health care providers.

Local officials and other

interest groups found that even if Lafayette was not the
appropriate admission unit for an individual, other
programs in the immediate vicinity might be.
The Clinic staffs a Community Mental Health team.
Team members may refer callers to other treatment
centers, may make outpatient appointments, or admit to
an inpatient unit.

The team functions as both an intake

screening unit and an intermediate stage of treatment
between complete hospitalization and total independence.
According to Ann White (personal communication,
February 23, 1985), former President of the Community
Mental Health Boards Association:
We realized, and are starting to develop the services behind the conceptualization, that what is
required is a whole continuum of services because
there certainly is a whole continuum of patients.
You just don't find all the needed services in any
institution, no matter how good or how comprehensive.
This philosophy has further integrated Lafayette
into the community.
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By 1961,

1,325 new outpatients were examined at

the Clinic, making Lafayette the twelfth largest psychiatric outpatient service in the United States in terms
of patient treatment time.

By 1971, the Clinic was one

of the three most active outpatient centers in the midwest.

While it appears that Lafayette Clinic managed to

fit itself into its environment rather thoroughly,
partially as a result of its location in the heart of
one of Michigan's most populous counties, there were
questions about whether it was actually serving the
population in need.
A research report by Karl Kish, M.D. and Paul
Lowinger, M.D. (1971) used a demographic analysis to
study whether university programs in psychiatry actually
served the inner city.

They found, at least for

Lafayette, that the answer was "no":
The focus of psychiatry has in recent years shifted
to prevention, therapy and rehabilitation within
the community. This study asks to what extent a
public psychiatric teaching hospital acts as a
community mental health center. Do the demographic
characteristics of the population using the services of the outpatient clinic reflect the characteristics of the local community? Does a typical
university program serve the poor, the black, the
very young and very old? (Kish & Lowinger, 1971, p.
276)
The report notes that Lafayette Clinic is located
in the city's central poverty area, across the freeway
from Detroit General Hospital, the emergency and treatment center for much of Detroit's indigent population.
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In 1968 the ten mile area around the Clinic was an
economically disadvantaged community containing eight
percent of the city's people, 54 percent black and 46
percent white.

Forty-seven percent of household incomes

fell below $3,000, then the poverty level.
Yet, the results of the authors' survey showed that
"the Clinic does not adequately serve the needs of the
blacks, poor, and aged of the inner city" (Kish &
Lowinger, 1971, p. 278).

In the sample only one patient

was over 60 years of age.
the population was over 65.
white.

In the area, 12 percent of
New clients were 77 percent

Returning patients were 86 percent white.

While it could be a problem of mobility, inner city
poor seemed able to reach clinics at Detroit General
Hospital in large numbers:
Anyone who has worked at Detroit General for any
period of time will be struck by how many poor,
black people regard it as "their" hospital, though
it too is a medical school teaching hospital which
is open to any city resident.
(Kish & Lowinger,
1971, p. 279)
The study added that 38 percent of the referrals to
Lafayette Clinic were from private doctors or hospitals.
As a result, only rarely were people served who existed
outside the mainstream of general health care.

A scant

two percent of the people admitted to Lafayette were
referred by courts, attorneys, police, clergy or
churches.

As will be discussed later, this meshes well
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with Lafayette's perception of its mandate and the
specific roles chosen by its leaders to assure survival.
After all, poverty stricken, inner city dwellers are
least likely to exercise their franchise, tend to be
less concerned about social issues, and, as a result,
exert the least amount of pressure on decision makers,
including legislators.
Mental Health Services: Detroit and Wayne County
The Michigan Department of Mental Health assumed
state operation and control of the Detroit Psychiatric
Institute in 1972, expanding the number of adult
inpatient beds from 60 to 205.

In that same year

Northville State Hospital had 650 beds; Lafayette had 80
specifically designated for Detroit and Wayne County
patients; and Wayne County General had 450 beds for
clients who could be admitted for as long as one year.
An expanded emergency psychiatric service at
Detroit General Hospital added 10 beds for short-term
admissions, funded by the Detroit and Wayne County
Community Mental Health Services Board.

A Mental Health

Drug Abuse Center established with state funds supported
17 beds, and Cities Center had another 25.
By 1972 there were 1,412 beds for inpatient treatment of mentally ill individuals from Wayne County and
Detroit:
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Table 4
Agencies Providing Inpatient Psychiatric Treatment
For Wayne County and Detroit Area Residents

AGENCY

CHILDREN

Lafayette
(state)

60 beds

Detroit Psychiatric
(state)

50

YOUNG ADULT

ADULT
80

60 beds

180

Detroit General
(county)

10

Mental Health Drug Abuse
(state)

17

Cities Center
(federal/state)

25

Northville
(state)

650

80

Wayne County General
(state/ county>

450
TOTAL:

1412

While this may seem like an abundance of public
services in a relatively small area, there are some
interesting statistics that show both the atypicality
and need of this district.
Wayne is the third most populous county in the
United States behind Cook County, Illinois and Los
Angeles County, California.

Of the 11,731 persons

admitted to Michigan's state psychiatric hospitals in
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1977 (the year Michigan Institute for Mental Health
opened), 5,000 came from Wayne County and 1,400 from
Oakland.

One third of all the admissions (nearly 3,700)

were between the ages of 22 and 30.

More than half were

between 22 and 40 years of age.
In 1972 Dr. E. Gordon Yudashkin, Mental Health
Director said:
The mentally ill and mentally retarded from Wayne
County and Detroit have been shunted to far-off
institutions. There has been a dearth of local
services, especially in the inner city. Mental
Health services for this highly concentrated population area are grossly inadequate to meet the
needs of its 2.7 million people. ("Services Expanding in Wayne-Detroit," 1972, p. 1)
At the same time, Dr. Joseph Denniston, M.D. was
appointed DMH Deputy Director for Detroit and Wayne
County, with an office at Northville State Hospital.
James Hunt, Metro Regional Mental Health Executive and
Mark Cavanaugh, DMH liaison officer with the Department
of Social Services were also added to the staff.

While

under contract to DMH, Cavanaugh was responsible for
assuring that placements in the community were prompt,
effective and appropriate.
Two issues were already evident.

There were enough

DMH concerns about the Detroit and Wayne County district
and the difficulties of serving this public that regional staff were appointed four years before regionalization occurred throughout the rest of Michigan.

In
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addition, there was increasing awareness of placement
issues that would continue to impact on citizens
state-wide.
As mentioned in Chapter IV, Yudashkin's placement
program created considerable community stress.

The

legislature and House Mental Health Committee were
particularly concerned about over-concentration of
foster and group homes in the Detroit area.

Prior to

its June recess, Representative Dave Hollister, Chairman of the Mental Health Committee, stated that he would
ask for a total investigation into the community placement program if it was not being carried out properly
and according to the law (Michigan House of Representatives Mental Health Committee, personal communication,
June 16, 1977).
During the same meeting, Sue Stine speaking for the
Department of Social Services, commented that adult
foster care placements had only been in existence since
1975 and there was no home finder program in the Department.

Yet, deinstitutionalization was already putting

pressure on the Detroit area, and as a result, on the
Lafayette Clinic.
Specifically, discharged residents were generally
placed into the Wayne County metropolitan region, since
that was where the Clinic was located.

This meant a

buildup of dependent care homes and former mental
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patients in that county.

(See Figure 6.)

issue of proximity was one of zoning.

Added to the

"In the Detroit

metropolitan area, where more than 60 percent of all the
state's former mental patients are placed, zoning is a
particular problem because it restricts most of the
placement facilities to inner-city locations" (W.
Mitchell, 1974).
As Lafayette Clinic's treatment program improved,
discharges increased.

The results were growing numbers

of displaced persons in Wayne County, despite efforts to
develop appropriate community living situations outside
the metropolitan area.
At a meeting among community mental health boards,
the House Mental Health Committee and the Department of
Mental Health, one board member stated:
The practice, going back a number of years, was to
place former patients into foster care, close to
the state facility. This was done because the
facility provided many of the follow-up and support
services to the residents. Also, if the person
needed to be rehospitalized, it was convenient to
have them close by. As a result of this practice a
thriving foster-care industry has sprung up in
inner-city Detroit. (Michigan House, personal
communication, June 12, 1980)
The effect was to develop a ghetto of former and
current patients that served to further isolate them
from the community.

"Lafayette was sometimes seen as an

ivory tower kind of program that really kind of used
people to get what they wanted," explained a Wayne
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County Community Mental Health worker.

"When they

didn't want them any more then we got them."
Community mental health services were forced to
offer ongoing programs to an ever-increasing number of
people who were non-residents and non-tax payers.

In

addition to impacting on community mental health
services and hence local costs, this influx of the
mentally ill also affected the probate court system in
those counties, the police, jail system and the Department of Social Services.

Perhaps because of these

pressures, the Wayne County Circuit Court and the

u.s.

District Court, Detroit were at the forefront of several
critical mental health decisions.
Joe Dulka (1979) an M.D. from the Crisis Center at
the Detroit Receiving Hospital, said DMH responded to
these problems by:
developing the now-infamous "Management Plan" of
1975 which outlined an on-going reduction in
hospital beds and staff. This resulted in large
numbers of patients who were previously being
followed by State hospital clinics being transferred to community mental health clinics. These
clinics became flooded making them less responsive
to their communities, diminishing their ability to
perform preventive services and intervene in the
deterioration of their clients. At the same time,
the Department requested what amounted to a budget
reduction and provided no funding to Community
Mental Health to support the increased load of
patients.
(personal communication to the House
Mental Health Committee, June 5, 1979)
"So, while we wanted to do a good job and serve as
many people as possible," added an intake worker, "the
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more people we placed out, the more difficult our job
became when those non-residents went back into the
hospital."

Since counties bear the local share of

institution costs when a person is rehospitalized, this
further penalized an already financially struggling
system.

These difficulties were exacerbated by state-

wide budget reductions.
Although placement efforts were a DMH program
priority, trying to accomplish those goals did not
endear service providers to citizens.

Mitchell (1975)

reported:
More than 3,000 mentally ill and retarded patients
would be released from Michigan institutions by
mid-1976 under a budget-cutting plan adopted by the
state Mental Health Department.
At the same time, the plan postpones for at
least six months the spending of some $1.8 million
budgeted to provide community care for the released
patients.
"It's a paradox within a paradox," said former
Detroit Common Council President Mel Ravitz, who
now heads the Detroit-Wayne County Community Mental
Health Board. (p. A3)
Department of Mental Health
The 1976 Michigan State Plan for Comprehensive
Mental Health Services underscored the problems of
serving the Detroit area.

The plan was a U.S. Depart-

ment of Health, Education and Welfare requirement under
the National Health Planning and Resources Development
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Act of 1974, PL 93-641.

According to Ron Uken (1977>,

Administrator of the Planning and

~valuation

system of

the Michigan Department of Mental Health, the Act was
intended "to facilitate the development of a national
health

plannin~

policy, to augment area-wide and state

planning for health services, manpower and facilities,
and to authorize financial assistance for the development of resources to further national nealth planning
policy" (personal communication to the House Mental
Health Committee, June 23, 1977).
Each state facility was required to provide
emergency services.

Michigan's plan mentioned that:

While a board may applj to the department for
waiver of any of the other service categories,
emergency services may not be waived by the
department.
Emergency services provide immediate
access to mental health services to anyone who is
experiencing au emergent .nental dys.funct ion.
(Michigan Department of Mental Health, 1976b, p.
11)
The plan also implemented a survey of need in order
to develop state-wide priorities for mental health
programs.

A social indicators matrix, using the

National Institute for Mental Health Demographic Profile
System was adopted.

The five dimansions studied were

employment status, economic status, family status,
neighborhood structure, and ethnicity.
Catchment areas were ranked on the basis of each
dimension score.

In addition, the number of acute

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

/

151
inpatient beds, residential beds, partial day slots and
outpatient case loads were used in ranking catchment
areas by resource capacity.

Eastside Detroit was ranked

60th in need, indicating it had the greatest need for
mental health services of any area in the state.
The two rankings (need and resources) were added
together to create a summary score indicating net need.
Southwest Detroit scored 57, Central Detroit 58, Inner
Cities 59, and Eastside Detroit 60.

For comparison,

Lansing South and Lansing North were ranked 26 and 28
respectively.
One DMH planner stated:
There was no doubt that the Detroit/Wayne metropolitan area was taking more of our money and
receiving fewer services than any other area in the
state. We kept pouring money down the hole to try
to keep things together. It was no help that the
area also tended to be a hotbed of controversy. A
lot of landmark decisions came out of courts there
and a lot of trouble was brewing, what with community placement programs, big institutions with
allegations of abuse and other such.
In the Metropolitan region (see Figure 6) there
were a total of 8,750 admissions to state facilities in
FY 1977-78.

This is from a state total of 12,546.

In

comparison, the Southeastern region (MIMH area) saw
1,123 admissions, mostly to the Ypsilanti Regional Psychiatric Center.
DMH Clinical Director Vern Stehman, in a February
8, 1979 hearing before the House Mental Health Commit-
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tee, stated that readmission rates to state hospitals
remained fairly stable.

In fact, they "had always been

around 30 percent across the country."

He added that he

felt it was better to have clients out of institutions
for six months and back in for six weeks than for people
to be institutionalized all the time.

He also added,

however, that the Detroit metropolitan area remained the
major exception regarding readmissions.

It continued to

have a 50 percent rate, the highest in Michigan.

Half

of all the people discharged from Detroit state-operated
facilities, including Lafayette Clinic, were readmitted
within a year.
In 1978 the Department of Mental Health opened a
new 172-bed agency, the Metropolitan Regional Hospital
in Wayne County.

This institution replaced the psychi-

atric beds previously available in the Wayne County
General Hospital, thus dropping the number of beds for
adults in Wayne County by 278.
FY 1979-1980 allocation figures continued to
demonstrate ongoing service concerns.

Community mental

health programs in the Metropolitan region received
almost $26 million.

Facilities were allocated an

additional $78 million.

The next highest grant went to

the Western region where community mental health receive
$13.6 million and facilities $11.9.

In comparison, the

Southeastern region community mental health programs
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received $1.7 million.

Facilities (the Michigan Insti-

tute for Mental Health) received $4.8.
Given the level of need for services in the Detroit
area, the dearth of adequate inpatient programs, and
Lafayette's entrenchment in the medical community, it
would have been difficult to justify program cutbacks in
the early years.
Leadership: Bureaucrats and DMH Officials
Lafayette was not immune to the political byplay
occurring around it, but it had several distinct advantages.

One was that it was essentially a second gener-

ation facility, with the opportunity to settle into the
community before the crisis period began.

Unlike the

large first generation institutions, local involvement
was encouraged.

This position was solidified by the

skill brought to the role of Director by Jacques
Gottlieb, M.D.

Gottlieb helped to establish the Clinic

and remained its Director for 20 years.

During most of

that time, he was also Chairman of the Department of
Psychiatry at Wayne State University.
Gottlieb's appointment was the result of a nationwide search by a selection committee that consisted of
top decision makers in Michigan's medical community.
According to June 20, 1954 recruitment materials, the
committee was looking for "a person with the highest of
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qualifications in the psychiatric field, including
demonstrated administrative ability, proven teaching
capacity and outstanding recognition in psychiatric
circles" (Lafayette Clinic, 1954).

Pay for the new

position would "be in line with the highest salaries
paid for comparable positions."
Gottlieb was the unanimous choice.

He was a

professor of psychiatry and Chairman of the Department
of Psychiatry and Neurology at the University of Miami.
Prior to that he had been Director of the Psychiatric
Institute at the Jackson Memorial Hospital, Miami.
Gottlieb was also well respected by Department of
Mental Health officials who recruited him. "Jack and I
worked very well together, explained William Anderson,
M. D.

(personal communication, January 29, 1985).

"He

was Director there when I was Director of the Department
and I think we accomplished a lot together."
In fact, Gottlieb worked with DMH Directors Wagg,
Kimmich, Stehman, Anderson, Yudashkin and Smith.

Each

of the former Directors interviewed had high praise for
the man, although relationships with the Department of
Mental Health deteriorated somewhat in the 1970s following Yudashkin's resignation.
Gottlieb's political skills were an important
aspect of agency survival, according to one former DMH
Chief Deputy Director:
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Lafayette started pff with a very powerful figure
as its head. And this person had enormous influence in the Department, in DMB, in the Legislature.
He was able to haul millions and millions of
dollars into the budget and get great acceptance
for it. Gottlieb did a great job with legislators.
He would have them there. He would have members of
their family who were in trouble come there and
give them the treatment, and they were always
pleased. They always walked away feeling
satisfied.
An observer commented, "While it is somewhat of an
oversimplification, it is generally true that these
superintendents ran a sort of fiefdom, answerable in
only a general way to a central authority" (McCauley,
1974, p. 6).

This was evidenced most clearly in the

budget process.

Gottlieb and other facility directors

solicited support and funds directly from legislators on
appropriation committees.

Hearings were held at insti-

tutions and testimony received from superintendents with
little direct input from Department of Mental Health or
Department of Management and Budget staff.
Lafayette Clinic's relationship with key bureaucrats and politicians began to slip a little following
Gottlieb's retirement, but the residue remained.

This

was especially true since, although technically retired,
Gottlieb continued his teaching and consultation duties.
He also continued to serve as agency spokesperson.
Facility Staff
.It would be unfair to characterize Gottlieb's
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tenure as completely without problems.

Lafayette Clinic

weathered many of the same staff difficulties that other
agencies experienced in integrating clinicians with
direct-care personnel and academicians with state
workers.

But, one of the most difficult aspects of such

a relationship had been clarified by the legislature and
accepted by both the Department of Mental Health and
Wayne State University -- the clinical chain of command.
A former Administrative Officer and Acting Director
following Gottlieb's retirement, stated:
From my perspective, the relationship among and
between staff has always been relatively smooth.
There are always some conflicts around administration, but at least at Lafayette we consider
ourselves a Civil Service organization with Civil
Service employees. That's even the professional
staff. No serious problems at all. They are
considered Civil Service staff with joint appointments and I think they have fully accepted that
role.
One concept developed at Lafayette, and relatively
unique to work situations, was that of the milieu team.
An individualized treatment team was assigned to each
patient.

Generally it consisted of a psychiatrist,

psychiatric nurse and attendant, psychologist, social
worker, occupational therapist, recreational therapist,
work therapist, special education teacher and vocational
rehabilitation counselor.
The unusual aspect was the carry-over of this
treatment concept to staff relationships.

Peter
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Beckett, M.D.,

(Lafayette Clinic, 1971, p. 9) said, "The

patient's progress -- the measure of success -- depends
heavily upon total communication within the milieu team
and elimination of attitudes in staff which might slow
the patient's progress."

To· accomplish this, teams

adapted many of the techniques of psychotherapy within
their daily work relationships, including "freely and
openly expressing their opinions and feelings, and
challenging and probing harmful attitudes in team
members" (Lafayette Clinic, 1971, p. 9).
Only rarely are such intensive relationships
completely trouble free.

A Lafayette Human Relations

Council was established in 1965 during what was termed
"a racial crisis in our society".

But minutes of the

July 17, 1965 meeting revealed that there was "a greater
gap between the managerial sector and employee sector of
the Clinic" which prompted an ongoing staff council to
moderate interactions between direct-care workers and
administrators.
During that same period there was some concern
among personnel about a proposed transfer of Lafayette
Clinic from the Department of Mental Health to University jurisdiction.

On November 28, 1967 Mrs. Cornelia

Wright, a Lafayette staff member, wrote a letter to Dr.
Anderson, DMH Director, enclosing a letter/petition
signed by 61 employees.

In the letter she asked, "Why
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is Lafayette Clinic being cut off from Mental Health and
Civil Service and handed over to Wayne University?" She
went on to ask, "Can anything be done by the employees
of Lafayette Clinic to prevent this severance? This is a
stupefying shock to be suddenly cut off from security
many of us had planned on."
Anderson's reply, dated December 1, 1967 states,
"The Department of Mental Health has made no request to
transfer Lafayette to Wayne State University and has not
been asked to take any official position on any proposal
initiated last year."
A letter from Gottlieb to Anderson adds:
I presented your attitude of firm support for the
continuation of the Lafayette Clinic as a unit in
the Department of Mental Health. This assuaged
their (staff) concern over our survival as they see
us essential to the teaching and research programs
of the university.
With the feeling of assurance that you also
were interested in our adequate survival, they had
no hesitancy in canceling all of their study committees concerned with the problem of our transfer.
They assured me that they were in no way interested
in raising any issue or controversy as our function
in the past as a Division of the Department of Mental Health has been extremely satisfactory to them.
They were only concerned in assisting us in receiving adequate support so we could meet our obligations efficiently. (December 21, 1967)
Concerns about DMH support of the Clinic were not
completely ameliorated.

By August, Gottlieb felt

compelled to write Anderson again, telling him:
Without question, the 1967-68 year that we are now
in is the most difficult that we have ever faced at
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Lafayette Clinic. The funds from the State are
completely inadequate, and made no provisions for
initiating support of our research wing •••• In
order to keep our staff intact, and to maintain
morale, it has been necessary to use every expediency possible.
Monies were slowly being filtered from research
programs to direct care and community placements.
Already there was evidence of a very real difference in
priorities between the Department and Lafayette Clinic
administrators.
Decision Makers
A major decision point, demonstrating Gottlieb's
strength as institutional leader, occurred in the early
1970's.

In the midst of crisis Gottlieb not only man-

aged to salvage Lafayette programs and receive additional funding, but he further anchored the facility
within the system.
The story was one that inherently appealed to newspapers.

It had every element of sensationalism.

A

37-year-old mental patient, committed to Ionia State
Hospital after raping and killing a student nurse 18
years earlier, was considered an excellent candidate for
experimental brain surgery to curb his aggressive
impulses: "Last year, doctors at Detroit's Lafayette
Clinic said they believed there is hope for the man.
They offered him a chance for brain surgery, and he
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agreed" ("Brain Surgery Case Opens," 1973).
Dr. Ernst Rodin, a neurologist at Lafayette, had
planned experimental brain surgery on Smith and surgical
and chemical experiments on 23 other involuntarily
committed patients, in an effort to control their
aggression.

suit was filed by Gabe Kaimowitz of

Michigan Legal Services to halt the experimentation.
Charles R. Halpern, of the National Mental Health Law
Project, representing the American Ortho Psychopsychiatric Association, and University of Michigan law
professors Francis A. Allen and Robert A. Burt were
Smith's court appointed attorneys.

Representing Rodin

and Gottlieb was Samuel I. Shuman, Wayne State University Professor of Law and Psychiatry, and Assistant
Attorney General Thomas Wheeker, representing the
Department of Mental Health.
According to client Louis Smith, who was known as
John Doe to the public during much of the court case,
"Dr. Yudashkin (DMH Director) told me last May that the
surgery would not hurt or impair my emotional abilities.
I was surprised by him asking me.

I don't think too

many people in institutional life approached me oneto-one like Dr. Yudashkin" (Caine, 1973, p. Al).

It is

interesting to note that the Director of the Department
of Mental Health became directly involved in obtaining
client permission for a facility research program.
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The press immediately took advantage of a sensational story.

The Detroit News ran a weekly series,

including a five page Sunday News Magazine article by
"John Doe" (1973) entitled, "Can You Cut Out Hate With A
Knife?: The Story of a Tortured Mind."

Kaimowitz argued

that, "We must refuse to let the state of Michigan
become a playground for the type of experimentation
which has troubled man since Nurenberg." ("Brain
Research, ••• " 1973).
Newspaper articles traced the history of psychosurgery from its beginnings in 1936 and talked about
doctors using ice picks to perform lobotomies.

They

cited Dr. Walter Freeman as the "father of American
lobotomy" since he performed 3,000 to 4,000 operations
in this manner.
A three-judge Wayne County Circuit Court panel
consisting of Horace W. Gilmore, John D. O'Hara and
George E. Bowles was asked to decide whether involuntarily confined mental patients could participate in
experimental psychosurgery.

Not only did they rule that

surgery would be illegal, but they added that Smith's
rights had been violated by his indefinite hospitalization following the rape-murder.

On Friday, April 6,

1973 they ordered him released by Monday, April 9, after
ruling that his confinement was unconstitutional and
hearing testimony that he was a good risk for freedom.
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The result threatened to devastate Michigan's
mental health system.

Essentially the court had stated

that the majority of involuntarily committed patients
residing in state hospitals were being illegally
confined.

This related specifically to the criminal

population of mental institutions, including all of the
criminal sexual psychopaths at Ionia State Hospital who
had never been tried for their crimes, but were institutionalized instead.

While a murder trial was being

urged for Smith, DMH officials were contending with the
necessity of having to free thousands of the mentally
ill.
A compromise was reached.

The Department agreed to

immediately present the legislature with a comprehensive
mental health code, including new admission and discharge criteria.

The code was described as "an act to

modernize, add to, revise, consolidate and codify the
statutes relating to mental health" (Act 258, 1974).

It

also directed the Department to establish effective
coordination and integration of all public mental health
services for the purpose of providing a unified system
of state-wide mental health care (Section 116(g)).
As an activist for services in the metropolitan
area, and a confidante of DMH Director Yudashkin,
Gottlieb successfully lobbied the Department of Mental
Health and legislature to include a separate chapter in
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the new Mental Health code pertaining specifically to
Lafayette Clinic.
This was a masterful stroke because it came at a
time when both Lafayette's mandate and relationship with
the Department and legislature were at their most
tenuous.

As mentioned previously, placement programs,

particularly those in the Detroit area, were being
roundly criticized.

Yudashkin was under pressure by

Detroit-area legislators who argued that "the man's
approach was irresponsible and inexcusable.

He was in

the process of destroying some good programs by developing some bad ones with little thought to how they would
be implemented or what the final results would be."
Furthermore, Lafayette Clinic was directly involved in
the court case that declared current admission statutes
unconstitutional, throwing Michigan's mental health
system into turmoil.
Gottlieb gained concessions from a DMH Director who
was under fire from the same legislators who were supporting the Clinic, despite the fact that the Clinic
could be considered directly responsible for creating
many of the problems with which the Department was being
forced to contend.

The fact that Gottlieb did accom-

plish his goals is a tribute to the man and the strength
of Lafayette's support within the bureaucratic and
legislative hierarchy.
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Inclusion of the Clinic in a separate chapter of
the code meant considerable last-minute work and negotiation, but the effort was supported by other bureaucrats and gave Lafayette a charter, written into law.
It also clarified clinical supervision, a potentially
troublesome area.

Finally, it reiterated the relation-

ship between the Clinic and Wayne State University.
Chapter 9 of Public Act 258 of 1974, states that:
The department and Wayne state university shall
jointly appoint and control a director of the
Lafayette clinic who shall be a qualified psychiatrist with demonstrated ability as a teacher and
administrator. The director shall have complete
supervision and control of the operation and
personnel of the clinic.
As DMH Chief of Clinical Services from 1977 until
1983 when he retired, Stehman (personal communication,
February 27, 1985) commented, "A University is in business to educate, not to treat patients.

Through the

University every doctor becomes an independent contractor.

University involvement is great but it is impor-

tant to get the rules established before you sit down."
Gottlieb got the rules established.
Bureaucrats
The period between Gottlieb's retirement and the
appointment of Samuel Gershon, M.D., to head Lafayette
Clinic five years later was characterized by a reduction
in activities, although the facility continued to
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receive renewed accreditation from the Joint Commission
on Accreditation of Hospitals.

Gershon acknowledges

that the Clinic's prestigious reputation became tarnished as a series of acting directors took over while
four separate search committees looked for a permanent
chief who could satisfy the duties of Clinic Director
and Psychiatry Department Chairman (Covert, 1980, p.
Cl).

"We've had acting directors for six years-- an

astonishing length of time," Gershon stated.

He went on

to say:
Any institution that doesn't have someone running
it for that long has all sorts of problems created
in it. You lose staff, can't recruit new good
people. The legislative support for budgets
dwindles over time with no one to make the needs
known and justify them. The budget problems we
have now are much worse than we've ever had before.
(Covert, 1980, Cl)
The Clinic received its first research grant since
1974 during the first year of Gershon's appointment.
One grant in six years is not an impressive record for
what was once a pioneering institution, Gershon admits.
"Lafayette Clinic originally was funded through bond
sales," Gershon said.

"The public felt a commitment to

mental health when the facility opened. It's a question
of reawakening that commitment" (Covert, 1980, Cl).
Gershon continued to work toward re-establishment
of a close working relationship with Wayne State University and considered it an ongoing effort.

Shortly after
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becoming Director, he successfully formalized his own
position.

The Director of Lafayette Clinic is now

simultaneously appointed Chairman of the Department of
Psychiatry at Wayne State University.
Over the last several years the relationship
between Lafayette Clinic and the Department of
Psychiatry at the School of Medicine has undergone
a major revision with the development of close ties
and integration of programs •••• Lafayette Clinic
can now function as the Neuropsychiatric Institute
of the Department of Psychiatry (Lafayette Clinic,
1983, p. i).
The Mandate
Gershon perceived Lafayette Clinic as providing a
"consultative and referral source for problems of
clinical concern within the state system" (Lafayette,
1983, p. i).

Broadly stated, he considered the Clinic's four
major goals as:
1)

Advancing research for greater understanding

and improved treatment of mental illness.
2)

Providing a high standard of training for

workers specializing in the mental health disciplines
and for others concerned with mental health problems.
3)

Providing modern psychiatric services for the

citizens of Michigan.
4)

Being a leader in extending the techniques of

mental health care in the community.
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But the facility's goals and mandate have evolved
over the years to meet the exigencies of the times.
Lafayette's first annual report stated that the agency's
primary goal was to serve as an acute psychiatric treatment resource for patients.

Only secondarily was it

expected to supplement and augment educational and clinical psychiatric resources in the community.

Finally,

the Clinic was expected to initiate, assist and amplify
training and research programs.
In discussing the research component, the report
went on to say:
It was decided that the major research efforts of
the Lafayette Clinic would be directed towards the
most devastating illness that fills mental hospitals ••• schizophrenia .••• This illness is
primarily one of young people and of a chronic
nature, even having its initiation in the young
child at times. (Lafayette Clinic, 1956, p. 8)
Initially, research centered on discovering the
causes of schizophrenia.

Thomas Sullivan, Lafayette

Assistant Director, noted that Clinic faculty were also
at the forefront of brain research within the United
States (Covert, 1980, p. Cl).
One of the most interesting characteristics of the
agency, however, has been its ability to adapt with the
times, to change focus to meet perceived community and
Department of Mental Health needs.

As Covert (1980, p.

Cl) would add, "Since Lafayette was founded in 1955, its
researchers often displayed a keen eye for hot topics in
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psychology, and their studies were underwritten by
frequent federal research grants."
For instance, in the late 1950's, Clinic staff
probed the relationship between dietary deficiencies and
mental retardation.

In the early '60s, they conducted

human stress tests for NASA and, at the end of the
decade, were deep in research on methadone and marijuana
for treatment of narcotics addiction.

Today, staff are

involved in sexual dysfunction and sleep research, as
well as gerontological studies.
These changes in focus were partly a response to
ongoing budgetary difficulties created by chronic underfunding.

In the 1961-62 Fiscal Year progress report, it

was stated that:
In spite of the fact that the research program of
the Lafayette Clinic has been making excellent
progress the funds allocated by the State of Michigan for the support of this institution cover only
service function and part of training. Only 6% of
the total appropriation to the Lafayette Clinic is
used for the support of research. (Lafayette
Clinic, 1962, p. 2)
According to Wayne State University administrators,
this lack of funding for research was less an indication
of belief in Lafayette's ability to garner grant support
than an expression of DMH's lack of interest in
research.

The highest DMH priority, and the one for

which funds were provided, was ongoing care of patients.
Yet, as early as 1965, an audit by Peter A. Martin,
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M.D. (personal communication to the Department of Mental
Health, September 9, 1965) acknowledged that without
Lafayette Clinic's grant base, services would collapse:
"Here, as throughout the mental health institutions in
Michigan, the line item budget ties the Director's hands
and promotes inefficiency instead of efficiency of
operations."
Despite these difficulties, staff were able to gain
substantial funds from outside sources, enough to keep
research programs viable.

One example of this ability

to garner support by perceiving and attempting to meet
community needs occurred following the Detroit riots of
1967.

Gottlieb was able to obtain a research grant of

$130,000 for the study of the "Detroit Disaster".
One Lafayette (1971, p. 33) summary states, "Even
before the Detroit riot of July, 1967, had ended, a team
from the Lafayette Clinic, Wayne State University and
the University of Michigan began to explore its causes
and its likely consequences."

Citizens, including those

arrested, along with officers from the Detroit Police
Department, were interviewed.

The report concludes

that, "this study and similar ones done elsewhere have
increased comprehension of the nature of urban disturbance, may have corrected misconceptions, and have had
at least an indirect effect on public policy" (Lafayette
Clinic, 1971, p. 33).
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While some might question how appropriate this role
was for a mental health institution, according to the
Clinic's twelve year report published in 1967, a major
facility goal was to:
minimize the long-standing barriers between the
psychiatric hospital and the community. Lafayette
Clinic's attacks on these barriers include its own
urban location, simplified admission procedures,
accessible drop-in clinic, day-care and night-care
facilities, community education activities and use
of newer modes of Social Insurance like Medicare,
and UAW-Blue Cross health insurance coverage.
(p. 6)
A study by Kish and Lowinger (1971), however,
questioned whether the "black uprising in Detroit and
the following well-publicized Lafayette Clinic civil
disorder studies" may have been significant in decreasing clinic referrals, particularly for low income, inner
city residents.

Given the program's economic straits,

any source of funds was welcomed and the money was
interaccounted into the operational budget for
personnel.
It appears that Lafayette Clinic administrators
were forced to compare the value of support gained from
community and university decision makers to that withdrawn by an already isolated and essentially disenfranchised group of potential clients.

The 1971 Lafayette

Clinic progress report further delineated the administrative philosophy behind increasing involvement in
locally funded projects.

It argued that:
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Like most institutions, a hospital can assume the
aspect of a little world of its own.
In these
times, however, society cannot afford to have its
institutions isolated unto themselves. The
resources of the Lafayette Clinic and the knowledge
generated through its programs have a direct
bearing upon our awesome social problems.
Society
must have ready access to our resources and
information. (p. 13)
The Legislature
By 1973, support, most notably in the form of
legislative funds and research grants, was drifting
elsewhere.

For Fiscal Year 1973, ending June 30, 1974,

the University of Michigan was actually allocated more
money than Lafayette Clinic for "Administration and
operation of the neuropsychiatric institute and children's psychiatric hospital-- $7,879,800 and mental
health research institute- $2,097,100" (Public Act 118,
1973, p. 461).

The University of Michigan was also

offered $732,800 in federal funds.
Lafayette Clinic, the larger, older, stateestablished and funded program received $6,004,600,
including $445,300 in federal funds.

Of this amount, 10

positions and $221,900 was allocated for establishment
of data processing services.
Another example of astute management occurred
during that critical year, 1974.

Concerns had been

raised about psychosurgery on involuntarily committed
adults who may not have the ability to consent.

The
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ensuing lawsuit embroiled Lafayette Clinic in legal
issues that would continue to impact on the systen1 for
years to come.

Yet, the Clinic managed to receive

special funding from the legislature in 1974, along with
an appropriation of $6,435,800 for an average patient
population of 135.

This included authorization for 342

staff positions.
A report of the Special Senate Committee on Mental
Health, authored by Senator John E. McCauley (1974),
explained that "A drug has been synthesized by Doctor
Frohman of this Clinic, which he claims and Doctor
Hendrie backs up, will cure schizophrenia partially or
in total.

This drug is now in the process of being

patented for the State of Michigan by Governor William
G. Milliken."
The miracle drug had been developed.

"If success-

ful, the medicine could restore millions of patients to
normal life," Gottlieb (McCarthy, 1976, p. Al) told
reporters.

Developed over a period of nearly 20 years,

the medicine was being isolated and synthesized at the
Clinic.
testing.

Staff were only awaiting approval for human
"Researchers at Lafayette Clinic for years

have worked on the premise that schizophrenia had a
biochemical cause," read one newspaper account.
"Through years of painstaking investigation, they now
feel they have nailed it down" (McCarthy, 1976, p. Al).
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Clinicians mentioned that approximately half of
Michigan's 5,000 mentally ill patients in state hospitals suffered from the disease (occupying one quarter of
all hospital beds).

The medication would cure most of

these clients, greatly reducing the need for public
mental health services.

The legislature allocated

$690,500 for an "accelerated schizophrenia research
program" (Act 233, 1974, p. 632).
Public Act 257 of 1975 directed the Department of
Management and Budget to reduce the general fund amount
appropriated to the Department of Mental Health by 1.5%
"in order to equal the amount of estimated revenue as
reflected in House Bill No. 4439 of the 1975 regular
session of the legislature" (p. 870).

Despite this, the

same act authorizes $710,700 to Lafayette for accelerated schizophrenia research (not to exceed 31.2
positions).
Although Lafayette's operational fund allocation
increased slightly during 1975 to $7,058,400, with
federal monies subtracted ($1,332,300) and a 1.5%
reduction ($85,891), actual funds totalled $5,640,209
for an approved population of 115 and staff of 289.1.
An additional $1,048,730 and 58.1 positions were
approved for a 20-bed children's center.
Money was also allocated to the Ionia Probate Court
to help offset the unanticipated jump in court costs
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resulting from petitions on behalf of Ionia State
Hospital patients.
in~~tes

Without court involvement these

would nave been discharged en masse as a result

of earlier rulings regarding involuntary confinement of
criminal sexual psychopaths.
The following year, 1976, was an odd appropriation
year because it ended on September 30, 1976 instead of
June 30, 1976.

Despite budgetary juggling, the legis-

lature requested another $753,300 for Lafayette's
accelerated schizophrenic research program (Act 251,
1976).

Governor William Milliken vetoed it.

The

legislature submitted a special supplemental appropriation (Act 309 of 1976) for the full $753,300, along
with a request for an additional $212,100 to reopen a
closed ward at the Clinic.
While the Governor had vetoed other mental health
appropriations, including $463,500 for a depression
research project at the University of Michigan's Mental
Health Research Institute, only Lafayette's request was
reinstated.

Negotiations included projected reductions

in Ionia Riverside Center costs as programs were downphased.

Act 309 took immediate effect on October 28,

1976, approximately a month after the start of the
fiscal year.
Unfortunately, no further information was ever
released about the miracle drug and the promises of 1974
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gradually faded away.

With that unacknowledged failure,

it became imperative that Clinic research focus on other
contemporary issues.
During FY 1975 Lafayette Clinic received another
special appropriation of $251,300 to develop a substance
abuse service, with a staff of 9.7 people.

The legisla-

ture wanted to launch a strong offensive against drug
abuse and allocated a total of $17,830,700 to 5 Executive departments.

The largest sum went to the Depart-

ment of Public Health ($16,353,600) with Education
receiving $695,300; Social Services $385,700 and
Corrections $144,800.

Lafayette was the only Department

of Mental Health drug abuse program to be funded.
The General Public
Community placement and Mental Health Code issues
continued to be two of the primary concerns impacting on
the Detroit area and Lafayette Clinic.

Citizens were

upset by the thousands of former mental patients living
in urban communities, especially inner city Detroit.
"What we're dealing with are society's discards," said a
Wayne County Department of Social Services worker:
You can call them schizophrenics, or you can call
them bums.
It doesn't matter. What matters is
that they come to us because nobody else can deal
with them. And when we're done with them, do you
think society really wants them back? (Hart &
Watson, 1977, p. Al)
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Staff did not perceive these issues as caused by
neglect or lack of interest.

A Lafayette Clinic

employee clarified their view:

"The sense that I got

was a concern for increasing the quality of care within
the mental health system.

There was a lot of involve-

ment in what kind of programs we were providing.

This

relates both internally (facility treatment) and externally (to the community)."

However, services continued

to be hampered by lack of funds.
The Legislature
In 1977 Lafayette Clinic received an appropriation
of $8,517,400 for 306 staff positions.

Of this amount

$1,157,500 was received from federal funds.
$650,000 was allocated for research.

Only

Interestingly

enough, in that same mental health appropriation bill
(Public Act 106 of 1977), the legislature inserted an
unusual last paragraph:
Sec. 49. It is the intention of the legislature
that the close collaborative relationship which has
existed since the establishment of Lafayette Clinic
between the department of mental health and Wayne
state university shall continue in the programs as
established in section 904 of Act No. 258 of the
Public Acts of 1974, being section 330.1904 of the
Michigan Compiled Laws. (p. 550)
Although there is little evidence of what elicited
this reaction, there must have been some perception of
threat to this "close collaborative relationship" that
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necessitated a legislative response.

Smith was then DMH

Director and one former staff member clarified what
happened:
Smith was very, very supportive of university
affiliated research, but there was increasing
dissatisfaction as money began to go toward other
projects.
I might even say that there was some
resentment that the Department was beginning to
develop new programs without adequately supporting
existing ones.
It was during this fiscal year that Michigan
Institute for Mental Health, with Michigan State
University (MSU) assistance, opened.
Lafayeti~-6ontinued

to make compromises in reaction

to increasing budget reductions throughout the state.
The Administrative Officer at that time said, "We tried
to do some early downphasing before the really big stuff
hit.

After taking care of the inpatients, then we had

to examine how best to allocate money to maintain as
much as possible of the research component."
Joe Snyder was an extremely powerful legislator in
both Michigan chambers and on both the Mental Health and
Appropriations Committees.

He was elected from the

Detroit area and, before retiring in 1979, remained a
strong advocate for the Clinic.

"There's just no

doubt," said one of Governor Milliken's aides, "the
history of the politics of mental health in the '70s are
thoroughly intertwined with Joe Snyder.

He was the

activist."
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A Lafayette Clinic staff member mentioned that
Snyder:
went out of his way to assure that the hospital was
supported. When we had to close the ward, we had
interested legislators down here to tour the ward
and visit the Clinic.
I think the Clinic did have
solid legislative support; even the Governor carne
to visit.
Michigan Department of Mental Health
The next several years were turbulent.

Public

attention focused on another Wayne County facility,
Plymouth Center, where allegations of abuse created
system-wide repercussions.

A former Clinic psychiatrist

said, "I think that caused more changes than the Mental
Health Code.

I know that mostly our reaction (at

Lafayette Clinic) and the reaction of most of the other
service providers in the area, was just to lay low."
Two DMH Directors, Smith and Stehman, resigned
under pressure.

In the meantime, search committees had

finally agreed on a Lafayette Clinic Director.
When Gershon accepted the position in 1979, he
found that state budget cuts had left the center underfinanced by $2.5 million, a full third of its $7.5
million 1979 budget (Covert, 1980, p. Cl).

He also

found a facility that was generally demoralized by staff
losses, lacked strong leadership, and was under close
scrutiny for potential human rights violations.
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Given the unusual circumstances in Wayne County,
the Department of Mental Health could not afford to
eliminate any program serving the poverty area, but it
could insist on operational research, according to a
former DMH Director who went on to say, "It didn't
matter a hill of beans to the powers that be that a
program was meeting community or consumer needs, what
mattered was the budget."
The DMH 1979-1980 update to the 1976 Michigan State
Plan for Comprehensive Mental Health Services clarified
the Department's position:
Research to be supported must be broadly defined as
operational research. The research should be seen
to have an impact on treatment provided in the
public mental health system in Michigan.
It must
have a relevance to the current overall goals and
concerns of the Department of Mental Health. The
Department of Mental Health will not support
research of a more basic investigational type (p.
109) •
During Fiscal Year 1980, the Clinic had 354
employees and received $10,491,900 of which $953,700 was
allocated for research (20 positions).
amount came from federal funds.

$122,000 of this

Cutbacks caused the

closing of two wings (the adolescent and neurology
units) in 1982.

One of the empty wards has since been

reopened to serve what is perceived to be a growing
community population in need, the geriatric mentally
ill.
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However, there remain some serious differences in
opinion, both within the legislature and the Department
of Management and Budget, regarding facility programs.
Department of Management and Budget Staff
Legislative involvement in agency services began to
erode in later years.

One Michigan Representative on

the House Mental Health Committee states:
I've toured the facility.
I'm aware of some of the
research things that h_ave gone on.
It's high cost.
I think whenever you want a very intensive program
like that, it's always going to be a higher cost.
The professional ratio to patients is so low compared to regular hospitals. Now the question is,
are they getting their money's worth? I don't
know .••• The cost may not be justified.
The 1974 legislative mandate offered some sense of
security.

But, according to a former Department of

Mental Health Director, "A very liberal legislature,
back in the earlier days, gave them (Lafayette Clinic)
some very special rights, special conditions and I
suppose many of them don't like that now."
Concern about Clinic programs was also expressed by
the Legislative Research Analyst who handled the Department of Mental Health budget during the past ten years:
There have always been legislators who have questioned some of the things that have happened at
Lafayette Clinic •••. Of course in the last few
years we've had to have so many budget cuts, or
threatened budget cuts that never happened, and
each time the Department of Mental Health is always
asked by the Governor, "What can you give up?"
••. And the legislature asks itself ••• "now what
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can be cut?" And Lafayette Clinic always comes up.
Now we can't cut it because it is required by law.
When asked whether the idea to cut the Lafayette
budget is brought up by the Department of Mental Health,
her answer is "No, by everyone.

Because it is always

felt that, my gosh, if we can't afford to treat people,
what the heck are we doing spending money on research?"
Among those who questioned research during a time
of growing patient care costs were Department of Management and Budget fiscal analysts.

Lafayette was increas-

ingly forced to depend on outside grant monies to fund
research.

However, since it was one of the few accred-

ited state-operated inpatient programs, third-party
reimbursements covered a substantial portion of directcare costs.
That did not completely ameliorate concerns
according to one analyst:
For a number of years, I can't remember how many
years, there was one research project going on at
Lafayette Clinic, research into the cause of
schizophrenia and the treatment of schizophrenia.
They got into this peptide thing that after much
hoop-de-do turned out to be absolutely nothing -nothing. And the state put millions of dollars
into it. Now that's the research game of course.
You fund research. Maybe it comes up with something, maybe it doesn't. But, if we have to cut
$50 million.
University Officials -- Wayne State Faculty
While the Department of Mental Health continued to
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urge fast, efficient patient care, Lafayette faculty
attempted to maintain support for ongoing research
projects.

Increasing budget constraints and differences

in expenditure priorities between DMH and Lafayette
administrators renewed interest in a transfer of
authority from the Department of Mental Health to Wayne
State University.

This time, staff were more supportive

of the proposal that had initially been presented in
1967.
One legislative research analyst, interviewed in
January 1985, mentioned that, "Right now there's a
project going on aimed at transferring the facility to
Wayne State."

When asked if that is a legislative

initiative, she replied, "No, it's an Executive branch
initiative. But I think there are some legislators who
support it."

She added that it was not a budget issue,

"not as far as the Executive branch is concerned because
they expect to continue funding.

But, if the transfers

do happen they feel that third-party payments or federal
funds, or research grants, etc. will be forthcoming."
Such a change in status would also protect
Lafayette from budgetary, philosophical and political
uncertainties extant within the Department of Mental
Health.
In discussing his opinions about the Clinic,
however, the DMH Director of the Office of Legislative
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Liaison, said:
Super nice facility, has outstanding talent down
there •••• Probably one of the best in their specialties, probably the best research centers in the
midwest •••• The only difference is when we had the
lean years, why they suffered a bit and I think
they prefer to be a part of the Wayne State University than a part of the Department of Mental
Health. But I definitely see support within the
Department and Legislature for Lafayette Clinic.
The long-term disposition of Lafayette Clinic,
thus, remains uncertain.
Media
As will be mentioned in Chapter VI, Lafayette has
received only limited media attention during the past
years.

The Clinic's Acting Director following

Gottlieb's retirement pointed out that "Lafayette kept a
low profile with the media.
low-keyed approach.

Gottlieb really preferred a

He wanted to prevent any possible

misunderstanding."
Attentives
It is difficult to know whether this attitude
toward the media was helpful or harmful.

During inter-

views, advocacy group members and leaders from several
types of organizations generally expressed ignorance of
Lafayette Clinic programs.
refer clients.

Several were hesitant to

When asked about the Clinic, the Execu-

tive Director of one consumer group stated:
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I never refer anyone.
I wish I had more knowledge
about Lafayette, that's one reason. Another reason
is what people tell me, and people are people who
have been there. That's a guinea pig place.
That's an experimental -- and children, that's
another issue with Lafayette •••• They have to show
me some proof that their program's effective. And
I don't see anything.
The Secretary/Treasurer of a more militant client
advocacy program was vehement in his opposition:
Lafayette represents the greatest danger of all the
institutions.
It is the closest thing to Nazi
medicine you will ever find.
It is experimental
and they use people for guinea pigs. They don't
have to tell anyone what they're doing and they get
tons of money to perform experiments that most of
the time don't have any results.
But an entirely different viewpoint was offered by
the Director of a mental health association working with
both families and service providers:
It does not have the national prominence that it
once did, partially because of funding, probably
some political pressures throughout the years. We
just really have not attracted the kinds of funds
and staff that keep a location as prominent as it
once was. But, there's a director there, Gershon,
who came in about five years ago and has done a
good job of rebuilding Lafayette Clinic.
Lafayette Clinic staff generally agree that these
next years will be characterized by rebuilding.

In the

past there have been ongoing discussions regarding
transferring the facility to Wayne State University,
serious setbacks in achieving funding which necessitated
reinterpretation of the mandate, as well as some suggestion that at least the research component should be
discontinued.

However, a unique legislative charge,
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reiterated over the years, along with personal involvement by several DMH directors and legislators, has
solidified the institution's position within the system.
It is worthwhile to contrast this program with
another, similar facility that also appeared to have
such support, at least initially.
Michigan Institute for Mental Health
The Beginnings
Tradition, Culture and Institutions
Michigan Institute for Mental Health (MIMH) was a
third generation facility.

It evolved from the Ionia

State Hospital (a large, first generation institution),
which opened on September 7, 1885 as the Michigan Asylum
for the Criminally Insane.
At its peak Ionia State Hospital housed 1,500
people including forensic clients (under criminal court
charges) of whom almost 200 were criminal sexual psychopaths.

A maximum security institution, the primary con-

cern was isolation from society of a dangerous criminal
element.

Seventy years later in 1955,there were 329

employees and 1,400 patients.
By the 1960's there was increased understanding of
the difference between criminal sexual psychopaths,
insane criminals and mentally ill persons.

Service
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areas for the mentally ill had been clarified by the
Department of Mental Health and persons admitted directly to the Ionia State Hospital were, for the first time,
treated separately from the criminal population.
The new Ionia Riverside unit (a second generation
facility) was housed in a renovated building on the
grounds.

It was designed to be a short-term hospital-

ization program providing emergency inpatient psychiatric treatment for residents of Clinton, Ionia, Gratiot
and Montcalm counties.

Persons could be committed to

the Ionia Riverside unit either voluntarily or by
probate court.

Bed capacity was 250, and the unit

averaged 215 inpatients.
However, most Ionia patients were still committed
to the Center for Forensic Psychiatry in order to
determine competency to stand trial; for treatment
because of incompetency to stand trial or acquittal by
reason of insanity; or as mentally ill convicts transferred from correctional institutions.
Changes in the criminal code, including repeal of
the Criminal Sexual Psychopath Act, the plea "guilty but
mentally ill" and the new Mental Health Code began to
impact on the types of programs and treatment available
within both the mental health and correctional systems
during the late sixties and early seventies.
As early as 1967, executives from the Departments
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of Mental Health and Corrections were meeting in an
attempt to clarify custody and treatment boundaries.
Gus Harrison, Committe Chairman and Director of the
Department of Corrections, sent a January 2, 1968 letter
to Glenn

s.

Allen, Jr., State Budget Director, request-

ing release of planning funds for a "corrections medical
facility" based on authorization contained in Public Act
124 of 1965.
The study committee urged authorization to build a
shared institution at Ypsilanti for the criminally
insane and criminal sexual psychopaths.
projected at one million dollars.

Costs were

Ionia would then

become a general mental health institution.
A Lansing State Journal article by Jerry Moskal
(1967) interpreted the report as saying, "key officials
are requesting permission to build a joint facility at
Ypsilanti and for an almost immediate phase-out of
troubled Ionia State Hospital."

The article added that

"Gradual phase-out of Ionia had been urged previously by
a House Committee, which also recommended criminally
insane patients be treated at other state mental health
hospitals." Moskal (1967) went on to cite escapes,
improper parole practices, inadequate treatment and
alleged brutality of patients.
Some of these same study recommendations had been
made a year earlier by Robert A. Kimmich, M.D., then
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Director of the Department of Mental Health, following
review by a six-member Medical Audit Committee.

While

that report, which was sent to Governor George Romney
and members of the Legislature, mentioned phasing out
specialized services performed at Ionia, it also recommended that the facility be converted to a general
regional mental hospital.
In response to the Kimmich report, the Legislature
authorized a Center for Forensic Psychiatry through Publie Act 175 of 1966.

According to the Act, the facility

would handle "diagnosis, evaluation and treatment of
patients committed to the Department by criminal
courts."
In 1968 P.A. 143, the Goodrich Act, repealed the
criminal sexual psychopath law.
As a result of continued efforts by DMH and
Corrections officials, a residential unit of the new
forensic center opened in a building on the grounds of
Ypsilanti State Hospital in September 1969.

But the new

program did little to ease the tensions caused by population pressures at Ionia State Hospital.

A March 5,

1970 letter to Dr. William Anderson, DMH Director, from
Dr. George Birzgalis, Ionia Medical Superintendent,
revealed some of his concerns:
The public image of the Ionia State Hospital is
very vulnerable to severe criticism in the news
media because of the concentration of dangerous
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patients at this institution. If a patient after
his discharge from this hospital commits a new
offense, articles with large headings appear on the
front pages of newspapers. On the other hand some
dangerous patients who cannot be released into the
community write to news media, letters with complaints of alleged abuse and mistreatment of
patients •••• A few newspapers publish these
unfounded allegations again with large headings on
the front pages.
Instigated by these news
articles, other articles with severe criticism of
the Ionia State Hospital follow in the newspapers.
Usually they are written by persons who have never
been at this institution and who have no factual
and objective information on the operation of this
hospital.
Birzgalis (personal communication, March 5, 1970)
went on to mention an anonymous group organized by
inmates called the "Committee on Patient Welfare" which
mailed letters to relatives of inmates with "malicious
charges of abuse and mistreatment of patients."
In April, 1973 Department of Mental Health officials again discussed phasing out Ionia's forensic
program during Senate Appropriations Committee hearings.
Patient census had been reduced to about 300.

As a

result, approximately $1.5 million was transferred from
Ionia State Hospital accounts to the Center for Forensic
Psychiatry in Ypsilanti.
Senator Robert VanderLaan of Grand Rapids was
vigorously opposed to this approach.

He was concerned

about opening a new facility in temporary quarters while
underutilizing existing resources.

He urged the Depart-

ment of Mental Health to designate Ionia State Hospital
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as a forensic treatment center.

To ensure consideration

of his proposal, VanderLaan introduced Senate Concurrent
Resolution 23 in February, 1975.
The resolution called for a reexamination and
reevaluation of all departmental policies regarding
forensic services, noting that "recent news stories and
editorials throughout the State have focused public
attention on the problems inherent in housing mentally
ill offenders in the Wayne County jail."

With the

"modern facilities" at Ionia containing over 500 empty
beds and increasing demands for treatment and evaluation
of mental patients, "it seems shocking that such a situation exists."
In response, Acting DMH Director Donald Smith, M.D.
named a panel to work with a larger advisory task force
established at the same time to advise the Department on
integrating correctional and mental health services.
The panel focused specifically on development of forensic services in Michigan and alternatives, including the
feasibility of Ionia and the Center for Forensic Psychiatry jointly meeting state-wide needs.
Smith submitted his report to the Secretary of the
Senate in July, 1975.

His recommendation was that

Riverside Center, Ionia would best serve the state by
continuing as a regional mental health facility for
mid-state counties.

He also suggested that mental
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health diagnostic and treatment services be strengthened
at the center.
Department of Management and Budget
Two months later (September 19, 1975) Gerald
Miller, DMB Director, issued a press release stating
that he would recommend to the legislature that the
Ionia facility be transferred to the Department of
Corrections.

He stated that "While the prison inmate

population has been growing, the development of
community-based mental health programs has made possible
increased treatment of mentally ill persons outside
state institutions."

Miller drafted a transfer bill

which included cost figures and suggested language for a
supplemental appropriation to implement transferring
mentally ill clients from the Ionia Riverside unit.
In a November 26, 1975 letter to Jerome Hart,
Chairman of the Senate Appropriations Committee and
Dominic Jacobetti, Chairman of the House Appropriations
Committee, Miller cited the escalating inmate population
stating that "The buildings at Riverside Center are
maximum security buildings of recent vintage which are
easily adaptable to correctional use •••• In addition,
the facility at Riverside is not accredited which means
that the State is losing Federal funds."

In conclusion

Miller found that savings to taxpayers would amount to
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Attached to his letter were dra;ts of the

proposed bills.
Ionia Superintendent, David Ethridge, M.D. provided
an informational update for employees on September 26,
1975:

"Press releases on both sides of the issue have

begun to appear and it is obvious the controversy has
now entered into the political realm."

He went on to

say:
Many of you will no doubt find it gratifying that
the local community mental health clinics, probate
judges, county prosecutors, and many of our former
residents and their families have written letters
to the Governor, Acting Director of the Department
of Mental Health, Director of Management and Budget
and their own legislators attesting to the high
quality of services they have received from us and
objecting to the plan to discontinue psychiatric
services here at Riverside Center. At this point
in time, only a very few individuals have come out
in support of the proposed transfer. (Ethridge,
1975)
Politicians and Bureaucrats
There was a state-wide need for more prison space.
In 1976 Michigan prisons had already exceeded their
rated inmate capacity by 11,500, and the population was
rising.

However, in the first Michigan State Plan for

Comprehensive Mental Health Services, published in 1976,
there is no mention of the transfer or a new facility.
An interesting discussion, however, is recorded in
the minutes of the Michigan House of Representatives,
Mental Health Committee meeting of November 20, 1975.
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Ethridge met with the committee to discuss plans for
Riverside patients if the Ionia State Hospital were to
be closed.

The minutes read:

Dr. Ethridge had toured Kent Community Hospital as
a possible site for the installation of mental
health patients. He stated that the second floor of
the hospital could possibly be utilized for this
purpose, and that intensive remodeling would have
to be done •
••• Dr. Ethridge noted that there are approximately 50 to 60 patients currently scheduled for
transfer who are long-term chronic patients, but
feels that acute intensive admissions would be a
problem.
Joe Farrell (DMH Southeastern Regional Director) estimated it would cost approximately $70 per
day for a chronic patient at Kent Hospital which is
higher than the rate at Kalamazoo. Dr. Ethridge
stated that the majority of patients at Riverside
now come from the tri-county area of Eaton, Clinton
and Ingham counties.
John Baggott of Kent County Mental Health Services
told the committee that the Kent Hospital area was being
considered for a CMH alcohol unit, and that "plans (for
the Riverside transfer) are developing so rapidly that
no one knows exactly what the problems or costs will
be."
Ethridge clarified that the Department was planning
to release 86 patients to the tri-county area.

He added

that the biggest problem in the Lansing area was acute
emergency care, but current efforts to use St. Lawrence
to fill those needs were coming along well.
Gail Harris, Ed.D. of the Tri-County Community
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Mental Health Service (C-E-I CMH) opposed moving
patients to Kent county because of the distance. She
stated that the tri-county board was hoping to build a
100-bed facility in Lansing which would also serve
children.
The discussion ended with Ethridge promising to
defer additional work toward development of a Kent
facility until DMH could determine if similar facilities
were obtainable in the Lansing area.
On February 22, 1976 an advertisement appeared in
the Wanted to Rent section of the Lansing State Journal.
It said:
THE STATE OF MICHIGAN-Desires to lease for 5 years
with standard legislative cancellation clause and
renewal option in the Lansing area, a hospital
facility of approximately 100 bed capacity to
include 7,000 sq. ft. of office space. Facility to
be ope~ated by the Department of Mental Health,
have access to parking for 150 cars and be
available as soon as possible.
The Legislature
That same week Representative Ernest Nash
(R-Dimondale) introduced Michigan Public Act 58 of 1976,
mandating transfer of Ionia State Hospital to the
Department of Corrections.

The bill directed the

Department of Mental Health and the Department of
Management and Budget jointly to submit to House and
Senate Appropriations Committees a comprehensive plan
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and budget for "the provision of institutional and
community-based mental health care for residents of the
Riverside region."

It also authorized some $3.5 million

in state expenditures: $1.3 for the Department of
Corrections to hire new staff, $2 million for construetion and $159,000 for relocating the Department of
Mental Health program.
It was estimated that the State would save $15
million by moving mental health patients to a new
facility.

The bill passed 34-0 in the Senate and 102-0

in the House and took effect on March 24.

There was no

pre-vote debate.
A February, 1976 Huron Daily Tribune article
reported:
State officials, forced earlier this year to juggle
funds to balance the state budget, have resorted to
a similar tactic to reduce critical prison overcrowding •
•.• The state resorted
prisoners in the face of a
population which currently
officials to lodge inmates
institutions •

to juggling patients and
rapidly expanding prison
has forced corrections
in hallways at some

••. Miller (Budget Director) had asked the committee to approve the plan on an emergency basis,
and some members complained they were being forced
to write a blank check for prison building.
("State Changing, ••• " 1976).
Senator Jerome Hart (D-Saginaw), Chairman of the
Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Mental Health
stated there was little resistance to the action in
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mental health circles, "We want assurances that it will
be as good or better for the patients involved.

It may

be a step ahead, in phasing out an old facility" ("State
Changing, ••• " 1976).
Norbert Enzer, M.D.

(personal communication,

February 22, 1985), Chairman of the Michigan State
University (MSU) Department of Psychiatry, was a
personal friend of DMH Director Smith:
I was interested in training and education of
professionals, obviously particularly psychiatrists, and in research opportunities. The latter
was of some personal interest to Smith, but not at
the time a high priority institutionally because
they looked to Lafayette to do that.
Enzer (personal communication, February 22, 1985)
broached the subject of a combined research/teaching
mental health facility.

His approach was:

Lafayette Clinic's down there in Wayne and at least
in the past the Department of Mental Health substantially supported the Department of Psychiatry
at Michigan. How about doing something for us?
And one of the things he and I talked about was the
possibility of creating something not unlike the
Lafayette Clinic here, namely a research and training institute.
Harris (personal communication, April, 7, 1976)
continued to insist that the Clinton-Eaton-Ingham
Community Mental Health Services Board be considered an
active partner in planning for Riverside patients.

She

estimated that 70 percent of the residents were from the
tri-county service area.

"Thus, it is urgent that we

plan for comprehensive community services, .. she stated
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in calling for an April, 1976 meeting.

The C-E-I Board,

along with St. Lawrence Hospital, submitted a proposal
to DMH that offered 80 beds at St. Lawrence (20 acute
care) as well as 80 partial hospitalization beds (20 at
St. Lawrence and 60 in Ingham county).
Michigan Department of Mental Health
DMH officials, however, showed little interest in
coordinating services with community mental health.

No

state officials attended the tri-county planning meetings.

The October 1976 program statement, submitted by

DMH Director Donald

c.

Smith to meet legislative

requirements for the transfer, offered an analysis of
regional and statewide needs in planning for a permanent
replacement facility for Riverside Center.

It drew

heavily on DMH's 1976 plan without including C-E-I and
St. Lawrence's recommendations.
While it appears that an assumption qad already
been made by chief executives that the facility would be
Lansing-based, the report added other recommendations.
It was estimated that 120 adult beds would meet the
inpatient psychiatric treatment needs of the Riverside
catchment area and Shiawassee county.
mentioned that

11

The study also

there is a definite need for a residen-

tial treatment center to serve children in the catchment
area 11 (Michigan Department of Mental Health, 1976c,
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p. i).

A 40-bed unit was suggested, 20 for short-term

diagnostic programs and 20 in cottage-like units for the
severely disturbed.
The following program components were discussed:
1.

Occupational and vocational therapy to serve

community-based aftercare or outpatient clients on a
fee-for-service.
2.

A 36-bed unit for the chronically mentally ill.

3.

Provision of comprehensive training for mental

health personnel.
4.

A commitment to operational research.

The summary concludes that

11

the design of the new

facility should be committed to flexibility so that
future changes in service delivery needs can be accommodated with programming or residential space that can
be used for other purposes .. (MDMH, 1976c, p. 11).
In Smith's November 18, 1976 letter distributing
the report for review and comments to community mental
health boards, probate courts, legislators and other
interested parties, he adds,

11

If approved in fiscal year

1977, it is expected the facility would be completed by
1981.

11

In that same year (1976) DMH initiated a new
methodology in the planning and budgetary process.
Program Policy Guidelines (PPG) were issued, to be used
in formulating service requirements for the 1977-78
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Fiscal Year.

Each PPG for subsequent years was expected

to build upon policy and program foundations of the
past.
According to the Department, these guidelines were
intended to serve two related functions:

1. To delin-

eate, on a multi-year basis, the priorities of the
Department for planning, development, management and
evaluation of mental health programs; and 2. To provide
guidance to state-operated facilities and community
mental health boards for review of current programs and
preparation of program budget requests for the following
fiscal year (MDMH, 1976a).
For the mentally ill, top priority was given to
offering treatment in the least restrictive environment.
The question of where best to relocate Riverside Center
patients was being addressed as part of this process.
The Department had unsuccessfully explored placing
patients in two apartment complexes; a Provincial House
facility; the Michigan School for the Blind, Lansing;
the VFW home, Grand Ledge; the Great Lakes Bible School;
space at Michigan State University; Edmore Hospital,
Mount Pleasant Center for Human Development and Kent
County Community Hospital, Grand Rapids.

With no other

possibilities immediately available, the Department
proposed an interim plan.

Officials suggested using

other state hospitals until such time as a "Lansing-
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based, community-oriented, university-affiliated
facility which could serve as a model for other areas of
comprehensive service delivery" could be built (MDMH,
1975, p. 4).
Before that plan could be more fully explored, a
better solution was offered.
Environment
In Eaton county, eight miles south of the State
Capitol, but isolated enough to be practicable, the
Jarvis Acres Christian Retirement Center was going into
receivership.

It was a familiar story of the private

church-related nursing center selling life estates,
bonds and debentures, then finding itself unable to meet
debts.
Jarvis Acres, opened March 1972, had been placed
into receivership November 1975 for default of Mortgage
bonds.

The company owed $150,000 in back taxes and was

behind more than $750,000 in mortgage payments.

The

bank holding the $4 million mortgage on the facilities
and 70 acres of grounds indicated it would pursue
foreclosure unless Jarvis found a way out of its one
million dollar debt.
Fully half of the building was unoccupied.

Yet,

there was an imperative need to sustain the home because
of the elderly who had invested so heavily in the
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venture.

New Riverside Center would be housed in two

wings adjacent to, but isolated from, Jarvis Acres.
Considerable remodeling would have to take place to
bring the rented wings up to state standards, an extra
plus for the Jarvis Acres Co~poration.
Interest Groups and the Media
On June 2 the Windsor Township Planning Commission
met to receive the request from the State of Michigan
for a special use permit.
As Davis (1978) makes clear, there is another side
to innovation that those in the business of promoting
change processes should confront:

"All change is not

free-spirited onwardness and upwardness.

Much of it can

be wearisome, forceful adaptation" (p. 651).
The first public hearing to discuss DMH plans
accomplished little.

A June 16, 1976 Eaton County

Journal article revealed that after the May 3 meeting,
"Rumors have included such items as: criminally insane
patients to be moved in; dope addicts; a stone wall
between the State facility and remaining Jarvis Acres
portions of the building; bars on windows and
mismanagement of funds" ("Jarvis Acres, area resident,"
1976).
At the June 23 Windsor Township Board public
hearing to discuss issuance of the Special Use Permit,
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Mrs. Warner, a local resident, presented a petition
signed by 700 area residents opposing the facility.

She

and two other housewives had visited Riverside Center in
Ionia.

What they saw were "young people 18-25 years of

age, very dirty, hair matted, no socks and with spaced
out looks" (Elkins, 1976).
The appropriations bill for funding had passed the
Senate Appropriations Committee on May 12 and the House
Committee on May 13.

The official transfer would occur

on January 12, 1977.

According to Mrs. Warner, "this

was done very quickly, no chance for the public to be
informed" (Elkins, 1976).
The main concerns, as expressed at the hearing,
were that "the presence of mental patients would
depreciate property values and the future of Jarvis
would again be in jeopardy after the lease expired"
("State Use, ..... 1976).
Trustee Fred Smith argued vehemently against the
conversion, saying people did not want it, "They built
their homes in the area, then learned a facility for the
mentally ill would be a neighbor.

It isn't fair.

When

you move an institution into a settled area, that isn't
the choice of the people already there" ("Jarvis Acres
Controversy, ..... 1976).
Representative Ernest Nash (R-Dimondale), sponsor
of the transfer bill and a Jarvis neighbor, sent a
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letter supporting the proposed facility to all registered Windsor Township voters.

This is despite the fact

that Nash (personal communication, February 25, 1985)
felt:
In the community the overwhelming opinion was they
didn't want it.
It's like many other things such
as prisons or institutions, any kind of institution
almost. "We don't want it in our neighborhood. We
want it someplace else." And a lot of it's based
on the fear of the unknown.
In early July, area residents and township board
members received anonymous clippings of two
Journal articles, printed July 5 and 6.

~aton

Rapids

A 66-year old

mother received multiple stab wounds in the back.

She

and a 22 year-old, who had also been knifed, were taken
to St. Lawrence Hospital.

Police arrested the woman's

32 year-old son who was later taken to Riverside Hospital in Ionia, where he was under observation ("Nash
Checks, ••• " 1976).
The Windsor Township Planning Commission voted to
recommend granting a lease during its July 7 meeting.
According to one report on the meeting:
Voting to issue the special use permit (5 to 2)
followed a lively discussion by trustees before
less than 20 spectators -- a meager turnout
compared with the hundreds who turned out for
earlier public hearings where opponents to the
permit said the change would reduce property
values.
("Planners OK, ••. " 1976)
Smith adhered to his stance that the board had to
answer to the dictates of its voters and should not
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listen to "political interests and moneyed interests"
("Planners OK, ••• " 1976).

But the prevailing voice was

that of City Council member Gordon Cornwell who told the
planning board, "society is going to have to deal with
the care of these people in some way" ("Planning
Board, ••• " 1976).

The knifing incident, "along with

concerns of Windsor Township residents plus some local
mistrust of state government," led to several conditions
being attached to the Special Use Permit according to
Windsor Township Supervisor Garry Marsh ("Planners

OK, ••• " 1976).
In order to be admitted to a State facility,
patients have to meet one of three criteria under Chapter 4 of the Michigan Mental Health Code (Public Act 254
of 1974):
1.

Dangerous to themselves.

2.

Dangerous to others.

3.

Unable to take care of basic physical needs.

In addition, a person would have to be certified mentally ill by a licensed psychiatrist.
The Special Use Permit specified that the New
Riverside Center could not accept people with the
following diagnoses, even though they met all other
criteria for voluntary or involuntary admission:
1.

Any patients under criminal court charges.

2.

Anyone under the age of 18.
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3.

Drug abusers.

4.

Alcoholics.

5.

The mentally retarded.

Local politicians were dependent on constituency
support; yet, they were also bound to honor legal
ordinances and regulations.

The compromise was a

restrictive special use permit.

According to Nash

(personal communication, February 25, 1985):
By that time I think they felt the pressure was
gone. They felt that they were in a position of
not being able to deny it no matter what the public
feeling was, that all the rules and all the laws
had been met and they just weren't in a position to
deny.
On July 8, a petition against the transfer was
signed by 73 of 99 Jarvis Acres residents.

On August 11

the Township Board of Supervisors approved the Planning
Commission recommendation.
With Township Board and City Council approvals, the
Department of Mental Health was able to lease 54,300
square feet of Jarvis Acres space, effective July 31,
1976.

Properties included the first and second floors

of the east and south wings, the main dining area and
surrounding grounds.

Payments would be $556,442

annually, with adjustments for taxes, insurance and
maintenance.
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Michigan Department of Mental Health Bureaucrats
It was acknowledged by both the Department of
Mental Health and Michigan State University staff that
the new agency was of particular interest to DMH
Director Don Smith.

A former MIMH clinician noted:

It was always my understanding that Don Smith, who
had a very close relationship with the MSU Department of Psychiatry, developed this concept and then
hammered it out with the University people. It was
a very personal conceptualization that he envisioned, a top quality facility.
Ivan Estes (1976}, Personnel Director for the
Department of Mental Health, talked about DMH projections for the new agency during a September 8 meeting
with Jack Boyett, Personnel Director for the Department
of Corrections: William Abshire, Superintendent of
Riverside Correctional Facility: and Jon McNeil,
Department of Civil Service:
Riverside Center - Dimondale will be a training
facility for the Department of Mental Health.
Jarvis Acres is just an interim facility.
In about
five years we expect a new facility will be built
in the Lansing area and will then become a renowned
training facility.
New Riverside (MIMH} - the First Years
Facility Staff
Charles Pearson, a DMH Special Projects Coordinator
responsible for general administrative services, was
appointed New Riverside Director.

Pearson received his
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Bachelor of Arts degree from Michigan State University
in Business and Public Service and was reaching retirement age.

The law requiring that hospital superin-

tendents be physicians had recently been changed.
William Anderson, M.D., also nearing retirement,
agreed to serve as the Clinical Director on contract
from Michigan State University.

With Anderson's past

involvement as Department of Mental Health Director, it
was felt that the link between DMH and the University
had been carefully forged.

Joseph Farrell would con-

tinue to serve as Chief Deputy Director of the Southeastern Region.
Ionia employees were given the option of transferring to New Riverside, the Department of Corrections
or taking a layoff.

Since many direct-care staff did

not meet the physical requirements to become guards,
there was considerable concern.

Additionally, a number

of older employees had neither high school diplomas nor
GEDs, a Department of Mental Health and Civil Service
requirement.
The first 15 patients to be admitted to The New
Riverside Treatment Center (NRTC) came with Ionia staff
on March 6, 1977, although personnel transfers to the
Department of Corrections had been occurring since
November.

Other Ionia Riverside patients were being

released to nursing homes, their families and community
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living situations.
In addition, approximately 110 residents were
transferred from the Ionia Riverside facility to Ypsilanti, Kalamazoo, Traverse City and Clinton Valley
Center with the expectation that chronic patients"from
the New Riverside catchment area would eventually transfer back into the new facility.

Ypsilanti opened

30

bed ward to handle transfers and direct admissions in
the interim.
By October 1 there were 38 in-house clients,
although bed capacity was 50.

By December, remodeling

was finished and bed capacity rose to 80.

At about the

same time the tri-county community mental health board
established a nine bed respite care center that offered
overnight lodging for mentally ill persons.
Institutions
The New Riverside Treatment Center was designed to
fill many of the community needs that Riverside, Ionia
had worked toward, including treatment of acutely
mentally ill adults in a small crisis-oriented center.
However, NRTC had the additional advantages of being
closer to the population in need, operating in a new
building offering modern accommodations in a suburban
area.

As a State of Michigan agency, it served a six-

county area of Clinton, Eaton, Gratiot, Montcalm and
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Ionia with a total population of 503,177.

On January 1,

1978 Shiawassee county was also added to the catchment
area.
At the same time, the program's name was changed
to Michigan Institute for Mental Health (MIMH) to
reflect a transition from traditional mental health
facilities and, more specifically, a breaking away from
Ionia State Hospital and the Riverside Correctional
Center.

MIMH was a third generation program.

Joseph Farrell (personal communication, February
11, 1985), then DMH's Southeastern Regional Director,
commented that:
The whole idea of MIMH was that it was to be novel,
experimental in concept if not in treatment, and
that it would represent a partnership of the state,
community mental health boards and University. So,
from the very beginning we had discussions with MSU
about us contracting with them for psychiatric care
as well as research.
The agency had 136 employees with Michigan State
University faculty responsible for clinical services.
Under a unique agreement, the Director of Clinical
Affairs was on contract from MSU's Department of
Psychiatry, as were Unit Directors and psychiatrists.
Clinical professionals such as psychologists, physicians, social workers, and nurses were jointly recruited
by the University and DMH.

Although paid by the State,

they received appointments to the MSU Department of
Psychiatry faculty.

Audiovisual specialists, library
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consultants and other medical services were provided by
MSU under contract.

However, most employees were civil

servants, generally reporting to MSU contractual staff.
This organizational model, despite some unique
aspects, was fairly traditional.

Departments such as

Pharmacy and Activity Therapy provided centralized services. Each discipline had an appointed department head
who in some instances had little or no clinical responsibility as, for example, in the case of the Director of
Nursing and Clinical Director, while others, such as the
Directors of Social Work and Psychology, carried a fulltime case load.
MIMH was conceived (at least by the University
faculty) as a teaching program.

It provided the only

psychiatric in-hospital training site in the area. On
the average, there were three to four psychiatric residents, an equal number of physicians in residence as
well as psychologists, social workers, pharmacy and
student nurses in training.
Each MIMH patient received an individual treatment
plan designed by an interdisciplinary team consisting of
a psychiatrist, social worker, psychologist, activity
therapist, educational coordinator (if appropriate),
pharmacist, and direct-care and other adjunctive staff.
Treatment was planned and supervised by team members during twice weekly meetings and centered around
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individual combinations of four modalities: psychotherapy (group and individual); milieu, use of the
environment in normalization and behavior modification;
recreational/educational/music therapy; and chemotherapy, the use of psychotropic medication to ameliorate symptoms.
Therapy, team discussion and client records were
problem-oriented, with progress on each of a number of
problem areas noted after careful observation.
care staff were part of the teaching milieu.

DirectThey

participated completely in team meetings and implemented
the greatest portion of treatment plans.
A placement unit was developed later in facility
operation.

Serving chronic patients, it offered

specialized treatment for individuals who were no longer
considered actively psychotic but for whom placement was
difficult or who had, over the years, become "institutionalized".

In many instances, clients were placed

directly on this unit when they did not fit into any
other community program.

Most attended some form of day

care or vocational training.
Community Mental Health
A mentally ill person considered suitable for
admission was first seen at the Central Admitting Point
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at Ingham Community Mental Health Center, where a
physician performed a preliminary examination.

The

physician's admission orders evaluated the patient's
level of functioning, the least restrictive level of
.~

movement possible for the individual, as well as an
estimate of the risk of harm to self or others, and the
level of psychiatric and nursing care required.
Generally, those admitted were either actively psychotic
or suicidal.
According to MIMH Social Worker James Austin
(1980), by negotiating with Community Mental Health for
screening at a central admission point located in the
community and jointly staffed, many of the usual
admission problems were solved.

For instance, all new

.. admissions were first seen by a trained mental health
therapist who assisted the psychiatrist or psychiatric
resident to gather information, interview the client and
family, and made recommendations.
If the client was not suitable for admission,
community mental health staff could assist with
transportation, accommodations, and referrals to
appropriate services.

Austin (1980) adds, "for the

first time the Community Mental Health Agency was able
to observe directly the problems that individuals
. present when they are being hospitalized, which assisted
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them in planning" for discharge and outpatient services
(pp. 29-30).
Release plans were implemented by the unit social
worker.

If readmitted, patients were placed back on the

same unit.

Although each client was assigned a s6cial

.

worker, the facility provided no after-care, outpatient
or respite services.

The burden of responsibility for

this aspect of treatment, including some day programming, fell on local community mental health staff.
In fact, most services other than direct care were
provided within the community or by community consultants.

Recreational, barber/beauty, dental and medical

needs could be met in the city, so there was little
reason to duplicate these same programs in an institutional setting.

Whenever possible, patients were

encouraged to continue to use family providers, thereby
maintaining contacts for after-care support.
Institutions

Efficiency and Effectiveness

Approximately 450 patients received services at
MIMH each year, with another 120-150 sent to Ypsilanti
Regional Psychiatric

Hospi~al.

Between 30 and 50

clients were admitted monthly, with an average length of
stay computed for in-house patients at the end of each
month and for those discharged each month.

Figure 7

shows admission and discharge rates, depicting monthly
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statistics for 1979.

Figure 8 shows that length of stay

for in-house patients remained almost twice as high as
for those discharged each month.

For the most part,

these were individuals on the placement unit who represented the agency's "chronic" population.

Figures 9 and

10 provide the same information for 1980.
About ten percent of the patients on this placement
unit were discharged to dependent living situations such
as foster care homes, residential facilities and nursing
homes.
With a university-based evaluation and research
unit assigned to the facility, data about clients and
assessments of patient improvement in relation to other
agency variables was more complete than might normally
be expected.
The average length of stay at MIMH was four to six
weeks.

Some critics felt that MIMH's increasingly rapid

turnover of patients would result in higher admissions
to other area services, including alcohol units and
jails.

However, recidivism of MIMH patients to any area

facility remained at a low 25%, compared to Ypsilanti's
74% and Lafayette Clinic's 50%.
Joe Farrell (personal communication, February 11,
1985), DMH Chief Deputy Director and Southeastern
Regional Director, considered the facility to be efficient, adequately serving the population in need, ful-
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filling its mandate as established by the Department of
Mental Health:
There was generally agreement that the treatment
was good. The facility was accredited. I mean, if
you're going to close a facility, why would you
close the one accredited facility? We have very
few accredited facilities. So, in any objective
measure, if you didn't look inside at the dynamics
of the facility, you'd have to say that it was a
star performer.
Economy
In Chapter I it was mentioned that we cannot
automatically discount obvious reasons for closing a
facility.

Among possible factors are mismanagement,

poor operating procedures, extraordinarily high costs,
inefficiency, ineffectiveness or fraud.

As will be

noted later, costs did become an agency issue, partially
as a result of crises identified in Chapter IV, including budget reductions and itaff cutbacks within the
mental health system.
According to one MIMH staff member, "In the early
'80s budget issues became more prominent, finance issues
began to enter into concerns about providing quality
care •••• Budget became more closely tied to treatment
with growing concerns about economy and efficiency".
Perhaps the single most discriminating criterion
between a state psychiatric facility and a private
hospital is the client's ability to pay.

If clients
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and/or families have the money, their first inclination
is to seek private care.

Since the majority of patients

in a state mental hospital are indigent, a large proportion of expenses are borne by the state.
At least half of MIMH operating costs were reimbursed, because of licensure and accreditation, through
federal programs such as Supplemental Security Income
(SSI) and Medicaid.

MIMH was one of the few accredited

state facilities for mentally ill, the only one, other
than Lafayette Clinic, for adults.

Therefore, costs

could be charged to third party payees such as insurance
companies.
eral grants.

In addition, the agency received three fedAccording to Farrell (personal communi-

cation, February 11, 1985): "We were able to reduce the
cost per day by third party insurance where virtually no
other facility in the system could do that.

So it made

our net state cost less than any other place."
Roughly one-third of the Center's total budget paid
for direct-care staff.

This is typical of most institu-

tions and includes personnel for three shifts, seven
days a week; direct-care staff supervisors; and cost of
coverage for vacations, holidays and sick days.

The six

psychiatrists and Chief of Clinical Affairs were Michigan State University faculty and paid on contract.

The

first agreement was for $597,000 and gave MSU responsibility for patient care.

The only ongoing building
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expense was for rent paid to Jarvis Acres corporation.
Most other costs were standard, and similar to
those of other facilities.

Interestingly, drug and

pharmacy costs at MIMH were less than at most other DMH
agencies, even though MIMH used a unit dose system which
is generally more expensive than bulk dispensing.
Instead of a pharmacist or nurse counting out pills in
small cups three times a day, pills came individually
wrapped so they could be handled by non-pharmaceutical
staff.

The intention was to teach clients responsi-

bility for taking their own medication and free charge
nurses from dispensing duties.
While MIMH programs appeared to be expensive when
looking at cost-per-day figures, knowledgeables argued
that the opposite was true when costs-per-episode of
illness were discussed:
Even though MIMH's per diem rate was high, comparatively speaking and considering the length of
treatment, the length of each episode of illness
combined with readmissions was extremely low and
was not reflected in the rate per day. Our
patients were treated in a matter of days, not
months. So the figures we had said far different
things than those presented by the Department.
The prime concern was final cost to the patient.
When expenses were considered in light of recidivism
rates and compared to other facilities, it became less
costly for a patient to be admitted to MIMH than other
institutions.
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This appeared to be a position supported by the
Department of Mental Health, even up until the time the
facility was ordered closed.

In March, 1981 three

months before MIMH's closure, DMH Director Ochberg told
the Communications Council:
It's easier to do it (provide services) in large
mental hospitals, jails, concentration camps.
Is
it more expensive to do it in the community? No.
I think it is much more expensive to do it well in
an institution. We want to run an institution
really well so that you'd be privileged to go
there •••• That institution is going to cost a lot.
(Michigan Department of Mental Health Communications Council, personal communication, March,
1981)
A month before MIMH was closed, Ochberg told the
Michigan Psychiatric Society:
Responsible deinstitutionalization means reduction
of dependence as a society on large, old-fashioned
institutions as the bulwark of treatment for
chronic mental illness .••• It does not connote
opposition to psychiatric hospitalization.
On the contrary, the mental system would be
incomplete and ineffective without the ready
availability of well-funded, accredited, psychiatric hospitals. There must be small, active
treatment hospitals which serve limited geographic
areas, where psychiatrists can participate enthusiastically in treatment programs. (Ochberg, personal
communication, March 18, 198lb)
Michigan Department of Mental Health
It can be argued that the daily operations of
institutions are relatively insulated from the Director
of the Department and state policy issues.

But as early

as 1974, it was recognized in a report by the Special
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Senate Committee on Mental Health that the Director had
considerable impact on local services.

The Committee,

established by Senate Resolution 353 of 1973 and chaired
by Senator John E. McCauley (1974), studied the programs
and policies of the Department of Mental Health. ·one of
McCauley's strongest criticisms was that:
The rapid turnover in the Director's position
undoubtedly has contributed to the failure of the
Department to develop and establish procedures and
arrangements for the effective coordination and
integration of all public mental health services .
••• If the individual who has all the executive
authority of and within the Mental Health Department; in other words, the Director; changes an
average of every two and a half years, as has been
Michigan's experience for the past decade, then it
follows that failure to accomplish meaningful overall policy is understandable. (p. 8)
He went on to say that, "Throughout the investigation of the mental health program by the staff, there
have been striking incidences of a lack of leadership
from middle management upward" (p. 21).
This situation did not improve in the ensuing
years.

The MIMH Office of Research and Evaluation

(1980) noted that, "While changes which occurred at MIMH
are not directly attributable to leadership changes
within DMH, nevertheless these changes had a subtle
effect on the ambiance surrounding the project."
An "easy" relationship between Donald Smith, DMH
Director and Norbert Enzer, Chairman of the MSU Department of Psychiatry, is described in a draft of agency
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history.

Enzer (personal communication, February 22,

1985) commented, "There was a pretty high level of
trust, of candor, and of personal good feeling and a
sense that, ultimately, what we had dreamed of was worth
arguing about."
But, with Smith gone and Vern Stehman, M.D., as
Acting Director, many projects were stalled.

"Because

Stehman was an interim director," the MIMH Office of
Research and Evaluation (1980) history observed, "the
attitude was to adopt a wait-and-see stance until a new
director was in office."
Beyond that issue, one MSU psychiatrist said, "I
didn't see him (Stehman) as having the same interest in
issues of education and training and research that I saw
in Smith."
Perhaps for those reasons Stehman was not considered a supporter of agency programs.

According to an

MIMH clinician:
He stated many times that "we couldn't continue to
afford to drive this Cadillac" •••• You have to
remember that most of these DMH lieutenants had
been brought up in the old warehouse system. It
was the system they were comfortable with and could
understand •••• We seemed to be affluent in an
austere time.
So, the thought was that we couldn't
afford the luxury of that program.
When Ochberg was appointed Director, there was
renewed optimism regarding DMH involvement in the
facility.

Another MSU Department of Psychiatry faculty
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member mentioned that:
I had these grand blue sky dreams that here's going
to come this guy who was a very sophisticated
academic-type psychiatrist, undergraduate school at
Harvard and medical school at Johns Hopkins, psychiatric residency at Stanford. All the best. And
that he would certainly understand what we were
about and he would see the importance of the training and the research •••• He never really got
actively involved. And then, in '79, when the
budgets began to be tough and things looked
ominous, we began to feel we were in jeopardy.
The Dean of the MSU Department of Psychiatry at
that time, agreed with this assessment.

He felt that

Department of Mental Health administrators "didn't have
the same appreciation for research and education (as
University staff), so it always became a hassle.

They

(DMH) had money set aside for research but as the budget
crunch came, the first money to go would be the research
money."
Michigan Institute for Mental Health Staff
According to Selznick (1957), management of
conflict is a critical decision area.

In particular,

the problem of organizational rivalry is aggravated in
special purpose enterprises because aims are more
sharply defined, and therefore more vulnerable to
divisive activity (p. 9).
At MIMH there were several sets of factions that
served to shape the agency.

The most visible conflicts

were those between clinical and administrative staff,
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and between DMH Civil Service and MSU clinical
personnel.
MIMH Civil Service Staff
As a group, Ionia Riverside employees were considerably older than MIMH employees (the average age was
38, compared to 23 for MIMH staff), with a lower average
educational level.

For the most part, they also had

considerable seniority in the State system and thus were
able to choose both their work site (MIMH) and shift.
All had worked with the criminally insane at Ionia where
crimes were particularly heinous and mental illness
generally chronic.

Typically, direct-care staff did not

interact much with patients and treatment was minimal.
Everyone wore uniforms.
Newly hired MIMH direct-care staff were young,
idealistic and had at least a high school education.
Six had college degrees.

Prior to unit assignments they

were placed in an intensive training program that emphasized human rights, short-term treatment and the role of
all staff members as treatment-oriented care givers.
No one wore uniforms.

This was sometimes distress-

ful for Ionia workers who not only found themselves
initially unable to tell staff from patients, but who
occasionally found themselves misidentified.

Few were

used to the demands of active, continuous treatment of
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very mobile patients.

One MSU clinician considered part

of the problem the fact that:
We were moving in the direction of much more supervision and the inclusion of research and education
as major activities along with patient care. And I
think a lot of those people really had very little
interest in that kind of thing.
Some of them felt
it was an intrusion, and aside from their own personal dislocation and all of that, they were in a
sense a little out of water.
Sometimes overtly hostile, as well as covertly
subversive, it was this "hard-core" group that most
inhibited administrative changes.
Administrative responses to such resistance
included selective hiring of new employees, intensive
training and the conscious split of factions by shift
and unit assignments.

Agency values and philosophies

were gradually strengthened as the Ionia Riverside
employees found themselves outnumbered.

Many were

eventually co-opted when they joined the direct-care
versus professional battle.
Clinical professionals were the elite.

Yet,

direct-care workers implemented the greatest portion of
treatment plans.

Facility operations were based more on

a democratic process than the medical model.

Decisions

regarding patient treatment were part of a group process
in the form of a treatment team, rather than the sole
purview of a psychiatrist. Not even chemotherapy was
sacrosanct.

Direct-care staff were expected to document
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instances when patients appeared to be receiving too
much, or not enough, medication.
The result was a form of leveling.

While the

organizational chart was hierarchical, the unit and team
concepts lead to a non-traditional approach.

such

democracy generated innovative treatment solutions and
esprit de corps within the direct-care faction.

It was

also hard on professional egos and potentially destructive of agency discipline.
MSU Staff and Faculty
MSU faculty were responsible for psychiatric treatment.

The Clinical and Unit Directors owed primary

allegiance to Michigan State University as their
employer.

However, all other employees were civil

servants.
This clinical-administrative schism manifested
itself most often in attempts by clinicians to define
agency divisions of labor.

In the professional hier-

archy, power resides in expertise; one has influence by
virtue of one's kn6wledge and skills (Mintzberg, 1979).
Many MSU staff felt that administrators should be
responsible for "political" decisions such as budgeting,
building maintenance, service agreements for day care or
foster care.

MSU faculty were to handle the medical

decisions, the front-line treatment of patients.
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An MIMH clinician characterized the schism as:
a split between clinical administration and administrative staff simply because Michigan State
University staff were most closely tied to the
clinical program which created inherent allegiances
in various areas of the hospital. These problems
ended up manifesting themselves ultimately in
quality of care to patients.
Now don't get me wrong, care at MIMH was
clearly superior, comparatively speaking. The
services provided there were head and shoulders
above most other state-provided services, whether
institutional or in the community.
I think the
program had a much greater impact than most such
facilities.
But that kind of in-fighting had to
impact on care and facility programs. Indirectly it
affected morale and operations.
There appeared to be a basic disagreement over both
ends and means.

"State administrators" wanted an effi-

cient, cost-effective operation, with patients moving
swiftly through the system.

Means were orthodox, care-

fully defined by DMH manuals, operational guidelines and
one hundred years of institutional practice.

For MSU

staff, research and teaching were also important with
precedents, as defined by previous institutional operations or civil service policies, perceived as irrelevant in this context.
Mintzberg (1979) tells us that professionals in
these structures do not consider themselves part of the
team.

"To many," he writes, "the organization is almost

incidental, a convenient place to practice their skills.
They are loyal to their profession, not to the place
where they happen to practice it" (p.360).
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Although professional clinicians have a strong
aversion to administrative "experts" muddling in treatment, the very intimacy of the agency precluded strict
divisions of labor.

Offices were on

acted with most patients

daily~

wards~

staff inter-

and the therapeutic

milieu was maintained by clinical and administrative
staff alike.
University support was even hard to obtain for
clinicians "out in the field", according to one MSU
program coordinator, partially because of distance.
"The faculty always perceived the faculty that was
located there (MIMH) as second class citizens, more
practitioners and less academicians."
The University and the Department
However, the division between Michigan State
University and the Department of Mental Health went
deeper and was more difficult to resolve.

One of the

first skirmishes occurred when it came time to renew the
MSU clinical services contract.

The original contract

covered an 18 month period and would expire at the
beginning of the next fiscal year (October 1, 1978).

It

provided for negotiations 90 days in advance.
Charles Pearson, MIMH Director, was concerned about
several issues, including slow recruitment of psychiatrists by the University and MSU's failure to appoint a
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permanent Director of Clinical Affairs.

However, the

critical problem area lay in definition of chain of
command.
According to the contract, "The Director of
Clinical Affairs will report regarding the day-to-day
operation of the clinical services to the facility
administrator and will be responsible to the Chairman of
the Department of Psychiatry for the quality of service
provided" (MDMH, "Clinical Services, .•• " 1977).
In his June 7, 1978 letter to Joe Farrell, Pearson
explained:
This sentence creates the greatest operational
difficulty for the facility director. Some clarification is necessary if the Department wishes to
maintain operational control. The key word here is
"quality". Dr. Enzer assumes, as you can see in
his memorandum of June 1, 1978, that the university
controls all programmatic aspects including bed
occupancy and utilization, total service area and
operations, etc. Directives of the Department of
Mental Health to the facility director have not
been carried out or have been appealed to Dr. Enzer
by university staff assigned to the facility.
At
this time the university seems to assume that the
chain of command places Dr. Enzer and the Director
of the Department of Mental Health on a coequal
level and that information comes from Dr. Enzer to
the Director of Clinical Affairs to the Director of
Michigan Institute for Mental Health and on to the
Regional Director. This certainly creates confusion as any change in direction can be stalled for
months.
Joe Farrell reiterated his own concerns in a June
13 letter to Vern Stehman, DMH Director, "Michigan State
University has not operationalized the contract to our
expectations" although "the Department has provided the
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funds, facilities and supports as promised."

He then

proposed that the position of Chief of Clinical Affairs
be shifted to the Department, "This will clarify that
the clinical responsibility lies with the facility
director."

Farrell also recommended reducing the number

of staff psychiatrists on contract from the University
to two, which would allow the Department to hire the
remainder.

Pearson predicted in a June 19 follow-up

memorandum that such contract changes could cause some
resignations in professional staff, but "I think the
problems created by this will be minimal."
The Department moved ahead to update the contract
adding, "the Director of Clinical Affairs will be hired
by the Director of the Michigan Institute for Mental
Health and shall be a regular Civil Service employee of
the Department of Mental Health."
About a month later (July 28) Farrell outlined the
proposed contract changes for Pearson, with copies to
the DMH Director, Personnel Director and Enzer. "General
agreement was subsequently reached within the Department
that the Chief of Clinical Affairs should be a psychiatrist employed directly by DMH," he wrote.

"This action

would make clear that clinical responsibility (as well
as administrative) rests with the facility director."
Farrell went on to mention that there were additional contract issues that needed to be discussed when
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Norbert Enzer, M.D., Chairman of the MSU Department of
Psychiatry, returned from his vacation in mid-August:
While most of these matters can await that time,
the appointment of the Chief of Clinical Affairs
has been decided upon. Accordingly, due to the
time constraints imposed by the October 1 contract
year, I am directing that you commence recruitment
efforts immediately to identify candidates for this
important position.
(J. Farrell, personal communication, July 28, 1978)
Enzer interrupted his vacation to reply on August
4, 1978:
I am generally concerned that you did not hear my
comments to you over the phone on Thursday, July
27th, and my prior comments about the attitude of
our faculty regarding this action of the Department
of Mental Health. I believe this decision will
have a profound effect on our faculty, at least
some of the staff of the Michigan Institute for
Mental Health, and ultimately the programs there.
It clearly has had a profound effect on me.
In my personal view, this is the third major
unilateral decision on the part of the Department
of Mental Health during the first year of a major
contract between the Department and Michigan State
University's Department of Psychiatry. The contract was intended, I thought, to operationalize a
"collaboration" with mutually beneficial long range
goals. Unilateral decisions scarcely characterize
a collaborative relationship nor do they foster
trust •
..• These matters will require considerable
future discussion and in my view the future at this
moment is uncertain.
Despite continued protestations by Enzer and MSU
faculty, the renewed contract gave complete adminis.trative and ultimate clinical control, including power
to appoint the Director of Clinical Affairs, to the
Department of Mental Health.
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The schism was wider than most system participants
were willing to acknowledge.

While none of the inter-

play occurred publicly, there was a continual tug and
pull between the two lead agencies.

Generally DMH won

the battles because, while MSU had prestige, DMH had the
money.
One final example, although occurring at the end of
MIMH's existence, shows this division most clearly.
Gordon Gritter, M.D.

(198lb), MIMH Director of Clinical

Affairs, brought together an ad-hoc committee of agency
staff to assist the tri-county community mental health
board in developing alternatives to agency in-patient
services.

Through a January 23, 1981 letter to Enzer,

Gritter laid out some criteria for a proposed program at
St. Lawrence:
Let us begin, then, by deciding that the involvement of the Department of Psychiatry in the proposed unit at St. Lawrence Hospital be determined
by teaching and research considerations, not by
community service needs. As a first step, let's
unabashedly name it the "MSU Unit". Having done
so, we can state its characteristics •
••• It is expected that some members of the
staff of the MSU Unit will be employed and paid by
the University and some by the Hospital. This is a
highly undesirable and potentially troublesome
arrangement, but seems fiscally unavoidable.
It is
an arrangement that makes it urgently necessary
that lines of authority and responsibility be
clearly defined.
The proposal continues in considerable detail,
revealing issues of concern and sources of irritation
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regarding the existent MIMH/MSU relationship.
Ongoing discussions between the two agencies
provide evidence of a power struggle that lasted
throughout MIMH's four year history.

One MIMH staff

member characterized the underlying problem as "one of
control, who had the ultimate responsibility.

Concep-

tually I'm sure everyone agreed it was supposed to be
shared, but realistically it was completely different.
The big issue seemed to be who had the final word on
administrative decisions."
Several observers considered Charles Pearson the
weakest link in the programmatic chain:

"We saw him as

somebody biding his time with a couple of years to go
before retirement and not wanting to rock the boat or
really do anything."
When MSU administrators were asked to identify when
they saw the program begin to fall apart, one said:
I think when Chuck Pearson was selected to administer the program. He had an almost invisible
style . . • • What happened was that there was a weak
administration and what was needed to get that
program through was a strong, well-thought of,
outspoken leadership. That's how other new programs
survive; But, Chuck wasn't much of an advocate.
Then you had a rather strong University component
with all the direction coming from outside the
facility, and problems naturally erupted.
MIMH - The Last Years
Symptoms of these conflicts were to emerge at

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

235

unexpected times.

The Step Level program and subsequent

media attention serves as one example.
progressed through MIMH in steps.
nated for observation.

Residents

Level I was desig-

Patients were generally escorted

to activities and evaluated continually.

Those who were

aggressive or self-destructive might be placed on a
"15-minute checks" schedule.
At level II and above, clients were allowed access
to the dining room which included a snack bar, pool
tables and other recreational equipment.

Patients could

also take classes and participate in work therapy programs where they were paid for performing housekeeping
duties.
At step III they were allowed to go on field trips
in nearby communities with staff supervision.

At level

IV the client was allowed access to the grounds and
unsupervised community trips.

At each level patients

could receive visitors, go home with family and participate in unit activities.
No cards or passes were issued and administrative
staff, unfamiliar with client levels, would either refer
to the patient chart or check with direct-care staff
before allowing patients to accompany them from one area
to another.

Direct-care staff were assigned as "primary

therapists" for specific individuals and were responsible for knowing where their patients were at all times.
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In February, 1900 the decision was made to implement an open door policy.

In the past, all outside and

many of the inside facility doors were locked.

Staff

were responsible for providing client admission to
activities.
The new policy meant few changes except that all
inside doors as well as external doors in one unit would
only be locked at night.

It was a change supported by

administrative staff as well as the Joint Commission on
Accreditation.

Therapeutically the intention was to

encourage patient responsibility toward his/her own
recovery.

In an internal memorandum, Gritter (February

12, 1980) noted that few psychiatric facilities in the
country remained on a completely locked status.
Community Influentials
Concerned over complaints from neighbors, the
Windsor Township Board asked MIMH to submit monthly
progress reports "to substantiate claims that most
patients were capable of handling the responsibility of
unrestricted movement" (Schultz, 1980a).

Following a

public meeting, the Board also recommended that residents submit written documentation of "incidents".

This

followed Maybelle Alderman's recount of being forced to
flee her horne about six months earlier when a patient
kicked her door open, ransacked her house, then slashed
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his wrists, and stabbed himself repeatedly.
It was mentioned by MIMH staff, including the
Clinical and Nursing Directors, that 1,234 patients had
gone through the facility without incident and that
previously all doors were locked but patients were
allowed to walk on the grounds unsupervised.
Another staff member pointed out that the change
was in response to Chapter 7 of Michigan's Mental Health
code which requires patients to be placed in the least
restrictive environment.

"In actuality," the MIMH

Administrative Assistant stated, "we have been in
violation of the law for the last three years" (Schultz,
1980a).
Probate Court Judge Don Owens and County Prosecutor
Peter Houk said they were informed of the change by
letter and were very upset by the policy, but at a loss
to stop it (Grose, 1980).

"Although," said Owen, "no

one sent to New Riverside has been charged with a crime,
many of them are desperately ill and dangerous."
On February 27, the Windsor Township Board
appointed a special committee to evaluate the policy and
"incidents reported by dozens of residents" ("Jarvis
Walkaways, ••• " 1980).

Upset by the number of corn-

plaints, the board named township Supervisor Arthur St.
Clair, clerk Dorothy Hull, trustee Jim Davis and township resident Michael Mitchell to look into complaints
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that the new "'open door' policy of the facility allows
patients to leave the grounds and wander through the
neighborhoods" ("Jarvis Walkaways, .•• " 1980).
It was noted that the state had given assurances to
the board about the "type of patient, treatment and
security" to be provided prior to issuance of the
special use permit.

If there were changes, then the

township would have to review its own policy toward the
facility, according to township attorney Richard J.
Robinson.
MIMH Staff
MIMH direct-care employees added to this ongoing
controversy in April by attending a Windsor Township
Board meeting to express their own concerns about
patient, community and staff safety.

The aides informed

the board that they feared impending layoffs would lead
to increased violence at the facility (Schultz, 1980b).
Walt Whalen, Chief Union Steward of Local 3071 of the
American Federation of State, County and Municipal
Employees (AFSCME), mentioned that his nose had been
"cracked" four times since last September and stated,
"We are very much in jeopardy out there."

David

Henigan, Local President who had his arm in a sling,
allegedly as a result of trying to subdue a patient,
said that union members at MIMH planned a petition drive
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demanding that "actions be taken to instill safety and
security" (Schultz, 1980b).
Community Attentives
Shortly thereafter, Mitchell presented to the board
a petition signed by 50 area residents, requesting that
MIMH be fenced and equipped with a push-button gate
through which patients could be monitored.
Because of the level of community concern, MIMH's
Office of Evaluation and Research studied the effects of
the "open door" policy by analyzing. data on unusual
incidents and seclusions.

Prior to the February 4 date

when the new policy would go into effect, the unit asked
all staff members and patients to answer a questionnaire.

On one hand, results showed that patients were

unconcerned about opening the doors.

Staff members, on

the other hand, thought unlocking the doors was a good
idea as it would increase the quality of care, but were
concerned about the burden it would cause them.
An examination of unusual incidents and seclusions
before and after the unlocking shows that immediately
after opening the doors, a marked increase in unusual
incidents and seclusions occurred.

This increase,

however, lasted only three weeks, and thereafter the
rate of unusual incidents and seclusions was the same as
before opening the hospital.

(See Figure 11.)
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Although seemingly separate issues, staff concern
about unlocking doors related directly to staffing
changes created by budget reductions.

As discussed in

Chapter IV, 1979 and 1980 were critical budget years.
Agency staffing had been reduced to 90% of SNAP
(Staffing Needs Assessment Plan, a DMH measure of
minimal staffing requirements), and further cuts
appeared inevitable.

Michigan Institute's annual budget

had already been cut from $4.2 million to $3.7 million
for FY 1980-81.
Community Mental Health
At the same time, MIMH was placing considerable
pressure on Community Mental Health services to find
placements for patients who were no longer considered in
need of acute care.

Any increase in length of patient

stay at the Michigan Institute could be directly
attributable to CMH's inability to find appropriate
placements.

In fact, by definition, clients on the

placement unit were ready to be discharged under
Community Mental Health supervision as soon as suitable
living situations were found for them.
Community social workers were asked to continue
their case work with admitted patients, in essence
serving as an adjunct to the MIMH treatment program.
MIMH appeared to be asking for more and more services at
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a time when fewer dollars were available and suitable
placements at a premium.
MIMH Direct Care Staff
Further budget reductions were threatened by new
legislative initiatives, including the Tisch amendment
which would mandate drastic reductions in state spending.

MIMH Acting Director Cretta Johnson made it clear

that, "If Tisch passes, we don't have the chance of a
snowball in hell" (Schultz, 1980c).
Newly unionized direct-care staff were vocal about
what they perceived as unsafe working conditions at
MIMH.

Management could not hire.

Not only was there a

state-wide freeze on filling positions, but Michigan
Institute had always been considered poshly staffed by
Departmental officials.
filled.
replaced.

Vacancies were not being

Employees who were injured or sick could not be
By October 1 resident care staffing levels

dropped to 35 from an original level of 54.

Personnel

felt they could not meet rigid accreditation standards
and still provide adequate treatment for patients.

In

light of the stakes, employees decided to take a stand.
Victoria Martin, AFSCME Board member and directcare aide, met with Lansing State Journal reporter Teri
Schultz and told her that MIMH employees were "literally
afraid for their lives•• (Schultz, 1980c).

"I don't want
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to lose my job," she said, "but at the present staffing
levels it is too dangerous.

I would rather see it

close."
Direct-care aides and local 3017 of the AFSCME
filed suit against MIMH in district court on June 30,
1980.

The action, also supported by parents of patients

in the facility, charged that staff reductions mandated
by DMH budget cuts had resulted in patient and staff
injuries and potential hazards to everyone.

The group

unsuccessfully sought an injunction to prevent further
layoffs.
Two months later many of the same concerns resurfaced in the newspaper.

"It's an emergency situation

out there," stated Victoria Martin, President of the
AFSCME local (Bronson, 1980a).

The August 14, 1980

Charlotte Republican Tribune article by Peter Bronson
went on to say:
Along with Clinical Director Gordon Gritter, Johnson said she is concerned with patient and staff
safety, but added that recent fears on the part of
patients' families, staff and patients are exaggerated. She blamed the lawsuit on an attitude problem among the staff.
"We are grossly overstaffed
in nursing," she said.
But Martin, at home recovering from a back
injury she said she got trying to restrain an
unruly patient, claimed otherwise. (p. 1)
Politicians and Bureaucrats
As a result of the publicity, Senator Richard J.
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Allen, Jr.

(R-Ithaca) asked DMH Director Frank Ochberg,

M.D. to look personally into reports of increasing
patient and personnel injuries caused by fiscal shortages.

In his letter to Ochberg, Allen said he was

registering his concerns over recent news reports
indicating that the institute was staffed at "dangerously low levels".
Ochberg continued to reduce mental health directcare staff, rather than Central Office (administrative)
positions, in answer to budget cuts.

Facilities for the

adult mentally ill received a disproportionate share of
layoffs (Ochberg, 198la).
The possibility of closing MIMH was raised during a
pre-election debate between Democrat Bill Davis and
Republican Ernest Nash as they contested a Michigan
House of Representatives 56th District seat.

Both men

contended that closure was a rumor and that they would
be opposed to any such a move.

Nash added he doubted a

closing would come about and that the plan came from
state executives, not the legislature (Albright, 1980).
MSU Faculty
Despite acknowledged problems, there remained
considerable MSU faculty support for the MIMH training
program.

A joint memo (November 25, 1980) from W.

Donald Weston, M.D., Dean of the MSU College of Human
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Medicine and Myron

s.

Mage, D.O. Dean of the College of

Osteopathic Medicine to Ochberg noted that:
We see the partnership between Michigan State
University and the Department of Mental Health not
only as a national model, but also as a major
contribution to the field of psychiatry for the
State of Michigan, and mutually beneficial to both
the Department of Mental Health and Michigan State.
We have been very pleased with the developments in
the psychiatric residency program, and had high
hopes that the significant progress which has been
made could be stabilized to assure an exciting and
viable future.
Copies were sent to Senators DeSana and Sederburg;
Representatives Dillingham, Hollister and Stabenow and
other DMH and University people.
MSU faculty felt that some of the problems encountered were historically based.

One key figure saw a

concern on the part of the Department of Management and
Budget that control over MIMH would be lost and it
"would become another University of Michigan hospital".
The implication was that astute lobbying would allow
direct institutional allocation of monies, rather than
having funds filter through the Department of Mental
Health budget.
Perhaps for that reason, consensus was that Gerald
Miller, DMB Director, was no longer supportive of the
agency.

An MSU clinician commented:

People said that to me too. And, you know, I was
saying to some of those people downtown, "Why don't
you give us a chance to talk to him?" Let's go
talk to him and let him see us, and maybe he'll
find out we're not such awful folks •••. I mean, if
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he feels that way, let's answer his questions.
I
could never get that to happen.
I never had the
opportunity to talk to him about MIMH •
••• People around would say, the legislature
feels that the University of Michigan has ripped
off the Department of Mental Health and they don't
like the Department dealing with universities •
••• I'd say, "Let's go talk to them and tell them,
explain what we're trying to do together.
I could
never get anyone to agree to do it •••• With Frank I
came to understand.
He didn't want to go see those
guys because he recognized they didn't like him
very much."
Key Decision Makers
Southeastern Regional Coordinator Joe Farrell, in a
September 16, 1980 letter, assured Westendorp that the
"Department of Mental Health is in the process of identifying reductions which it must take in response to the
Governor's request for agencies to identify savings for
FY 1980-81."

He went on to add that there is "consider-

able support for the high quality of clinical activity
at the facility."

Clearly the letter was an attempt to

reassure Westendorp and the Deans about cutback rumors.
MIMH Director Cretta Johnson, in a September 1,
1980 program evaluation for Farrell, was optimistic
about the continued need for state hospital and MIMH
treatment programs.

In updating the Institute's origi-

nal five-year plan she reflected on the state's changing
service requirements:
What we have seen is a concentration of resources
among the three primary actors (Community Mental
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Health, State Hospital, Michigan State University)
coming to bear on the acute short-term care population, and a reluctance to acknowledge the reality
that our state hospital population has become
mostly chronic over the last three years. The
experience relating to acute beds and chronic beds,
as the calculation shows, is just the reverse of
the information presented in the 1977 plan.
Hence the program emphasis in 1980 is forced
to shift to the treatment and care of the chronically mentally ill, those persons whose length of
stay averages longer than 90 days.
With that she outlined a comprehensive plan for
provision of the necessary services, including continued
expansion of MIMH programs into the Jarvis Acres
complex.

As local communities began to handle more and

more of the acute mental health care needs, she saw a
new role emerging for State hospitals -- habilitation of
the "institutionalized" client.
This proposal was at odds with what MSU faculty
envisioned as MIMH's purpose and their own continued
role in provision of clinical services.
The Legislature appropriated $3.9 million for MIMH
FY 1980-81 operating expenses.

Then, in an unusual

move, lawmakers unable to agree on a total state budget
for the fiscal year, voted to give Milliken unprecedented spending powers.

They then recessed

until after the

November 4 election.
Shortly thereafter, on October 8, Milliken made a
rare televised budget address (his fifth in 12 years in
office).

In it he outlined Michigan's "depression-
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level" financial problems and "hoped" he could convince
voters to reject the Tisch proposal in next month's
election (Longstaff, 1980).

For the first time since

1940, the Governor said, state government would live
within a smaller budget "this fiscal year than it did in
the previous fiscal year" (Longstaff, 1980).
During the speech Milliken ordered the Department
of Mental Health to take an $18 million budget cut in an
overall state-wide reduction totalling $116 million.

In

addition, Milliken announced that MIMH would be closed
by July 1 as a cost-saving measure.
The Charlotte Republican Tribune described the
announcement:
A televised budget address by Governor William
Milliken included some bad news for patients and
staff at Michigan Institute for Mental Health,
Dimondale.
In his live speech, the governor
explained the state's worsening financial crisis
and the effect of rising unemployment on state
programs. About midway through his talk, Milliken
also announced his decision to cut costs by closing
MIMH. And although such a move has been discussed
during recent months, his announcement came as a
surprise to MIMH staff members, patients and their
families. ("Governor Milliken Orders, .•. " 1980)
"The major reason is the lousy situation of the
state's economy," Doug Johnson of the Department of
Management and Budget said in explanation of Governor
Milliken's decision.

"It's one of the smaller facili-

ties in the state and because it is, closing it will
affect fewer people than closing larger homes in

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

249
Ypsilanti or Traverse City" (Bronson, 1980b).
Doug Johnson added:
The MIMH hospital is also more research oriented,
opened in cooperation with Michigan State University to study a progressive "open door" policy, and
research facilities are more expendable than traditional mental health·facilities. The same open
door policy drew criticism from neighbors who often
complained of walkaways and from staff members who
said patient freedom posed a risk to both staff and
patients. But Johnson said controversy had little
to do with the governor's decision to close MIMH.
(Bronson, 1980b)
Governor Milliken made his speech on October 8,
1980.

On October 10, DMB Budget Director Gerald Miller

sent a letter to Ochberg ordering him to make plans to
close the facility as soon as possible.
Ochberg (personal communication, January 17, 1985)
would describe the incident by saying, "we lost a Washington Monument Play".

He added:

Every time the Feds find their budget cut too
close, they threaten to close the Washington
Monument. We had to take a $20 million cut. DMH
Budget Director Bob Gleeson presented me with a
list of options. You realize that I don't go
hunting around for the budget savings or issues.
That is the way it traditionally happens. Those
were the options so we attempted some creative
thinking •••. We made a special pitch to the Governor and the legislature to save the whole budget.
They said yea, yea, yea and didn't do it.
MSU faculty reaction to Ochberg's story was forthright.

According to one clinician: "That's exactly my

understanding.

And that's what he said to me, that they

won't agree to this.

Well, baloney."

He went on to

say:
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When Ochberg presented his reduction plan to the
Governor, or to Gerry Miller, he listed MIMH as one
of the facilities that might be closed to save
money. The very fact that, although it was the
last one on the list, the very fact that he listed
it made it begin to be pretty clear what was going
to happen •••• Then when the Governor made his
budget announcement, that's when we all heard it.
The Project Director of Governor Milliken's Human
Services Cabinet mentioned that "Frank (Ochberg) just
didn't have the real managerial or the legislative
experience.

He just didn't have the kind of support

within the Department .••• You've got to know which
monument to offer up."
The Michigan legislature appeared largely unaware
or uninvolved in the decision to close the Institute.
Money was allocated to continue funding the agency
almost simultaneously with cutbacks that resulted in its
closing.

Many legislators, including Representative

Debbie Stabenow (personal communication, February 20,
1985) Chair of the Mental Health committee, were
generally unfamiliar with the program, other than a
vague understanding that it was more expensive than the
average.
An MSU faculty member stated that "there was this
sense of wanting to either protect the communications
with the legislature or keep them in the dark.
couldn't tell which it was."

I

The Chairman of the

Department of Psychiatry at the time, agreed with that
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assessment.

He added:

I never met with a member of either the House or
the Senate about this facility.
Nor am I aware of
anybody else from here (MSU) really doing that, the
Deans or anybody. We were never given that kind of
opportunity.
I always had the feeling that if the
legislature could see a well-intentioned, at least
well-intentioned, cooperative effort between the
State University and the Department of Mental
Health, that they would have been interested, and
at least attitudinally supportive of it."
MIMH Clinical Staff
Professional staff quickly rallied in an attempt to
save the program:

"When we found out what was happening

we had originally considered a lot of strategies,
including going to the newspapers.

But we felt that,

given the upcoming (Appropriations) hearings, the legislature would be the greatest help and most influential."
One MSU psychiatrist commented:
I kind of had the sense that we could sit down with
some of these guys and talk with them and have them
understand what was going on. That if indeed there
was this incredible legislative pressure to open
and then to close, that we might work it out with
them, some kind of compromise.
Department of Mental Health regional staff also
remained supportive.

The Coordinator's feeling was that

"the decision was not motivated by objectivity, because
the performance of the place was not bad at all."
Budget data could be interpreted several ways.

"When

you look at comparative analysis data, it had short
lengths of stay which was good.

The cost per day was
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higher, but if you looked at the cost per spell of
illness, it was less."
The general consensus of a number of Michigan
Institute professional staff was that "the legislature
was operating on a misconception."

As a result:

One evening we called on every member of the Mental
Health Appropriations subcommittee. We wanted to
present them with the actual budget figures. We
actually called various legislators off the floor
of the House, called them out of session, and
talked to them one by one. The Appropriations
Committee was going to be meeting the next morning
to discuss whether or .not to give money for MIMH
operation and they were operating off of some false
assumptions •
••• At 10:30 that night we all got calls to be
in the (DMH) Chief Deputy Director's office the
first thing the next morning. He informed us that
it would not be in our best interest to make the
presentation we had planned. When push came to
shove we were DMH employees. We were employees of
the Department and the Director had made decisions
and he was speaking on our behalf. It was clear to
us that we were to abort this plan of ours.
As a result, no further legislative action
occurred.

The decision to close had been made, the next

step was implementation.
MIMH - The Last Days
In light of the closure order MIMH Clinical
Director Gritter frankly evaluated MIMH's strengths and
weaknesses in a letter to Enzer (January 5, 1981).
Among the many strengths, he argued, were that

11

recruit-

ment, training and experience have combined to produce a
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team of professional, paraprofessional, administrative
and clerical staff which have built an effective organization operating at a high quality level, as attested by
a series of successful accreditation and licensure
surveys."

He also mentioned a successful treatment

program meeting the needs of area residents, training
programs, cost efficiency and continued excellent
working relationships with a variety of community
service providers.
Among the weaknesses, Gritter focused on the
MSU/DMH interaction:
Throughout its existence MIMH has been buffeted by
unresolved conflict and ambiguity about definition
of its primary role and task. DMH clearly defined
it as a Regional Psychiatric Hospital to provide
the full range of acute and chronic care and treatment •••• MSU, however, continued to regard it as
primarily intended for diagnosis and treatment of
acute psychiatric illness and for training and
research •
••• It has been highly characteristic of MIMH
that there has been no clear line of authority and
responsibility. While administratively a facility
of DMH, its clinical functioning was to have been
very much influenced by MSU.
In actual experience,
this has meant a series of covert skirmishes, and
occasionally open clashes, between an administrative staff with clear responsibility and allegiance
to DMH, and a clinical staff with mixed employment
arrangements, a predominant allegiance to MSU, and
a highly mistrustful attitude toward DMH and all
its works. Thus neither partner could really be in
charge, many policies, decisions, and directions
rested upon an uneasy consensus, and each party was
in recurrent danger of acting unilaterally in ways
that proved to be at least ineffective or at worst
destructive. (Gritter, 198la)
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Community Mental Health
As the facility began to phase down, an effort was
made to transfer the MSU contract for provision of
clinical services to tri-county community mental health
(CMH).

St. Lawrence would assume some of the inpatient

services (30 acute beds).

As a private facility,

however, it would only be able to accept voluntary
clients from Clinton, Eaton and Ingham counties.
CMH proposed to contract with St. Lawrence Hospital
for inpatient psychiatric care.

St. Lawrence, in turn,

would subcontract for clinical services with the MSU
Department of Psychiatry.

Costs would include $650,000

for Clinton-Eaton-Ingham Community Mental Health at St.
Lawrence, $130,250 for Central Admitting and $150,000
for the MSU Residency program.
The Department of Mental Health appropriation bill
to close MIMH recognized that no clear community
alternative existed for either chronic or involuntary
patients.

Accordingly, it included in the boilerplate

Section 73 that: "Funds appropriated in Section 1 for
the Michigan Institute for Mental Health are for a
phase-out of that facility by April 1, 1981.

Community

alternatives shall be developed for clients in their
area of residence" (State of Michigan Public Act 361,
1980, p. 1384).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

255
In a February 24, 1981 letter to DMH Director
Stehman, Farrell estimated a surplus of $562,700 from
the MIMH closing appropriation of $3,386,700.

Expendi-

tures were projected at $2,824,000, including an estimated $250,000 for remodeling at least one ward at Ypsilanti.

Farrell requested legislative and executive

support for the additional $367,550 needed to implement
the C-E-I/St. Lawrence plan.
On March 6, Farrell sent a follow-up letter to
Stehman clarifying the Department's unwillingness to
provide any additional funds and outlining alternatives,
including directing all new MIMH inpatient admissions to
Ypsilanti Regional Psychiatric Hospital.
Closing MIMH was much like the earlier closing of
Riverside Center, Ionia.

Patients in need of long-term

care were transferred to Ypsilanti, which continues to
admit involuntary patients from the tri-county area.
Other clients were discharged to home communities.

CMH

and St. Lawrence provide 30 private beds for short-term,
acute care.
Organized Advocacy Groups
Michigan Institute for Mental Health staff chose
the media as one way of voicing their concerns.

There

appeared to be a generalized belief in the value of
taking issues to an attentive public and to the legis-
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lature.

As mentioned in Chapter II, decision makers are

increasingly aware of the importance of constituency
.involvement in public programs.

Interviews of Michigan

leaders showed a growing appreciation for the strength
of organized mental health advocacy.

It is worthwhile

.to take a brief look at the role of such groups in the
larger system as discussed by relevant actors.
William Cote (personal communication, January 31,
~985),

a former Capitol Bureau Newspaper Reporter

observed that:

···

Certainly the legislature, and to a somewhat lesser
degree ·the Governor's office, are very sensitive to
those things. They get calls and telegrams and
letters from just a comparative handful of people,
a hundred people or something, and they may see
that as an enormous flood of feeling on one issue.
Most actors involved in the mental health field are

aware that one of the handicaps faced by programs for
the mentally ill is a lack of cohesive advocacy.

There

remains a sense of stigma attached to mentally ill
clients and their relatives.

Unlike parents of mentally

retarded children, there is little sympathy or understanding for those related to the seriously disturbed.
In fact, historically, the blame for psychotic behavior
has often been placed squarely on the family.

While

developmentally disabled persons are less able to advoc·ate for themselves, they are also represented by a more
credible group, their parents.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

257
Representative Debbie Stabenow (personal communication, February 20, 1985) said:
There are two kinds of consumer groups, I think.
One relates to the DD (developmentally disabled)
and that has been predominantly parents, although
more direct consumers are becoming involved, but
predominantly parents. That movement has been in
place much longer (than organized groups for the
mentally ill), and is much more sophisticated. In
fact, that's why we have many more services for DD
than we do for MI (mentally ill), because of the
advocacy. They are very organized, very sophisticated.
The President of OASIS, a self-help group, seconds
that opinion:
The MI population compared to the DD is disadvantaged because the DD groups, such as Associations
for Retarded Citizens, seem to talk with a more
unified voice. Oh yes, we all recognize that they
(ARCs) are doing a heck of a lot better job at it
than we.
There appears to be general consensus.

Michigan

decision makers and system observers acknowledge that
the mentally ill population has received little advocacy
support in the past and changes are occurring slowly
with limited impact.
One Legislative Analyst summarized the relationship
well:
In general our psychiatric hospitals don't have a
very good constituency. They're not the ones who
are well known to the legislators and are real
active. We do have, and this is quite new, just in
the last few years, a growing network of expatients who are organized after a fashion.
But
that has become so difficult to deal with up here
(the Capitol) because some of them come and are
very extreme in their testimony •••• Many people who
have been mentally ill, and who have recovered and
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maintain themselves sufficiently well to really be
integrated back into society, they aren't going to
get up and talk about it.
It's the stigma •••• No,
I think what concerns me most is not the way they
talk, or anything of that order, it's the fact that
they don't have their act together.
Representative Stabenow (personal communication,
February 20, 1985) agrees with that assessment:
The radical folks are hard to deal with, the folks
who want to get into the whole question of the myth
of mental illness and there should be no civil
commitment procedure, and so on. There's no way
the majority of people buy that •••• The legislators, most of them know relatively little about
mental illness, even people on the Mental Health
Committee, and when that's their first contact with
somebody who's an advocate, it just doesn't help.
Although one member of a client advocacy group
tends to concur, she adds:
Really we aren't always sure that what we're doing
is doing any good, partly because we don't know
what would happen if we weren't involved. But, we
have a vested interest too. And, if we aren't
there to be seen, the counterforces could really
sweep us away.
Use of the media, as will be discussed in Chapter
VI, is rarely the strategy of choice for such groups.
Most often, attempts to sway opinion occur through
personal contact.

The leader of a self-help coalition

for the mentally ill said, "We are trying to make our
viewpoints known to the main decision makers.

I'm on

the Governor's Council on Mental Health and its Recipient Rights Committee and the Advisory Council of
Institutions.

I'm just trying to awaken people to

what's going on in the system."
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Approaches seem orthodox and generally involve a
comparative handful of vocal advocates.

When asked how

issues come to legislative attention, Betty Davey
(personal communication, January 28, 1985), a Legislative Analyst, said "telephone calls''.

"Sometimes it's

something that shows up in the newspaper and I think
that's how any legislator gets involved in local
decision making or what happens at the local level,
through constituents who call or write."
Representative Claude Trim (personal communication,
January 23, 1985) seconded that opinion.
much personal contact as possible.

He prefers as

He attempts to reach

every group that has a potential interest in issues
through news letters, as well as face-to-face meetings.
"And of course," he continues, "in case there's someone
out there you forgot or may have overlooked, you try to
do it through the media.

Just every way you can think

of."
Stabenow (personal communication, February 20,
1985), in addition to directly contacting constituency
groups, sponsors topic-oriented community meetings.

She

also holds informal discussion groups in outlying areas:
"I'll announce that I'll be there at 8:00 in the morning
when all the people come in for coffee or something and
just sit and talk.

I get a good reaction."

Representative Ernest Nash (personal communication,
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February 25, 1985) adds:
We receive a lot of calls here because I think the
most it would cost anyone probably is 20 cents in
my district •••• It's an advantage in that whenever
something is on their minds they call me. On the
other hand, I do spend a lot of time answering
inquiries.
Constituents are considered.
bureaucrats and politicians.

They have weight with

One Fiscal Analyst men-

tioned that DMH Director Pat Babcock:
unlike the previous directors, is paying a lot more
attention to what is occurring outside the Department, more of a team player. But he, as an administrator, is also more concerned about what is
occurring within the Department. He will often go
mix with people, visit institutions on the night
shift. Then he will come back to the legislature
and tell the story of his Department.
Despite this evidence of attention, there is little
direct evidence of interest group impact on the Michigan
legislature.

We remain unable to evaluate the strength

of decision-maker attention to specific groups, although
there is a suspicion that less weight is given to opinions of advocates for the mentally ill than for the
developmentally disabled.
Boulter's (1983) policy ladder and matrix offer a
visual accounting of these pressures.

The implication

is that decision makers are aware of, and react to,
public opinion.

Some observers consider this reaction a

natural outgrowth of operating within the political
sphere.

However, it remains difficult to separate

simple attentiveness from spurs to action.
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It is assumed, but never stated, that those at the
top of the policy ladder are far more powerful than
those at the bottom.

While patient groups may attain

considerable visibility, Michigan Department of Management and Budget, Department of Mental Health, and
institution bureaucrats are more politically powerful
and, therefore, hold more sway in the decision-making
process.
Several persons interviewed discussed an incident
which serves as one example of a major policy change
which appeared to result directly from constituent
involvement.

Beth Leeson (personal communication, Feb-

ruary 4, 1985), Director of the Mental Health Association in Michigan, described the incident:
Back in the very early '80s, when we were going
through Executive Order cut after Executive Order
cut, literally almost on a monthly basis, there was
a decision that some of the institutions would have
to be closed. And it was decided that Clinton
Valley Center would be targeted for closure •••• so
there was a decision made to close it. And it was
a serious decision.
It wasn't a, "We might have to
do this," sort of decision.
It was a, "Let's get
things rolling decision." And it was based essentially on money.
The people of the Pontiac area and others
joined and coalesced into a giant group and that
included residents of the institution, parents, the
police departments, the school systems, religious
groups, people in the community, just about everyone you could imagine joined together. They held a
huge public hearing down on the grounds of Clinton
Valley Center for the legislators.
And then, shortly thereafter, they got on
·buses, organized really a wonderful effort, one of
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the best we've seen at the State Capitol •••• They
all came to Lansing, about 660 strong, and crowded
into the House chambers and one after another spoke
all afternoon. Finally, at the very end of the day
-- and it really was such broad-based support for
Clinton Valley Center -- at the end of the day Pat
Babcock had his opportunity to speak and he said,
"I'd like to make an announcement.
I've just been
meeting with the Governor," who at that time was
Milliken, and said "We've found an extra," I think
it was six million that was needed to keep it open,
"and you can go home satisfied that you've done
your job well because Clinton Valley Center will
remain open."
The decision to retain Clinton Valley appeared to
result from a perception of strong support as publicly
voiced by interested actors.
With that kind of evidence of efficacy, groups will
continue to join forces in organized efforts to sway
decision makers.

Cigler and Loomis (1983) tell us that

the effectiveness of protest is related to three areas:
the quality of publicity received, the congruence of
interest group goals with the values of decision makers,
and coordination of the protest with the needs for
ongoing maintenance of the group (p. 350).
Boulter (1983) argues that predicting decision
outcomes in the public sector is less dependent upon the
organization of the effort than the development of widespread coalitions; less dependent upon total numbers
than the unified voice of those who speak out publicly.
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Summary
Interviews, correspondence and other public documents provide insight into two facilities developed with
the highest expectations.

Optimism about innovative

treatment programs and intensive care quickly gave way
to the realities of budget issues.

Power struggles

within and throughout the agencies ultimately weakened
their structures.
Lafayette Clinic resided within a benign and even
supportive community.

It was surrounded by other

service agencies with professional expertise.

By the

time budget reductions became a serious concern, the
program was an integral component of local services.
Staff worked hard at proving agency indispensability.
Grant programs were chosen that were of interest to
attentives and could show measurable returns.
Dual ownership by the Department of Mental Health
and Wayne State University did not appear to be a
liability for Lafayette Clinic.

Although primarily

funded by DMH, agency perception of purpose was strongly
tied to University programs.

Disagreements over goals

were softened by the protective relationship of medical
and academic communities.

Clinical privileges were

granted for a number of other Detroit-area hospitals, as
well as the University.

A faculty position at Lafayette
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was prestigious.
Lafayette Clinic leadership was entrepreneurial.
Administrators were able to provide services to a ghetto
area without losing sight of the institutional goal -research.
Michigan Institute for Mental Health, on the other
hand, seemed unable to retain necessary support at the
highest bureaucratic levels.

There is evidence, partic-

ularly in relationships with the legislature, that
administrators actually suppressed potential support for
MIMH within both the Executive and Legislative branches.
While there may have been widespread belief in program
effectiveness and value, this message was never clearly
received by decision makers.
The result was an increasing focus on organizational and fiscal issues, rather than programmatic
concerns.

This ultimately proved disastrous as factions

pulled against each other.

Potential allies, particu-

larly in the community, were alienated by conflicting
messages.

Patients were presented as dangerous. Direct-

care staff considered themselves under siege and administrators felt increasingly constrained.

Community

Mental Health and other local service agencies found
their case loads increased, rather than eased, by this
DMH program.

MSU and DMH were struggling with their own

definitions of how to handle the power inherent in this
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potentially valuable, but also volatile resource.
MIMH leadership was weak, partly because of an
inability to clarify the chain of command.

Both the

Director and Clinical Director were former Department of
Mental Health Central Office employees preparing for
retirement.

As a result, most operational direction

came from DMH.
University faculty were unable to establish the
co-equal administrative relationship they considered
important to program viability.

Clinicians assigned to

the facility received little peer support and even found
their academic status lowered by such "field" work.

The

Institute was never able to develop a research component.
Chapter VII will use Boulter's (1983) decision
ladder to demonstrate graphically the different levels
of support for these two programs and the resulting
impact on agency survival.
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CHAPTER VI
NEWSPAPER CONTENT ANALYSIS
Boulter (1983) only peripherally discusses media
involvement in the policy making process.

However, in

Chapter II it was proposed that the media, particularly
newspapers, can play an important role in directing
public attention.

As a result, they also direct

decision maker attention.

Newspaper editorials,

selective choices of headlines, and coverage of some
issues while ignoring others may even directly sway
opinion or force action on issues.
It was suggested that program success or failure is
dependent on decision-maker's perceptions of the sum of
constituency support.

Part of this perception of public

concern is obtained from the media, particularly
newspapers.

It was further proposed that those organi-

zatins that receive strong public constituency and media
support are more likely to survive than those which
receive less support.

More specifically, the decision

to maintain or close an institution for the mentally ill
(particularly in a time of crisis) will be influenced by
newspaper coverage.
These issues will be explored through a newspaper
content analysis and discussion of decision maker
266
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strategies regarding the press.

Chapter VII will pull

together information from the case histories and group
advocacy strategies, the content analysis and decision
maker perceptions, in a comparative analysis.
Boulter (1983) determined decision-maker opinions
by coding public statements as either positive, negative
or neutral toward a given policy.

For groups, such as

organized advocates or a legislative body, he aggregated
opinions to develop a single score.

There is no mention

of how ratings were obtained or scores quantified.

For

the purposes of this study three methods were employed:
interviews, surveys of public documents, and a content
analysis of newspaper articles.

This chapter will

examine more closely the newspaper medium's involvement
in public decisions.
All mental health articles during an eleven year
period were read and logged for the three local newspapers considered most likely to provide press coverage
of Lafayette Clinic and Michigan Institute for Mental
Health.

(See Appendix A.)

For the years 1973 through

1983 a total of 887 Detroit Free Press, Detroit News and
Lansing State Journal newspaper articles on mental
health issues were reviewed.

Of this number, a total of

7 percent mentioned either facility.
Lafayette Clinic and 28 named MIMH.

Thirty-four named
One mentioned both.
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Initially, it had been assumed that most mental
health articles would focus on a currently breaking
story.

The story would appear once or twice, then fade

as media (and public) interest turned to other areas.
This did not seem to be the case for the newspapers
studied.

Rather, substantive issues such as community

placement, deinstitutionalization and budgetary cutbacks
received ongoing media attention.
A year-by-year discussion of coverage for these
three newspapers will provide a more comprehensive
understanding of trends occurring in the mental health
field while laying the groundwork for additional
information obtained through interviews and public
documents.
1973 Through 1983
In 1973 one story to gain considerable media
attention was the emotion-arousing issue of psychosurgery.

As mentioned in Chapter V, this controversy

touched upon Lafayette Clinic.

Eleven articles named

the facility, almost a third of the total coverage for
Lafayette Clinic during the eleven year period.

Head-

lines such as "Psychosurgery Called Partial Euthanasia"
and "Can You Cut Out Hate With a Knife: The Story of a
Tortured Mind by John Doe" (Doe, 1973) served to
generate public interest.
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What brought the problem to media attention was the
contention by Doe's attorney that the law by which he
had been confined was unconstitutional.

As a result,

the court determined that Doe had been illegally
confined and ordered him immediately released.
Every potential fear issue was aroused.

Uncontrol-

lably insane persons, raping, killing and then being
discharged because of legal technicalities; surgery on
involuntary patients; and lobotomies on non-consenting
individuals.
In some sense this foreshadowed concerns in later
years about the helplessness of institutionalized
patients, juxtaposed with the helplessness and anger of
citizens forced to deal with a seemingly inflexible and
unconcerned bureaucracy.
One other article only peripherally mentioned the
Lafayette Clinic that year.

A new law changed most

state facility names; Lafayette Clinic's name remained
the same.
A year later (1974) Lafayette was involved in
another emotional issue similar to that of 1973.

Out of

a total of 33 articles, five mentioned the Clinic, three
in the State Journal and two in the Detroit News.

This

time the headline read, "Lawyers Fight Experiment on
Girl, 7, in Test Case" (1974).

Children committed to
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institutions were being used as experimental subjects
without their knowledge or consent.
On further consideration, the stories revealed that
parents had given permission for the procedures.

The

implication was that parents who would institutionalize
their children could not be good parents, and institutions felt no compunction about experimenting on the
innocent.

In actuality, blood samples routinely

gathered during physical

e~aminations

upon admission

were used to test for high levels of zinc.

If levels

were low, children were given supplements.
Again, the issue was not so much the experiment as
a point of law.

Can parents, admitting a person invol-

untarily, give consent for experimental procedures? Once
more, all the trigger words were there.

But added to

these emotional words were the legal concerns raised in
courts about a parent's right to commit involuntarily a
child without a court hearing.

Basic parental responsi-

bilities were in question.
These relatively short-term problems were soon
superseded in 1974 and 1975 by the new Mental Health
Code.

A sample of 1974 headlines tells the story:

"Judges Upset Mental Commitment Law," "Ruling Broadens
Mental Patient Rights," "Revised Mental Code Urged,"
"Mental Care Programs Face New Strain," "Mental Health
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Code Passed," "Where Will Adult Retarded Go?," and
"Judge Won't Send Mentally Ill to Jail."
There were 34 mental health articles in 1973 and 33
in 1974.

In 1975 that number jumped to 51.

The biggest

concern related to individuals admitted to facili~ies
years ago.

Originally found insane after heinous

crimes, they were no longer considered mentally ill.
Under the new law they had to be discharged.

Headlines

included "State to Release 3,000 Mentally Ill" and
"'Dangerous Man' Free; Mental Code Gets Blame".

The

Detroit Free Press published a series of stories after
locating seven "mental escapees", most of whom had committed either rape or murder.

State of Michigan offi-

cials were accused of being lax in attempts to apprehend
such dangerous criminals.

The Department responded by

either returning the AWOL former patients to their
facilities or removing them from escape status.
individual had died two years earlier.

One

Clearly the

Department was on the defensive.
Thirty-two out of 51 articles in 1975 dealt directly with Mental Health Code changes and their effect on
involuntarily confined patients.

1974 and 1975 were

both marked by resignations under fire of top-level mental health officials, including DMH Director E. Gordon
Yudashkin, M.D.
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In 1976 the number of articles about mental health
programs rose to 80.

The year was one of increasing

attention to the broader mental health issues that would
continue to surface during the next few years.

In the

spotlight were fiscal problems (7 articles), institutional care concerns (13 stories), and system-wide
deinstitutionalization (12 articles).
Ten stories, all but one in the Lansing State
Journal, discussed establishment of the MIMH facility at
Jarvis Acres.

Although others covered the same

meetings, the specific agency or site were not mentioned
as in "Mental Board Again Rejects Mental Care Facility".
The first article to mention the facility by name
reports on proposed sites.

The next six discuss the

controversy surrounding establishment of a mental health
agency in a suburban setting.

Local meetings and

neighborhood opposition were covered in detail. The
remaining three stories, one in the Detroit News,
reported on the Windsor Township Board and Planning
Commission approval for DMH to lease the site.
During that same year, the single State Journal
feature on Lafayette Clinic would seem to presage new
attention for an important problem.

The headline was

"'Cure' for Schizophrenics Now in Hands of FDA"
(McCarthy, 1976).

Neither Detroit paper mentioned the

breakthrough, and there was no further coverage.
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As discussed in Chapter V, Lafayette Clinic had
been receiving funding for accelerated schizophrenia
research since 1974.

The appearance of this story in

the Lansing State Journal two years later may be
reflective of the Journal's ready access to the Capitol
Bureau and the fact that Mental Health appropriation
hearings for the new fiscal year were underway.
There were eight "upbeat" feature articles in 1976,
many during December, all regarding the mentally
retarded such as "Self-Respect is Part of Their Job's
Pay" and "Retarded Find Warmth, Hope at New Center".
In 1977 the total number of mental health stories
dropped back down to 61.

Unlike years before or after,

there appeared to be little concentration on broader
problem areas.

Articles seemed more supportive of

patient rights and the system, e.g., "Handicapped Are
Fitting In To Society", "A Proud Young Man Demonstrates
'New Era' In Chance For The Retarded" and "Healing An
Ailing System" <1977).
The latter article mentions MIMH.

While the focus

remained on problems within the Mental Health Department, there was some discussion of inroads and planned
improvements.

MIMcl was considered part of the coming

new era.
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A series of Detroit-area newspaper articles served
as an impetus for the Michigan Legislature, in House
Concurrent Resolution 144 of 1977, to call for the
resignation of the Coldwater State Home and Training
School Superintendent, whose "policies have left a cloud
of public distrust over the operation of the State-run
mental health institution."

The resolution goes on to

cite the "low morale of the institution's employees,
along with the recent

pers~nnel

disturbances which were

widely reported in the media •.•• If immediate attention
is not given to this critical matter, the public's
confidence in State-run institutions will be irreparably
harmed."

As a result of legislative and media pressure,

the Superintendent resigned the following week.
During the next year, news coverage of the mentally
ill and retarded changed irrevocably.

In November, 1977

Oakdale Center for the Developmentally Disabled, Lapeer
came under investigation regarding allegations of
patient abuse.

Several staff were fired.

On February

19, 1978 the Detroit Free Press began a series of frontpage exposes on Plymouth Center with "Children Tortured;
State Center Covers Up".
Again, people's worst fears were realized.

Help-

less children were being physically, sexually and
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emotionally abused by workers in a large impersonal
system.

Abuse investigations spread to other facilities

and programs.

Heads of facilities quit.

The Acting

Director of the Department of Mental Health resigned.
The mental health news in 1978, as seen in 187
articles, talked of little else.

Added to these horror

stories was increasing controversy about community homes
for the retarded and mentally ill and the beginning of
the deinstitutionalization ?ush as depicted in "Lawsuit
Protests Adult Care Home" and "2 Suburbs Seek to Bar
Homes for Retarded Adults".

Of the 42 articles not

specifically focused on allegations of abuse, 20 were
about group homes in the Detroit area.
On the one hand, institutions were pictured as
horrifying warehouses where innocent children cried out
unheard, "Children Held our Hands, Wouldn't Let Go".

On

the other, placement of handicapped adults in community
settings was vigorously opposed, "Lawsuit Protests Adult
Care Home".

Seldom were attacks on individual homes

linked with the broader problems of lack of coordination
and inadequate preplanning within the Department of
Mental Health.
House Mental Health Committee minutes of May 18,
1978 find representative Thomas Brown chiding fellow
members by saying, "We are keeping people locked up that
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shouldn't be and we are responding to what the press
says rather than what the professionals in the institutions have to say."
One of the few upbeat notes during the year was
coverage of the Macomb-Oakland Regional Center, a new
facility for the mentally retarded.

Agency adminis-

trators appeared to make a concerted effort to talk
about their community programs through such articles as
"'Rest Break' for Parents qf Retarded" and "Plan Helps
Find 'Special Sitter'".
Of the 187 mental health articles during 1978, four
named either Lafayette Clinic or MIMH, two for each
facility.

For MIMH, mention was part of the tag for

articles such as "Reports of Patient Abuse Not Limited
to Plymouth" and "Most State Homes Have Abuse Cases".
MIMH was listed among agencies with no reported incidents of abuse.

Lafayette was not mentioned at all.

However, during the year Lafayette did receive
renewed accreditation, "8 Mental Hospitals Win Recertification" and a staff member was quoted in an article
regarding the search for a new DMH Director, "Panels Try
to Fill Mental Health Job".

It is interesting to note

that MIMH's accreditations were never covered, nor was
the name change from New Riverside Treatment Center to
Michigan Institute for Mental Health ever mentioned.
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The media remained focused on abuses at mental
facilities during the following year in articles such as
"Crime, Morale Crises Plague State Hospital", "Plymouth
Center is 'Disastrous' Court is Told" and "How Captivity
Since Birth Left Jack, 54, a Mental Cripple".

Again,

the majority of articles concerned Detroit area
facilities.

The Detroit News also did a series on

Ypsilanti Regional Center's filthy kitchen.
Attention remained on .deinstitutionalization as
well.

Community homes were under siege as in "Bullets

'Welcome' Home for Retarded" and "Fire Destroys Troy
Home for Retarded".

During the year, a new DMH Director

and Lafayette Clinic Director were hired, with minimal
press attention.
In 1979, out of a total of 85 articles, 43
concerned institutional deficiencies and 9, community
homes.

Three mentioned Lafayette Clinic.

Two were

regarding the problems of appointing an Australian
Clinical Chief and the third about state facilities that
contracted linen services to non-local providers ("Dirty
Linen Hits the Road").
The one article about MIMH had an unusual focus
given the tenor of the times, "Patients Protected from
Abuse; Who Protects Attendants?".

The State Journal

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

278
article by Yolanda Alvarado (1979) begins, "Administrators at the Dimondale state hospital for the mentally
ill have gone overboard in their zeal to protect
patients from abuse, a group of nursing attendants say."
The story quotes direct-care workers who contended
that serious incidents occurred because of "asinine"
state mental health code rules and hospital policies,
the most critical of which was forbidding the use of
"seclusion" as a disciplinary tool.

According to the

reporter, Director Cretta Johnson "appeared both surprised and disturbed at finding out that some attendants
were so dissatisfied that they would contact the press."
Such a public argument between care providers
served to fuel the dissonance surrounding deinstitutionalization that was already causing considerable discomfort for readers in the community.

The dangers of

the mentally ill were reinforced at the same time as the
potential for abuse of powers within institutions.

If

trained attendants were afraid, then certainly citizens
had every right to be.
In 1980, the issues began to change.
articles focused on mental health.

Eighty-nine

The potentially

volatile story of involuntary sterilization faded
quickly with such articles as "Michigan Had 3,000
Sterilized in 1929-50", "Sterilization Victim, 63, Still
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Asks 'Why'".

Interest remained fixed, however, on the

continued problems of community placement.

Five

articles looked at sterilization of the institutionalized mentally retarded and 19 at problems in deinstitutionalization planning, including several cases of
arson, as seen in "FBI to Investigate Fire at Home For
Retarded".
Nine articles were written about renewed allegations of abuse at mental health institutions.

Added to

these ongoing controversies was a relatively new
concern, the budget.

Seventeen stories focused on

spending cuts and pending layoffs of direct care staff
in institutions.

Such articles only contributed to the

uneasiness citizens were feeling, "Hospitals Notify
Staffs of Cutbacks", "Budget Cuts Imperil Mental Health
Units" and "Milliken Seeks Another Big Slash in
Spending".
Although never publicly stated, the implication
appeared to be that if institutions had enough money,
there would be plenty of staff, abuses would not occur
and there would be no need to place people in the
community.

Yet, such thinking was clearly at odds with

the deinstitutionalization push.

Why put money in

institutions if patients were going to be placed in the
community?

It seemed to be an almost irreconcilable

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

280

dichotomy.

Only rarely were philosophical issues raised

such as what was best for the mentally disabled or how
better services could be provided.
The article "Mental Health Cuts Will Hurt" offers
one of the first discussions of potential budget
reductions that could force closing MIMH.

Two other

stories, "Mental Health Director Protests Cuts in
Budget" and "Injuries Up At Mental Institutions" both
briefly add MIMH to a list of Michigan's few accredited
facilities.
MIMH staff reacted to the threat of fiscal cutbacks
through such articles as "Care Aides 'Afraid for Their
Lives'" and "Mental Facility Aides Say Layoffs A
Danger".

These appeals to decision makers through

community attentives appeared to be aimed at generating
fear -- fear of reducing staff to the point that
patients would become unmanageable.
Of the remaining nine articles mentioning MIMH
during 1980, six relate directly to the open door policy
or neighbor concerns about patient "runaways".

Some

examples are "Riverside's 'Open Door' Policy Arouses
Concern", "Fencing of Mental Unit Asked" and "Jarvis
Walkaways Upset Windsor Board".
Lafayette Clinic celebrated its 25th anniversary
that same year.

The anniversary received brief notice
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in a Detroit News story about a research breakthrough.
Dr. Tibor Farkas, Psychiatrist at the New York University School of Medicine, addressed a psychiatric conference held at Lafayette Clinic and described his new
brain scan machine as "one of the most ambitious and
complex research projects ever attempted in psychiatry"
("Scanner Provides Peek Inside Brain").
A second 1980 Detroit Free Press article is
entitled "Lafayette Clinic Seeks Old Luster".

By Colin

Covert (1980), it begins:
Just over a year ago when Dr. Samuel Gershon became
director of Detroit's Lafayette Clinic, he was like
a man buying a used car. He expected to find some
problems but didn't realize their full extent until
he took over.
A half page picture shows George Smoot, lab
technician, performing a brain implant on a mouse.

The

article is positive, focusing on clinical research, with
no discussion of patient care.
Of the 111 mental health stories in 1981, most can
be divided into two categories: budget and deinstitutionalization/placernent programs.

Forty focused on the

problems of deinstitutionalization; eighteen on budget.
Community dissonance was prompted by such back-to-back
stories as "State Agrees to Costly Lease of Foster Horne"
and "Budget Slashes Worsen Woes of Psychiatric Care".
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Eleven articles were specifically about Dr. Frank
Ochberg, DMH Director, who resigned following an audit
of Departmental practices.

Headlines read, "Ochberg

Out, Group Homes Stay" and "New Chief Backs Group Home
Policy".
Another potentially serious and damaging issue was
raised by the Detroit News which carried a series of
seven articles beginning with "120 Died in State Hospitals in '80".
coverage.

However,

~o

other newspaper provided

Given the outrage of the 1970's over

allegations of abuse, it is surprising that allegations
of murder received less attention.

While it is not

possible to judge the validity of such accusations based
solely on Detroit News articles, it appears that
community interest was turned elsewhere.
Michigan Institute was mentioned in two 1981
reports about a televised budget address by Governor
William Milliken, who discussed the impact of proposed
cuts.

This was the first notice that MIMH would be

closed, "Economic Woes Force Hospital Closing".
Lafayette Clinic was also considered for closure later
that year if cutbacks continued, "Mental Health Sends
Budget Warning".
Michigan Institute for Mental Health closed in 1981
without further newspaper mention.

This lack of media
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attention appears counterintuitive given evidence of
ongoing community concerns about the facility, coupled
with earlier publicity about staff working under siege.
MIMH workers had seemed willing to take their story to
the newspapers.

If nothing else, publicity about

closing the facility would have been a useful tool for
local legislators wanting to gain constituency support.
In 1982 the focus on mental health began to wane,
approaching 1975 levels.

There were 65 articles, with

almost half (32} spotlighting worsening fiscal woes and
the impact on deinstitutionalization.

Headlines in 1982

tell of the continuing tug and pull created by these two
issues in the community: "Michigan Mental Care 'On
Ledge', Chief Says", "Breaking Point: A Bare Minimum
Isn't Enough For Mental Care", and "Community Placement
Plan Saving Mental Health Funds".
During the year there was renewed interest in the
Mental Health Code with six articles, including "Should
the Insanity Plea as a Defense Be Abolished?" and
"Michigan's Insanity Verdict Under Fire".

With jail

overcrowding, the chances a mentally ill criminal would
be released early were greatly increased.
Two 1982 articles mention Lafayette Clinic
peripherally, with short quotations from staff members.
Another, in the August 29 issue of the Detroit Free
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Press, features Dr. Barbara Geller, Child Psychiatrist,
who studied depression in children caused by chemical
imbalances.

The story is positive and one of several

reflecting more generously on the mentally ill and
developmentally disabled.
Of the remaining 14 articles, only one is placed
within an institutional context, "Ex-Mental Patients Aid
Others".

The rest are more typical of such features,

"Retarded Child May Aid A Marriage, Study Finds", "God's
Children: 'Love Is the Message We Want to Teach Them'",
and "Self Esteem Grows Along With Flowers and
Vegetables".
The range and type of stories during 1982 are more
reflective of those first evidenced in the early 1970's.
In fact, this pattern had originally been anticipated.
It was expected that the focus would be on a few stories
of newsworthiness, carried while interest lasted, then
dropped in favor of the latest news.

However,

throughout the analysis, we have seen persistent media
attention on specific issues of community concern.

In

1982 the spotlight remained on budget and placement.
These same concerns carried into 1983.

Out of 91

articles, 13 discussed the DMH budget and disability
benefits for patients; 15 were about deinstitutionalization problems or group homes; and 13 related to a
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death at Northville.

The death was allegedly caused by

a drug overdose which prompted further investigation of
the facility.

Lafayette staff were mentioned twice in

quotation attributions.
Perceptions of the Medium
In total, over an eleven year period, the Michigan
Institute for Mental Health was mentioned in newspaper
articles 28 times and Lafayette Clinic 34 times.

Two

factors appear to be responsible for this limited press
attention: deliberate risk avoidance on the part of the
agencies, and an ongoing news focus on the volatile
issues of the day, many of which were occurring in a few
Detroit locations.
During interviews most mental health advocates
mentioned that unless stories were sensational, they
tended to be of little interest to editors and
reporters.

One Director of a client advocacy group

said, "We try to talk to the press, whoever we can.
we can't get much attention."

But

The Lansing-area leader

of a relatives group he founded 25 years ago commented
that "It is hard to get quiet, good stories in the
media."

Another self-help group program coordinator

added "I find it bothersome and irritating at times for
them (the press) to come and interview us, and they want
gory stories."
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These opinions were supported by the content
analysis.

Generally mental health topics were highly

volatile, and stories were filled with emotion-arousing
words.

Of the 694 articles for which page numbers were

obtained, almost half (336) were on Al, A2, A3 (inside
front page) or Bl (front page of the second section), an
unexpectedly high figure.
Overall, during the eleven-year period studied, the
feature-type "soft-sell" articles were few and far
between.

When they did occur, they were more frequently

about the mentally retarded.

Of the 80 stories classi-

fiable by the trade as "upbeat", 60 highlighted the
retarded and 20 the mentally ill.

Examples are such

features as "Last Chance Family - Love for Disabled" and
"Wonder Woman: She Works Magic With Retarded.
Lack of media interest may also have been caused by
larger issues sweeping attention away from the two
facilities.

Initially it had been assumed that most

articles would focus on a currently breaking story.

The

story would appear once or twice, then fade as media
(and public) interest turned to other areas.

For the

newspapers studied, at least in the mental health
system, this did not seem to be the case.

In 1978, for

instance, there were 187 mental health articles, 11 in
the Lansing State Journal, 112 in the Detroit News and
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64 in the Detroit Free Press.

One-hundred-and-forty-

five focused on allegations of abuse in institutions for
the retarded, primarily at Plymouth Center for Human
Development.

This story was initially investigated by

the Detroit Free Press.

Of the remaining 42 articles

that year, 20 dealt with community concerns about foster
care homes which were first established in the Detroit
area.
State Journal interest in the larger mental health
issues may have been less than for the two Detroit
papers because the major problems, including allegations
of abuse, deinstitutionalization, and foster care home
placements, either originated in the Detroit area or had
their greatest impact there.
Edwin Diamond and Claire M. Tallarico (1985) in
exploring media reactions to a highly publicized New
York City crime help to explain these findings:
Researchers refer to the media's presumed
agenda-setting power -- the idea that the press
tells people what to think about, if not what to
think. We found that notion in this case dead
wrong. Most of the media went along with an
intense, emotional public opinion. (p. 7)
Decision-makers and the Media
We see considerable evidence of crisis within the
mental health system, crises that threatened the
stability of programs and forced large-scale changes.
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We also see evidence that politicians and bureaucrats
are aware of the media.

Joe Snyder, a Michigan

Legislator for 16 years, said about the Department of
Mental Health:
We just had to go out after them more than once and
publicize the problems that no one else would
notice if we hadn't •••• Then it was a question of
using the resultant publicity to force the
Department into making the changes that were
needed.
I used strong press releases to get my
point across •••• The media was very supportive in
those days, particularly the Detroit Free Press.
They delighted in our shenanigans. (personal
communication, February 4, 1985)
A former Governor's Office Project Director stated
that the Governor also used the press:
what it's there for.

"Sure.

That's

That's what part of the job of

being a politician is all about.

Get your story out."

From the news writer's perspective, an MSU
Journalism Instructor and Booth Newspaper Reporter for
15 years agreed that legislators read newspapers to help
them respond to community concerns.

Officials "cer-

tainly read our stories ••• because they would often
call us and discuss them, talk about them, disagree with
what somebody else had said or agree."

He added, "They

may be relying too much on what a comparative handful of
people are saying.
who speak up?

But what if they're the only people

Fairly small groups have a lot of influ-

ence because of that."

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

289
A Legislative Research Analyst agreed, "I do think
more legislators react to the press than they like to
admit.

But many of them don't have the opportunity to

really try to shape it (press coverage)."

A former

Legislative Liaison for the Governor's Office responded
even more succinctly when asked if legislative inquiries
were triggered by the press, "Sure. Absolutely.
question of the power of the press.

No

The press is very

influential."
In almost every case, positive interaction with the
media is considered to be a result of personal contacts,
dependent upon an individual relationship with a local
newspaper writer or editor interested in mental health
issues.

The Director of the Office of Community

Residential Services stated:
I think after a while you sort of establish good
relationships with two or three press people and
they need information and you need information so
you get sort of a detente with them. But, the
relationship is good enough that you can trust them
and if you have to go off the record they will.
However, Department of Mental Health Director C.
Patrick Babcock (personal communication, March 25, 1985)
considers the media from a somewhat different perspective.

News stories serve as signposts:

"I think once

you stop reading criticisms in the press or stop getting
shot at in a positive way in the legislature, getting
tough questions or getting into trouble, you're getting
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complacent.

And that is how (the problems at) Plymouth

developed."
Summary and Discussion
During the 11 years under study, the Michigan
Institute was only mentioned in relation to its opening
or closing, with little in between except peripheral
inclusion in larger stories.
A Lansing State Journal staff writer for the past
15 years described her involvement:
Regarding MIMH there were some big meetings at
Dimondale, but mostly the papers didn't pay any
attention. And these were people who were trying
to make a difference, but they weren't much heard •
••• At that time the Lansing State Journal was
getting away more from that meeting type of coverage. We were becoming more dependent on the wires
and stories of broader interest. As a consequence,
some of the local stuff got lost. And, when nobody
paid attention, the issues sort of just disappeared.
Lafayette's reaccreditation was mentioned briefly,
and Michigan Institute's not at all.

Both facilities

had a low public profile and, given the heat of the
media's spotlight, perhaps chose such a strategy
deliberately.
Lafayette Clinic was involved in two early conflicts in 1973 and 1974.

For the most part, agency

mention was peripheral to larger legal and research
questions.

Indeed, several articles about psychosurgery
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did not name Lafayette Clinic as an involved party.
While articles were filled with connotative, emotional
words that would surely impact negatively on the reading
public, that negativism was not tied as directly as it
could have been to the Clinic.
Most stories focused on larger mental health issues
and not the institution.

Interviews with Michigan

decision makers and leaders demonstrate, however, that
there is a belief that the media had some influence
during the years studied.

When asked how the

legislature became involved in investigating an
institution scandal, the Director of the DMH Office of
Legislative Liaison said,
got upset.

"Well they read the papers,

Something had to be done."

Pressure exerted on legislators and the Department
of Mental Health forced re-evaluation of the Mental
Health Code, resignations of Directors of the Department
and several facilities, and continued attention to the
problems of deinstitutionalization and development of
group and foster homes.
One of Governor Milliken's former staff members
criticized a DMH Director by saying:
I think he was sharp and very dedicated but didn't
realize, or wasn't quite as sensitive as perhaps
any of his staff people would be, to the impact of
that kind of media and the fact that he did need
it. Image is part of getting your mission
.accomplished.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

292

For the most part, mental health stories during
these years were damaging to Department of Mental Health
programs and, as a result, harmful to public understanding of problems of the developmentally disabled and
mentally ill.
When newspaper features emphasized the positive,
they were often about the mentally retarded.

However,

the few "upbeat" articles about availability of community services or overcoming handicaps were clearly
overshadowed by such exposes as the six page magazine
insert by "John Doe", a rapist and murderer scheduled to
be released under new mental health laws.
Harvey Brazer (1982), Professor of Economics at the
University of Michigan, noted in the massive 1982 study
he edited on Michigan's political economy that:
The Department of Mental Health seems to have been
the target of more than an average amount of
unfavorable publicity. Charges of nepotism,
lawsuits directed at state institutions,
neighborhood confrontations over residential
facilities, and charges of fraud and corruption in
the leasing of residential facilities have been
common during the early 1980's. Many of these
problems may be inherent in a mental health care
delivery system, but not all of them are. (p. 291)
Mental health issues do not tend to be valueneutral when presented in the press.

This may be a

result of the nature of the media itself.

The media are

dependent upon sensitive issues, controversial concerns
and those problems that strike at the heart of the
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community's fears.

One newspaper reporter calls it the

"Woodward and Bernstein syndrome":
Many of the papers ••• are doing what they consider, not advocacy, but interpretive reporting and
analytical reporting, where they are trying to come
to some conclusions as to whether the Department or
a particular facility, or whatever, is living up to
its aims at least.
Politicians tended to see the press as generally
negative toward state institutions and Department of
Mental Health care of the mentally retarded and ill.
Deinstitutionalization was 'criticized because of lack of
forethought and preplanning.

During the Plymouth

scandal, DMH was even criticized for failure to ask for
sufficient funds to properly maintain facilities.
Conclusion
This study concerns two facilities: Michigan
Institute for Mental Health and Lafayette Clinic.

It

was suggested that newspapers direct decision-maker
attention and that program success or failure is dependent on perceptions of support, as filtered through the
media.

It was also proposed that the decision to main-

tain or close an agency for the mentally ill will be
influenced by newspaper coverage.
It is not possible to affirm these propositions
based on the content analysis.
rejected.

Nor can they be

There is insufficient evidence of media
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support, or lack of it, for either of the two institutions under study.
The media's impact on the larger system is visible.
Changes occurred in the Mental Health Code and within
the Department of Mental Health.

Increased scrutiny

continues to be focused on the care and treatment of the
mentally handicapped and the state system in which they
reside.
We do not know how many of these changes can be
attributed to newspaper influence.

But, thanks to the

interviews, we do know that there is a generalized
perception by decision makers that they are influenced.
There is widespread belief in the importance of information provided through newspapers and the strength of
public concern as represented in the media.

Although

there are differing opinions about how direct the
connection is between information and action, there is
increasing awareness of press involvement in the
decision-making process.
Over a century ago John C. Calhoun (1929, p. 537)
said that public opinion "instead of being the united
opinion of the whole community is usually nothing more
than the voice of the strongest interest or combination
of interests; and not infrequently a small but energetic
and active portion of the people."
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The newspaper serves as a tool for this small but
energetic group of people.

There are growing numbers of

attentives that can become a powerful force in the
decision process.

A massive rally of support, like that

which occurred at Clinton Valley Center, becomes
possible only by reaching all of those who may have a
stake in the outcome.

The newspaper is one medium for

providing information on a single issue to a disparate
group of individuals.
This brief survey does suggest one important
caveat, however.

It appears that the media tends to

focus on the negative.

Those agencies which intend to

survive, at least in Michigan's current mental health
system, are best served by avoiding public attention
regarding such volatile issues as the mentally ill.
Articles mentioning Lafayette Clinic or Michigan
Institute for Mental Health were overwhelmingly
negative.

Although Lafayette Clinic had a number of

community service programs, they were never covered;
neither were community meetings, open houses and other
local services provided by the Michigan Institute.
Lafayette leadership began to deliberately avoid media
attention following several public controversies in the
early 1970's.

At Michigan Institute, staff took their
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concerns to the press, to the ultimate detriment of the
program.
This lack of positive media attention for Michigan
Institute may have been instrumental in limiting
advocacy and legislative involvement in the agency.
There was little understanding of, and interest in,
facility services.

Coverage of broader mental health

issues contributed to this problem.
not engaged by MIMH

progra~

success.

Legislators were
Rather, they were

captured by the disasters that were occurring at other
institutions.

This opened the door for greater

bureaucratic control of MIMH operations and ultimately
made it easier, as interviews in Chapter V show, to
close the facility.
The following chapter will summarize information in
examining the final proposition:

Organizations which

receive strong public constitutency support are more
likely to survive than those which receive less support.
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CHAPTER VII
A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
Considerable background information has been
provided.

Both the crisis period and actor perceptions

of that time were outlined in an effort to clarify
system dynamics.

Boulter's (1983) decision ladder was

then used as an overlay to examine the stakes and stands
of specific groups involve4 in decision making at both
Lafayette Clinic and the Michigan Institute for Mental
Health.
For our purposes it was important to provide this
research foundation in order to demonstrate that the
data was firmly grounded in historical reality.

In

addition, for those unfamiliar with the Michigan mental
health system, it offers a basic framework.
The role of the media in policy development was
also explored.

While media involvement in outcomes at

the two agencies appeared to be minimal, the findings
cause attention to turn to another potential source of
support and political power -- organized advocacy
groups.

We have looked at strategies used by these

groups and how they perceive the media.

This chapter

will take the information gathered and summarize it in
the form of plus and minus ratings of actor or group
297
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support toward the two agencies both before and after
the crisis period.
The fiscal crisis, exacerbated by placement
concerns, became a state-wide institutional issue in
1979 and 1980.

Therefore, the first few years of

Michigan Institute for Mental Health operation, 1977
through 1979, will be compared to its last years before
closure, 1980 and 1981.

Lafayette Clinic will be exam-

ined during this same period.
Boulter's (1983) decision ladder will then be used
to translate information into a rating table of positions toward each agency.

The resulting matrices will

graphically display public opinion and clarify decision
outcomes by encapsulating the data.
This chapter, in conjunction with the case studies,
will serve as a basis for assessing the applicability of
Boulter's (1983) policy ladder, as well as its utility
in other public decision making situations.

After

having applied the framework it becomes possible to step
back and examine it in Chapter VIII.
A summary of Positions
Boulter's (1983) framework is relatively simple.
He rated actor positions toward a decision (reducing the
speed limit to 55 miles per hour in several countries)
based on public statements and the crisis period (a
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sharp reduction in petroleum imports), using a tally
sheet.
Opinions for groups, such as the Michigan legislature, are aggregated in Boulter's (1983) framework to
create a single overall rating.

The assumption is that

the majority opinion is the one that will hold sway
during a policy debate.

In the legislature, for in-

stance, outcomes are agreed upon by votes and evidenced
by budget allocations.
Both Lafayette Clinic and Michigan Institute for
Mental Health programs were examined in depth to obtain
an enhanced understanding of the process under study.
With that background, it is possible to offer a comparison using a modified form of Boulter's (1983} policy
ladder and matrix.

Ratings of actor support before and

after the crisis period will be discussed briefly.
Ratings will then be combined in tabular form to offer
an enhanced understanding of stands and how they
impacted on the two facilities under study.
Lafayette Clinic
One example of a policy ladder for Lafayette Clinic
may be found in Figure 12.

It shows that the decision

was to retain the facility, even though the budget had
been severely cut.

That decision was made by Michigan

politicians and bureaucrats, as influenced by a variety
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LEVEL I

The decision was to retain the facility
although the budget was severely cut

made by

LEVEL II

Frank Ochberg, DMH Director
William Milliken, Governor
Gerald Miller, DMB Director
Michigan Legislature

influenced by

LEVEL III

LEVEL IV

Clinic Administration
Wayne Faculty
Regional Director

Civil Service Staff
Community Mental Health Staff
Wayne Staff
Unions

LEVEL V

shaped by

Organizational Leadership
Civil Service/Wayne Operational Relationship
Staff Concern About Treatment and Research
Facility Age and Reputation
Facility Location

The crisis was extensive budgetary cutbacks
throughout the state.

Figure 12.

Lafayette Clinic decision-making ladder.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

301
of people, issues and circumstances.

Based on infor-

mation provided in Chapters IV and V, it is possible to
rate key actor support toward Lafayette Clinic as
positive (+), negative (-)or seriously divided (split
opinion) before and after the crisis period, as documented by public statements.
Bureaucrats
Before and After the Crisis Period

(+)

In its developmental stages, Lafayette Clinic
received a great deal of support from bureaucrats,
including the Governor and the Director of the Department of Mental Health.

Initially there was considerable

optimism that Lafayette Clinic would find a solution to
the devastating problem of schizophrenia.

By 1977, when

that hope had begun to fade, Clinic program's were so
much a part of the system that any attempt to eliminate
beds or services would have been subject to severe
public criticism.
The Wayne County population was in need of mental
health resources.

Most patients were served by state-

funded programs in institutions which were part of the
largest placement effort in the state.

Despite receiv-

ing a majority of mental health dollars, Wayne County
continued to operate under the biggest deficits of any
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county mental health program in the nation.
Elimination of any Detroit and Wayne County mental
health program at this time, as allegations of abuse
elsewhere were occurring and deinstitutionalization
efforts were receiving increasing scrutiny, would have
been ill-advised politically and programmatically.

Not

only was attention clearly turned elsewhere, but, at
least initially, Lafayette's reputation was such that
elimination of the program would also have eliminated
one of the few bright spots in Detroit-area mental
health services.

While support for the agency may have

deteriorated because of reduced levels of funding, there
was still a need to retain what was perceived as a
quality program in Wayne County.
The Lafayette Clinic Director, Jacques Gottlieb,
M.D., was a strong agency advocate who strove to insure
that many key decision makers developed a personal
interest in Lafayette Clinic.
support began to fade.

When he left, this

Differences in perception of

value began to occur among bureaucrats when services
appeared to deteriorate and the facility strayed from
its original mandate.
DMH Director Smith

(+)

Don Smith, M.D., was an advocate.

He, however,

found himself under considerable personal pressure when
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allegations of abuse surfaced in the Detroit area.

He

remained concerned about Lafayette Clinic, and was a
personal friend of Gottlieb's, but found himself unable
to continue sheltering the program because of his need
to protect himself.
DMH Director Ochberq

(split opinion)

Frank Ochberg's support is not as easy to define.
Ochberg (personal communication, January 17, 1985) did
not consider the legislature as a whole to be an ally
because of what he called "the anti-Mental Health
Department sentiment" of rather powerful Detroit area
legislators, "There was no legislative attention to what
we were doing in a positive way."

This ongoing battle

between Ochberg and the legislature may have served to
temper Ochberg's interactions with the facility.
The crisis period affected the institution by
reducing funds.

Ochberg had neither the strength nor

inclination to redirect those allocation shifts.
Michigan Department of Mental Health Officials
Before the Crisis Period (+)
Lafayette Clinic is a designated training center
for most of the mental health disciplines.

About GO

percent of all State of Michigan psychiatric residents
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study at the facility.
The Clinic was conceived, at least by staff, as a
prestigious research program that would also provide
adjunctive services to a most difficult area and
population.
After Crisis (split opinion)
Budget cuts made it necessary for personnel to
change their focus.

The Department of Mental Health

began to emphasize fast, efficient treatment.

Opera-

tional, rather than educational, services were funded.
Research became of tertiary interest, which meant that
staff were forced to depend on grants in order to continue their studies.
DMH bureaucrats remained concerned about the
facility's ability to treat patients rather than just
study them, and evidenced some dissatisfaction over
staff unwillingness to drop grant projects and
concentrate on care of the chronically mentally ill.
There were also splits in opinion regarding the value of
sustaining research during a time of fiscal restraint.
However, Lafayette Clinic proved adept at changing
to meet new contingencies.

Research focused on current

issues of the day, and bed utilization was modified to
meet DMH requirements while still attempting to maintain
core research components.
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Wayne State University
Before Crisis (+)
From the beginning Wayne State University officials
and faculty were supportive of Lafayette Clinic.

The

new center promised additional funds, prestige, applied
training programs and the ability to recruit top quality
researchers.

University land, space and staff were

offered to assure that the _Clinic became an integral
part of ongoing academic efforts.

Ties were further

strengthened by Mental Health Code clarification and
legitimation of the University/Clinic relationship.
There were few administrative problems associated
with this joint effort, perhaps because Clinic personnel
identified more closely with the University than with
the Department of Mental Health.

The University affili-

ation and joint faculty appointments provided a measure
of prestige for Civil Service clinical staff.
After Crisis

<+>

Discussions have occurred periodically about transferring the Lafayette clinical program directly to the
University, along with state funding.

Such a move would

fully integrate the two services, which have been
sharing resources since Lafayette's inception.
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Department of Management and Budget Staff
Before Crisis (split opinion)
DMB personnel, as a group, have always expressed
mixed feelings about the Lafayette Clinic program~

As

fiscal analysts, they have a concern about spending
money where little immediate return is forthcoming.

If

funds are to be provided for mental health services,
they should produce quantifiable results in the form of
patients treated, or costs reduced.

Research is seldom

that clearcut.
After Crisis (split opinion)
While Department of Management and Budget staff
essentially follow the mandates of the Executive Office
and the legislature, their analyses of the Lafayette
Clinic budget showed a general lack of support for any
programs other than treatment and training.

As legis-

lators became increasingly aware of these issues in the
late 1970's, despite some evidence of Lafayette Clinic's
research efficacy, budget analyses became even more
direct in their focus on operational planning and
patient care.

In general, legislators followed DMB

budgetary guidelines in the appropriation process.

The

results were annual reductions in state allocations to
the Clinic.
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Michigan Legislature
Before Crisis (+)
The legislature was extremely supportive of the
facility in its early years.

This is partly because of

Gottlieb's talents as a salesman, and partly a result of
Detroit-area legislators who were powerful figures on
both the Mental Health and Appropriations committees.
Lafayette Clinic and other state mental health programs
in the Detroit area, were among the county's major
employers, serving a large number of constituents.
There had been a real hope that Clinic staff could
solve the problems of schizophrenia.

This expectation

was used to gain support and funds from the Department
of Mental Health, the Governor's Office, and the
legislature.
After Crisis (split opinion)
As Detroit-area legislators began to change and
less attention was paid to the needs of Lafayette
Clinic, funds began to drop.

The lack of results in

schizophrenia studies, despite allocation of millions of
dollars, raised serious questions about the viability of
Lafayette's research program.

Although funding support

remains, continued staff insistence on research despite
ongoing budgetary deficits has caused the legislature to
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take a closer look at the program and the resources it
offers.
Community
Before Crisis (+)

.~

The establishment of Lafayette Clinic within an
inner city service community served a protective
function.

Neighbors were generally supportive of the

agency which meshed well with a developing "continuum of
care" concept.
In 1973 and 1974 the Clinic survived several bouts
of public concern regarding the type and kinds of
research being conducted, as noted in Chapter V.
However, such difficulties were cushioned by location
within a tightly knit academic and medical community.
In fact, many Clinic programs, such as continuing
medical education and training, were specifically aimed
at this "elite" population.
After Crisis (+)
Deinstitutionalization, however, created considerable stress for local community mental health boards.
Lafayette Clinic staff would admit clients who fit
research criteria or offered compelling teaching
opportunities.

Then, after a period of care, these
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non-residents were released to an already overburdened
and understaffed county.

Discharged patients were

becoming increasingly expensive for local service
providers.
To its credit, Lafayette did offer several unique
programs for the community, including a methadone clinic
and counselling center.
Clinic Administration
Before Crisis (+)
Gottlieb was a strong Director who remained at the
helm for 20 years.

He provided program continuity and a

strong personal relationship with major decision makers
at all levels of government.

He nursed the facility

from its beginnings and so embedded it within the system
that questions about funding and program direction only
developed after his retirement.
Lafayette Clinic weathered many of the same staff
difficulties that MIMH experienced in integrating
clinicians with direct-care personnel and academicians
with state workers.

During this period, one of the most

difficult considerations in such a relationship was
clarified by the legislature and accepted by both the
Department of Mental Health and Wayne State University,
the clinical chain of command.
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After Crisis (+)
After Gottlieb's retirement the facility drifted
for almost six years.
arose about agency

Funds were lost, and questions

direction~

While there is no doubt

that Clinic administration remained strongly supportive
of the agency, this lack of leadership during the
interim may have been one of the critical factors in
declining legislative and Executive Office support.
Media
As mentioned in Chapter VI, there was little media
interest or involvement in the facility.

Gottlieb

deliberately kept the agency out of the public eye
during the early years when programs were most vulnerable.

Only rarely was publicity positive.

In 1973 and

1974 attention focused briefly on psychosurgery and
experimentation on involuntarily committed people.

Even

the announcement of a cure for schizophenia received
only minimal press attention.
Interest Groups and Attentives
Before Crisis (+)
Interest group perceptions of the facility varied
greatly.

Initially there was support of the Clinic and

belief in its ability to fill service gaps.

However, a
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growing sense of alienation by the population in need
and rising numbers of former patients still requiring
assistance caused opinions to shift.
After Crisis

(solit opinion)

The lack of media attention may have limited public
understandin~

of facility programs, resulting in differ-

ing interest group perceptions of the Clinic's utility,
responsiveness and effectiveness.

Concerns were raised

about Lafayette's role as a "guinea pig place" and
researci1 experimentation on involuntarily committed
patients.
The concept of research on patients carries with it
serious connotations for former clients.

A general

sense of wariness was evident among members of patient
advocate groups interviewed.

'l'his sarne sense of wari-

ness about Lafayette Clinic programs carried over to
patients and their families.

HmoJever, those former

clients who were interviewed were generally positive in
comments about their treatment.
While some studies

(~ish

and Lowin9er, 1971) sug-

gest that Lafayette was not serving the population in
need, that group is not usually considered part of the
decision-makin9 process and, therefore, caused little
negative impact.
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Michigan Institute for Mental Health
The MIMH decision ladder is shown in Figure 13.
There are some differences in rank order between this
conceptualization and Figure 12 for Lafayette Clinic,
based on perceived differences in power structures for
the two agencies.

Let us briefly review the key groups

and actors involved with the Institute, their stakes and
public stands.
Bureaucrats
Before Crisis

<+>

DMH Director Don Smith originally proposed the
development of the Michigan Institute.
defined need.

It met a well-

There was interest in transferring the

Ionia State Hospital building to the Department of
Corrections in response to prison overcrowding and
reduced state revenues.

The transfer would save money

and would allow for the creation of a modern mental
health alternative, an inpatient psychiatric treatment
center in an urban area.
DMB Director Gerald Miller was supportive and, in
fact, drafted the transfer bill for the legislature.
After Crisis (serious split)
The ongoing struggle to delineate the agency chain
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LEVEL I

The decision was to close the facility

made by

LEVEL II

Frank Ochberg, DMH Director
William Milliken, Governor
Gerald Miller, DMB Director
Michigan Legislature

influenced by

LEVEL III

MIMH Civil Service Staff
Community Mental Health Staff
Michigan State University Staff
Unions
Neighbors

LEVEL IV

MSU Faculty
MIMH Administration
Regional Director

LEVEL V

shaped by

Organizational Leadership
Civil Service/MSU Operational Schism
Staff Concern About Treatment
Relatively New Origins of Facility

The crisis included extensive budgetary cutbacks
throughout the state.

Figure 13.

Michigan Institute for Mental Health
decision-making ladder.
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of command, authority and responsibility caused key
decision makers to reconsider their initial support for
the program.

MSU faculty were angry and resentful about

renewed contract negotiations.

Budget analysts showed

that MIMH institutional costs per day were double those
at Ypsilanti Regional Center.

At the same time, it

appeared that staff were only serving 74 residents.
While there was little question of program quality,
there were ongoing concerns about "quantity" -- serving
as many clients as quickly as possible.

At the same

time, direct-care workers were in the process of suing
the Department to force the hiring of additional staff.
So, when Ochberg offered the facility to the

Department

of Management and Budget Director Miller, he, in turn,
saw little reason not to recommend closure to the
Governor.
Legislature
Before Crisis (+)
The Michigan legislature passed the bill to
establish MIMH quickly and unanimously.

Senator Joe

Snyder and Representative Dave Hollister, head of the
Senate Appropriations and House Mental Health Committees
respectively, were both advocates of the new program.
Representative Ernest Nash, an MIMH neighbor, had intra-
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duced the bill as one way of publicly demonstrating his
stand.
After Crisis (split opinion)
MIMH faculty and staff believed that the legislature could have been supportive, given enough information.

Budget appropriations for facility operation

were always approved quickly, without controversy.

In

fact, the legislature had already approved MIMH's 1981
budget allocation.
Institute costs were not as high as projected, and
care was generally better than clients could receive
elsewhere in the system.

Yet, there was general legis-

lative ignorance of MIMH programs even though the Chair
of the House Mental Health Committee served the Lansing
district.
Legislators were more aware of, and concerned
about, community reactions.

Local residents were gener-

ally unhappy about the facility.

There were few, equal-

ly vocal, advocates.
Department of Mental Health Officials
Before Crisis (split opinion)
DMH officials were split in their opinions on the
Institute.

There was a sincere interest in the prospect
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of providing treatment in a small, local hospital.
Smith proposed the concept of a jointly operated State
University program that would encourage top-quality
faculty to engage in mental health research and
training.
Yet, Vern Stehman, the DMH Director following
Smith, seemed to be one of the Michigan Institute's
strongest detractors, according to one observer.
After Crisis (split)
While the next Director, Frank Ochberg appeared
initially supportive, he offered to close the agency
when cuts were asked of the Department.

Although many

feel that he just got "aced out of the action••

(P. Bab-

cock, personal communication, March 25, 1985), and he
himself considered it a "Washington Monument play" that
backfired (F. Ochberg, personal

co~nunication,

January

17, 1985), others saw the action as a priori evidence of
lack of support.
DMH Regional Director
Before and After Crisis (+)
The Southwest Regional Director was involved in the
early decision making and considered himself a strong
agency advocate throughout its history.
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University Officials -- MSU Faculty
Before Crisis

<+>

University faculty in the Department of Psychiatry
were initially enthusiastic about the research opportunities offered.

The Chairman of the Department of Psy-

chiatry at the time Michigan Institute opened, mentioned
that the idea of a jointly funded program was in large
measure what encouraged him to move to Michigan from New
York.

A former DMH Director came from Illinois to serve

as Institute Clinical Director.
After Crisis (split opinion)
There continued to be ongoing struggles, however,
regarding staffing, funding and, most important, clinical supervision.

DMH Directors Stehman and Ochberg made

it clear that the facility would remain a state program
under Department of Mental Health direction.

The MSU/

DMH contract was renegotiated during its first year to
stipulate that the Clinical Director would report to the
DMH Administrator, not the University.

MSU personnel

found research becoming a lower DMH priority.

Budget

reductions added to the existing pressures to keep beds
fully utilized, further limiting research and educational opportunities.
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Department of Management and Budget Staff
Before Crisis (split opinion)
DMB staff had more mixed feelings about the agency.
Originally MIMH appeared to DMB to be a viable costsavings measure.

The Department of Corrections would

obtain a new prison at minimal expense, while DMH would
be able to operate a new local program without first
investing in capital outlay.

Concerns began to build

about a limited bed capacity and high patient costs per
day.
After Crisis (split)
Fiscal constraints became a serious concern at the
same time as expenses were rising and direct-care workers were complaining about inadequate staffing.

During

pre-election debate over the Tisch amendment, designed
to further reduce state revenues, MIMH administrative
staff began tentative negotiations to purchase the
Jarvis Acres building.

DMB staff were feeling ongoing

pressures to close facilities and move patients into the
community as part of a budgetary reduction that was
closely tied to deinstitutionalization and federally
funded foster homes.

The Institute's apparent

unwillingness to participate in budget and staffing
reductions was a source of concern to DMB staff.
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Community
Before and After Crisis (-)
Community neighbors as a group were never supportive of the concept of a mental health agency on the
Jarvis Acres site.

Officials did approve the Special

Use Permit, but Windsor Township Board meetings showed a
great deal of negative community reaction and, at least
initially, a split among board members.

However, the

Use Permit and zoning approval were garnered without
much difficulty.

Jarvis Acres residents filed a peti-

tion expressing their concerns.

While many of those

concerns were laid to rest, controversy over a new "open
door" policy late in agency history served to once again
arouse neighbor and Jarvis Acres citizen anxieties.
Michigan Institute Staff
Before Crisis (+)
MIMH staff were initially enthusiastic about the
program.

It is generally agreed that they remained

supportive of top-quality care for patients.
After Crisis (split opinion)
With budgetary cutbacks the unions raised the
issues of reduced staffing creating dangerous work
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conditions, staff injuries caused by aggressive clients,
patient walk-aways, the open door policy which made
control of patients even more difficult, and other
potentially volatile problems.

While few staff wanted

to lose their jobs, there was a definite schism between
ward personnel and management concerning these care
issues.
The same types of mixed feelings came from the MIMH
faculty.

They were MSU staff, interested in research

programs but bound to provide patient care at the
agency.

There was concern about the neglect of the

research component, exacerbated by a lack of clarity in
roles.
Most clinicians were civil servants with faculty
appointments, recruited by the University, yet bound by
Department of Mental Health rules

a~d

regulations. Some-

times considered "second class" academicians at the
University because of their patient care role, Unit Directors were under pressure to work toward MSU Department
of Psychiatry goals while circumscribed by the need to
provide ongoing treatment.
Other University officials began to feel those same
frustrations.

There was a deep philosophical difference

between the type of program that DMH required and that
envisioned by MSU officials.

MSU Department of Psychi-

atry staff found themselves investing more and more time
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and money in an agency that was serving their needs less
and less, while the Department of Mental Health made it
clear in contract negotiations who was paying for, and
therefore running, the program.
Unlike Lafayette, MIMH had not embedded itself
within the system.

Therefore, it was more difficult to

insist on a research program where no firm foundation
had yet been laid.
Media
The newspapers did not appear to be a key actor in
the decision-making process, except as a conduit of
information.

However, while MIMH tended to keep a

fairly low profile throughout its history, the open door
policy and staff concerns were of media interest.

This

interest ultimately impacted through the reactions of
neighbors and other interest groups toward agency
policies.
Interest Groups
Before Crisis (+)
Community Mental Health administration appeared
supportive throughout the facility's operation.

The

Clinton-Eaton-Ingham CMH worked with the Department of
Mental Health in developing an agency that would serve
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local needs, lobbied for its placement in the tri-county
area, and provided Social work and other adjunctive
staff.
The community mental health staff was initially
supportive of a local service alternative.

They were

willing to refer people to the agency and operated the
Central Admitting Point.
After Crisis (split opinion)
As budget cutbacks occurred, CMH direct-care
personnel were asked to provide more services without a
concomitant increase in funding or personnel.
All MIMH outpatient programs became the responsibility of community mental health social workers.

Even

some inpatient services, such as assisting clients to
apply for Medicare or Medicaid payments, were considered
the responsibility of CMH case workers.

These rising

expectations drew heavily on community resources during
a time of scarcity.

In 1980 the tri-county board insti-

tuted a case manager system which increased demands on
professional time.
Courts and Police
Before and After Crisis (+)
Courts and police remained supportive of the agency
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as an acceptable community alternative to large state
hospitals.

Although there were frustrations when MIMH

refused to admit some patients, the facility offered a
local alternative for service providers forced to deal
with the mentally ill.
Attentives
Before and After Crisis (no concerted opinion)
Few of the attentive groups surveyed in this study
considered themselves either for or against the facility.

During the time it existed, MIMH was acknowledged

as a useful service for seriously disturbed individuals.
According to one advocate group leader, "It was an
alternative, and the more alternatives the better for
someone in trouble."
But most special interest groups focused on selfhelp programs and local assistance to avoid hospitalization.

The Psychiatric Alternative Alliance was

adamantly opposed to the concept of involuntary commitment.

Members consider state institutions the outgrowth

of a Big Brother mentality that is, by its very nature,
objectionable.

Therefore, philosophically the group

remains strongly opposed to any form of inpatient
service.
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Patients and Families
Before and After Crisis (+)
Patients and their families liked the facility.
Although initially neutral about the program because of
its recent origins, families found MIMH to be an excellent alternative to long travel hours and lower levels
of care at older mental health institutions.

There was

genuine appreciation of agency services for acutely
mentally ill persons.
While this group had a vested interest in facility
programs, it was also the least powerful within the
system.

This was also true, although to a lesser

degree, of other organized patient advocate groups.
A Comparison
By placing these ratings in a table, it is possible
to examine system-wide support for the two facilities.
Table 5 graphically shows actor positions toward
Lafayette Clinic before and after the crisis period.

In

the years before budget cutbacks, 20 actors or groups
were strongly supportive of the Lafayette Clinic program.

Five were seriously split in their opinions and,

six issued no public opinion.

Only one group, the Psy-

chiatric Alternative Alliance, was adamantly opposed to
the modus operandi of the facility.
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Table 5
Actor positions toward Lafayette before and after crisis

Before Crisis
Majority Serious Majority
Against
Split
For
Bureaucrats
Smith
Ochberg
Milliken
Miller

After Crisis
Majority Serious Majority
Against
Split
For

+

+

+

*
*

+

*
*

+
+

DMH officials
Regional Dir.

+
+

University
Officials
Wayne Faculty

+

+

+

+

DMB staff
Legislature

+

*

+

*
*

Community
Officials
Neighbors

+

+
+
+

Clinic Administration
Civil Service Staff
Clinic Faculty

+
+
+

+

Media
Interest Groups
Cf.Ul Admin.
Cf.Ul staff
Courts/Police
Attentives
MH Assoc.
JUIHO
Psych. Alt.
Recoverv
Relatives
Citizens for
Action
OASIS

+
+

x

X

+
+
+
X

*
*

+
+

+

*
*
*X

*
*

X
X
X

X
X

X

X

Patients
Families

+
+

+

+
+

+ - Majority For
- Majority Against
Serious Split in Opinion
x - No Public Opinion

* -
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After the fiscal crisis, although support had
eroded, it was still evident.

Fifteen groups or indi-

vidual actors continued to be supportive.

Ten had

divided opinions, and six expressed no public opinion.
The Psychiatric Alternative Alliance remained in firm
opposition to the Lafayette Clinic.
The matrix for Michigan Institute for Mental
Health, as seen in Table 6 shows widespread public
support for the agency between the years 1977 and 1979,
and a general lack of support in 1980 and 1981.

Ini-

tially, 17 key actors and groups were strongly supportive of the Michigan Institute, and four were opposed to
the program.

Three groups had serious splits in opin-

ion, and nine had no public opinion.

By 1980, 6 groups

or individuals were against facility continuation; 13
actors or groups showed serious splits in opinion; 6
remained strongly supportive; and 8 had no opinion.
Summary
As Tables 5 and 6 have shown, there appeared to be
strong initial support for both Lafayette Clinic and
Michigan Institute, which deteriorated over time.

If we

consider that decision makers are faced with a sum of
public opinion that weighs on the final decision, then
the outcome for Michigan Institute becomes clear.
Bureaucrats and legislators found little support
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Table 6
Actor positions toward MIMH before and after crisis

Before Crisis
Majority Serious Majority
Split
For
Against
Bureaucrats
Smith
Ochberg
Milliken
Miller

+
+
+
+
+

Legislature

+

DMH Officials
Regional Dir.

*

University
Officials
MSU Faculty
DMB Staff

*

Community
Officials
Neighbors
Jarvis

*

*
*

X

*
*

+

*

+

X

+

*

*
+
+
+

MIMH Staff
Civil Service
MIMH Faculty
Media

+

After Crisis
Majority Serious Majority
Against
Split
For

X

X

+
+
+
+

Interest Groups
CMH Admin.
Ct-lli staff
Courts/Police
Attentives
MH Assoc.
JIMHO
Psych. Alt.
Recovery
Relatives
Citizens for
Action
OASIS

X

Patients
Families

X
X

*
*
*

+

*

*
*

X

X

X
X
X

X
X
X

X

X

+
+
+

+
+

+ - Majority For
Majority Against
* - Serious Split in Opinion
x - No Public Opinion
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for MIMH during a fiscal crisis, even from the Department Director who offered the program as a budgetary
sacrifice.
rapidly.

Existing support appeared to be eroding
With that deterioration came an unwillingness

to continue to place money in a program that, during a
time of cutback management, seemed to be more expensive
than other available services within the system.
Over the years there has been some tendency toward
similar opinion shifts for Lafayette Clinic.

But,

agency leaders have been able to entrench programs within the system so that budget reductions, while having
some effect, were not fatal.
Perhaps it could be argued that if fiscal crises
had occurred during Lafayette's first years of operation, it too might have closed.

However, Lafayette

administrators managed to clarify legislatively the
agency mandate while retaining DMH, academic, and
community backing.

The ability to garner grants, change

programs to serve community needs and maintain appropriations levels are all evidence of ongoing support.

With

this foundation, and continued awareness of environmental issues that impinged on the agency, Lafayette
Clinic has managed to survive, although with a somewhat
tarnished reputation.
It was stated initially that policy output is a
factor of actor positions during and after the decision
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period, as defined by conflict and crises.

We have

explored Boulter's (1983) decision ladder, using the
Michigan Institute for Mental Health and Lafayette
Clinic as case studies, and then rated actor positions.
By assessing the positions of key groups toward
programs, decision outcomes become more predictable.
The following chapter will discuss some of the implications of this finding and the study more generally.
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CHAPTER VIII
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
This study began with a single question: How were
decisions made that affected the success and survival of
two mental health institutions?

In 1977 the Michigan

Institute for Mental Health (MIMH), a public psychiatric
hospital, opened.

It was intended to serve the needs of

acutely mentally ill persons in a seven county area.
Michigan state University was under contract to provide
the clinical, teaching and research component.

This

cooperative concept in treatment was heralded as launching a new era in small, community-based, short-term care
programs.

Four years later a decision was made to close

Michigan Institute.
Lafayette Clinic is another small, intensive treatment center established in the Detroit area.

Similar to

MIMH in a number of ways, it also has a strong University affiliation.

Despite some serious setbacks in

achieving its mandate as intended by the legislature,
and decreases in funding, the decision of key actors
within the system has always been to continue this
program.
Public decision making is complex at best.

To

answer why decision makers closed one facility and

330

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

331

maintained the other presumes considerable background
information.

At a minimum, an understanding of the

environment, history, political actors and the
decision-making process is required.

Narrowing the

focus to a manageable research problem necessitates
placing the study within a framework.
Boulter (1983) offers one conceptualization of the
policy-making process.

He tells us that decisions are

made by politicians and bureaucrats who are influenced
by interest groups and the media, attentives and the
general public.

In addition, policy is ultimately

shaped by the environment, culture, tradition and institutions which impinge on decision makers.

Research

began with a brief review of this framework as well as
relevant literature within that structure.
A series of propositions are presented in Chapter
II.

Chapter III explains the research methods and

procedures which include a historical review,
administrative case studies, a newspaper content
analysis, interviews, and document analysis.
The next step was to complete the decision ladder
for the problem under study.

A comprehensive

presentation of data in Chapter IV outlines the key
components of Boulter's (1983) framework while
addressing such questions as:

Who were the decision
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makers?

What were the critical environmental factors?

What was the crisis and what were reactions to it?
These types of questions had to be answered at each
level of Boulter's (1983) policy ladder in order to
provide an understanding of the ultimate decision,
closing or retaining a mental health facility.

Without

that background, it is difficult to envision the
complexities and decision impact of a variety of actors
and events.
The shaping influences -- the environment, culture,
history, and tradition -- are presented in Chapter IV.
Assessment of the forces impinging on institutions
establishes the foundation for Chapter V, an in-depth
look at the two facilities.

A clearer understanding of

the dynamics of agency operation, the political
environment in which programs were embedded, and key
actors, is developed through comparative administrative case studies.
Within this context, Boulter's (1983) policy ladder
also considers media and interest group involvement.
Chapter VI, a newspaper content analysis, and Chapter
VII a comparative analysis explore these additional
facets of the decision-making process.

Chapter VII

compares the support of key actors toward Michigan
Institute and Lafayette Clinic both before and after the
crisis period.
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Research began with a basic question: Why did one
facility survive while another did not?

Although in-

triguing, by itself such a case study offers little more
than historical perspective on events occurring in the
Michigan mental health system.

In order to establish

the depth of understanding required, research questions
were developed at a second level.

Although framed in

light of the two facilities under study, they reflect
broader concerns.

The following propositions based on

Boulter's (1983) policy ladder provide additional
research focus:
1.

Those organizations that receive strong public

constituency and media support are more likely to survive than those which receive less support.
2.

Program success or failure is dependent on the

decision-maker's perception of the sum of constituency
support, as filtered through the media.
3.

The media serves both as a carrier of opinion

and as an influential actor in its own right.

The media

impacts on mental health decisions.
4.

Thus, the decision to maintain or close an

institution for the mentally ill (particularly in a time
of crisis) will be influenced by newspaper coverage.
These propositions were analyzed using Boulter's
(1983) framework.

Chapter VII summarizes opinion data
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using a tally sheet of constituency and media support
for the two facilities.
Finally, at a third level, the study was designed
to test the applicability of Boulter's (1983) framework
to public policy issues.

By structuring research within

this framework, it becomes possible to examine its
strengths and weaknesses.
Results: Case Studies
Chapter IV presents an overview of the political
environment in which both Lafayette Clinic and the
Michigan Institute existed.

The crisis was fiscal, as

the State of Michigan continued to experience a recessionary downturn.

At the same time, the Michigan legis-

lature mandated community mental health boards. Throughout the state these boards began to request greater
involvement in Michigan mental health decision making
and the right to have mental health dollars follow the
client into the community.

Each of these problems

created stress for institutions, which were forced to
treat more patients in a shorter length of time with
less money.

Traditionally, they were also responsible

for adequate community placements, which exacerbated
funding shortages.
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The Michigan deinstitutionalization program was
part of this crisis period, particularly in the Detroit
and Wayne County area where the majority of mental
health clients were placed in adult foster homes.
Ongoing allegations of abuse, "ghettoization" of former
patients, and regular changes in Department of Mental
Health (DMH) Directors only served to highlight system
weaknesses.
The Michigan Institute for Mental Health was born
into this environment.

Chapter V discusses its history.

While there was initial community resistance to the
facility's location, there was general constituent and
interest group support for the new concept in health
care to which MIMH subscribed.

The decision to open the

facility was made by Department of Mental Health
Director Don Smith, with the concurrence of Governor
William Milliken and Department of Management and Budget
(DMB) Director Gerald Miller.

Michigan State University

faculty were also involved in laying the groundwork for
an operational teaching and training facility.
support for the agency, however, eroded quickly and
perhaps irreversibly.

Ongoing staffing problems caused

by a lack of clarity in the clinical chain of command;
DMH insistence on placing a higher priority on care of
the chronically mentally ill than research; and staff
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anger and fears about underfunding caused decision
makers to question the facility's value.

MIMH began to

be perceived as more of a problem than a solution to
care needs.
Even though treatment quality was consistently
high, decision makers found themselves dealing regularly
with operational issues.

Factions developed as atten-

tion centered on the power struggles among key groups.
Support began to

deteriora~e

within the Department, DMB,

the University, and ultimately among facility employees.
Despite the best hopes of administrators, the agency was
not able to sustain the support foundation upon which it
had been built.

The decision was to close the facility.

Lafayette Clinic had strong leadership from the
beginning, which garnered equally strong legislative and
gubernatorial support.

The political strength of its

management team enabled the Clinic to survive serious
concerns about the research mandate, as well as regular
budget cuts.

When the crisis period occurred, Lafayette

Clinic was well entrenched in a medical community.
expanded its services to other professionals, in
addition to clients.
Re-examination of the ongoing utility of the
program occurred with gradual loss of legislative
interest, changing Department of Mental Health
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priorities, concern about the human subjects of research
on mental illness, and differing conceptions of the
value of institutions.

Survival became contingent upon

a strong sense of internal cohesion, a supportive
University affiliation, willingness to change to meet
community needs and success in focusing on the "hot
topics of the day".
Comparative case studies in Chapter V provide
extensive description and analysis of institution
dynamics.

Chapter VII then compresses and re-organizes

this information in accord with Boulter's (1983} framework.

Each of the factors is briefly examined; then

decision maker opinions are listed in tabular form.
Tables 5 and 6 graphically show an erosion of support
for the two facilities as publicly expressed by key
actors.

Seventeen key actors and groups were supportive

of Michigan Institute when it was established.

By the

time it closed, only six remained on record as advocates.
For Lafayette Clinic, in the years before budget
cutbacks, 20 actors or groups were strongly supportive.
Fifteen maintained their support.

Although neither

agency added advocates, Lafayette had more positive
constituent involvement from the beginning and retained
more of it over time.
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Through this process, the answer to the first
question -- how are decisions regarding public policy
issues made?

becomes clearer for this problem.

We

can identify decision makers, the linkages they established and the steps they followed.

The case studies

reveal changing perceptions of facility value and the
gradual loss of support for an agency that was never
fully part of the community.

The attempt to maintain

MIMH, given internal and external pressures to the
contrary, became too great to sustain.
In this instance, the decision to close or retain a
facility appeared to be politically, rather than
programmatically, motivated.

MIMH could demonstrate

program success, including quality care and minimal
recidivism: yet saw a steady erosion of political
support.

Lafayette Clinic, on the other hand, had a

history of political success including funding for a
drug clinic and special legislative attention.

Yet,

there was ongoing programmatic erosion, especially
regarding support for schizophrenia research.
Propositions
Based on this study it is possible to accept the
proposition that program success or failure is dependent
on decision maker perception of the sum of support.

The

organization that received the strongest public constit-
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uency and media support survived.

As MIMH began to lose

constituents, it also began to lose its footing.
Few decision makers are willing to stick with a
solution that is unpopular or that appears to generate
more problems than payoffs.

In both the rational and

political actor models, policy is based on a perception
of value.

MIMH's value was fading.

Lafayette was able

to maintain its sense of purpose along with support for
its programs, although in a modified form.
The proposition that the media impacts on mental
health decisions by serving both as a carrier of opinion
and as an influential actor in its own right, was not
sustained.

There appeared to be little media involve-

ment, as evidenced through newspaper articles, in the
decision to maintain or close institutions for the
mentally ill.

In fact, based on an eleven year analysis

of mental health newspaper articles in Chapter VI, there
was only minimal coverage of institutional programs and
negligible involvement in the two facilities studied.
Out of a total of 887 articles in the Detroit Free
Press, Detroit News and Lansing State Journal, 34
mentioned Lafayette Clinic and 28 named MIMH.

For

Lafayette Clinic, most articles centered on a controversial psychosurgery case and an experimental program
for children.

For MIMH, there was some discussion

regarding the facility's establishment and, late in the

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

340

agency's history, articles about the open door policy
and patient walk-aways.
Mental health news in general tended to focus on
long-standing issues of state-wide import.
were articles positive.

Only rarely

Some of the issues over the

years included deinstitutionalization and placement
programs; the mental health code, admission and discharge criteria; institutional abuses; and budgetary
concerns.

This policy-oriented rather than institution-

specific focus may be·a factor of the human resource
area studied.
Two factors appear to be involved in the lack of
media attention for MIMH and Lafayette.

Lafayette

Clinic Director Jacques Gottlieb chose a deliberate
strategy of risk aversion.
press.

He preferred to avoid the

At the same time, there was a continual news

focus on the volatile issues of the day.

Only rarely

did this media attention involve the two facilities
under study.
There were few attempts on the part of agency decision makers to use the press to sway opinions.

Research

shows that several astute legislators and mental health
directors utilized newspapers in the early years to generate changes.

However, subsequently there were few

examples of efforts by advocates to ••manage the media",
although in several instances MIMH direct-care staff
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went to local newspapers to generate support for their
position.
The newspaper content analysis in Chapter VI and a
discussion of advocacy strategies in Chapter V, suggest
that newspapers are considered an important source of
information.

During personal interviews, politicians

and bureaucrats mentioned that they pay attention to
what appears in the newspaper.

At the same time they

acknowledged that most advocacy occurs through face-toface contacts.
The idea that the media serves as a conduit of
information is much more accurate in this instance than
the concept of media involvement in shaping and focusing
attitudes.

We see that decision makers do weigh opin-

ion, partly based on what they read in the paper.

How-

ever, reporters only rarely covered the issues involved
in operation of either Lafayette or MIMH.

So, while the

media may be instrumental in directing attention or
advocating in some policy areas, there was little evidence of it in this study.
Results of this content analysis, however, can not
be extended too far beyond the bounds of this research.
Although discussion has centered on the media, only a
limited number of newspapers, regarding a potentially
volatile topic, were examined.
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The Framework
Boulter (1983) provided a framework through which
to organize the volume of material presented.

In his

1983 study, Boulter used the policy ladder to explain
United States retention of the 55 mile-per-hour speed
limit after the crisis (gas shortages) had passed. He
tallied the opinions of politicians, bureaucrats,
interest groups, attentives and the general public in
several countries toward this issue.

Essentially a

balance sheet totaling political influences was developed.

The resulting check sheet clearly showed ongoing

support for the lowered speed limit in the United
States.
Following the same guidelines, tally sheets were
developed in Chapter VII that show ongoing support for
one agency and a lack of support for another.
/

Along the

way, though, a number of methodological questions arose.
In eac)v~pplication of the policy ladder, outcomes
were alre~y known.

How can we be sure that we are not

involved in a circular argument?
because it lacked support.
it closed.

MIMH was closed

MIMH lacked support because

Given a foregone conclusion, ratings become

relatively easy.
One answer to that concern is Boulter's (1983)
insistence on using only publicly stated opinions.
342
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attempt has been made to substantiate carefully the
positions of relevant actors through interviews, public
documents and a newspaper content analysis.
That, however, raises the second question.

How do

we know who to include and who to exclude from such a
study?

Boulter (1983) implies that the opinion of any-

one who is interested, even peripherally, should be
considered.
Narrowing the focus becomes somewhat easier, thanks
to the public nature of the debate.

Those who feel

strongly about an issue, and consider themselves
involved, will be discussed by the media or other political actors.

Legislative debates, public meetings,

correspondence and newspaper articles, are all means of
assessing the relevant decision groups.
The third question then becomes: How much value
should be placed on each opinion?

Boulter (1983) gives

exactly the same value to every public opinion in the
decision-making arena.

The crackpot from Citizens for a

Better World is given the same plus or minus rating as
the ministers of OPEC.
This lack of discrimination is problematic.

Real-

istically, we understand that a decision maker's confidante will hold more sway over the policy outcome than a
hastily organized interest group containing only a few
members.
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An effort was made to consider these issues in the
development of the rating table for the two facilities.
Those individuals or groups who would be expected to
exert the greatest power in the decision-making process
were placed at the top of the chart.

Governor William

Milliken, Department of Mental Health heads Don Smith
and Frank Ochberg, Department of Budget and Management
Director Gerald Miller are, by virtue of their formal
roles, policy leaders.

However, this placement of key

figures is subjective and dependent on a thorough undertanding of the policy under study.

Only after develop-

ing a history of the era did it become truly evident
that Gerald Miller was a key figure for mental health
decisions.
Boulter (1983) does not provide for differentiation
between actors based on power or position.

But it

remains necessary to struggle with the concern that
seldom are positions always clear-cut, seldom are
weights and strengths of opinions directly comparable.
Nor does Boulter (1983) offer much insight into his
methodology.

While it seems simple enough to provide +

and - ratings, we are given little understanding of how
these scores are to be developed.

Nor can we be sure

that we are aggregating opinion in the same way as the
decision maker.
This is not considered a problem by Boulter (1983).
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If as many opinions as possible are included in a crude
count on the rating sheet, the decision outcome should
be predictive.
This study ameliorates some of these concerns by
careful documentation, beginning with case studies.
Then, in presenting the matrices in Chapter VII, each
step is discussed.

As a result, there is some under-

standing of why it was stated, for instance, that
Detroit-area legislative support for Lafayette Clinic
began to fade.
Opinions were determined through a combination of
interviews, public documents and a newspaper content
analysis.

Each person contacted was asked to name

others in the mental health field who might be knowledgeable about the issues.

This "snowball" effect lead

to involved persons who might not otherwise have been
considered.
There are acknowledged limitations to the use of
interviews as a research technique.
not freely available to "outsiders".

Some information is
Cognitive disso-

nance around crisis events may cause opinion shifts over
time.

Awareness of these issues helped to inhibit their

potential impact.

Cross-verification of material,

through a variety of individuals and sources, served to
verify and strengthen data accuracy.
A newspaper content analysis is presented in
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Chapter VI to better quantify answers regarding media
involvement in public policy.

Although intuitively we

may think that the press is a powerful factor in the
daily decision making of politicians, that fact was not
reflected in mental health decisions.

Most people

admitted to an awareness of media issues; yet only
rarely were the facilities under study mentioned in the
newspaper.

Nor were the linkages between media atten-

tion and resulting public policy ever established.
Boulter (1983) did not quantify his policy ladder
in this way.

As a result, it has been argued that

Boulter (1983) offers merely a framework, not a model
with predictive ability.

There is some evidence of a

predictive function in this study.
tial remains to be explored.

However, that poten-

By carefully quantifying

specific aspects of the framework, we can see it move
toward the heuristic capabilities of a true model.
The first step is awareness of the need to systematically incorporate strength of opinion, power and
potential for involvement of pressure groups, as well as
formal and informal positions of key actors and their
linkages, into the decision ladder.

Standardization of

procedures, including development of ratings and levels
of support, is also necessary.
Other forms of stakeholder mapping are designed to
identify groups (both within and outside the agency)
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that have the potential for affecting organizational
objectives.

Some ask the decision maker to identify

positions, power and potentials of involved individuals.
Comparative research, using several similar frameworks,
would highlight both the positive and negative aspects
of utilizing Boulter's (1983) policy ladder.

Different

approaches to analyzing a single problem can offer
increased understanding of the decision process.

If

outcomes are consistent, then the value of this method
of ordering the events surrounding crisis is enhanced.
The question remains: Is this particular framework
a useful tool for the public administrator?

It presents

many of the same difficulties as other tools of its
type.

To use it properly requires either in-depth

knowledge or research. The ability to condense background information into a rating sheet requires a
thorough understanding of relevant actors and their
stands.

While most of us can perform such a tallying

function regarding any issue of importance to us,
Boulter (1983) requires an awareness of the arena's
environment and the overall political situation as well.
One of the greatest strengths of Boulter's (1983)
framework is inclusion of a wider study universe.

In

addition to considering the environment, culture, history, tradition and other situational variables within
the decision-making process, Boulter (1983) adds a
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variety of interested groups and attentives.

He also

acknowledges that these people and groups will change,
depending on the policy under study.
The increasingly pluralistic nature of modern
society helps to explain the growing complexity of the
decision-making process and the mounting pressures
placed on public leaders.
sures.

Crises add to those pres-

While Boulter's (1983) framework may appear

simplistic, it does incorporate a systems perspective
that is often neglected in other forms of stakeholder
analyses.
At a minimum, most astute politicians have some
understanding of stakeholders and the dynamics in which
they are involved.

It is useful to explore what is

"intuitively understood" by laying it out in its starkest form in a check sheet of those for and against the
policy.

Such thinking focuses attention on generally

neglected aspects of the decision-making process while
forcing the administrator to quantify his or her own
stand toward the policy.
Recommendations and Future Research
Problems encountered in developing the substantive
portions of this study were often tied directly to
Boulter's (1983) lack of methodological guidelines.
There is little quantification of a process that could
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be intricate and meaningful if applied with sophistication by a decision maker.

Without such support, each

step is subject to criticism regarding the inherent
subjectivity of the information provided.
Considerable groundwork has been laid.

Within the

mental health framework already provided, it would be
possible to test its heuristic ability by developing
rating matrices for current mental health problems.

One

starting place would be to examine the potential transfer of Lafayette Clinic to Wayne State University.
Will a tally of support predict whether that move will
occur?
Chapter V mentioned briefly that if the crisis
period had been extended, and/or Lafayette Clinic's
leadership less astute in attending to institutional
needs after a lapse of six years, the facility might
also have been closed.

In hindsight, perhaps the two

programs -- MIMH and Lafayette Clinic -- were too
similar.

It is possible that none of the more inno-

vative, research-oriented programs would have survived
if the crisis period had continued.
A future study comparing a small, matrix-type
mental health program with a large, more traditional
institution, might be fruitful.

Perhaps a critical

factor left unexplored is size.

The number of patients

and staff that would have to be displaced if a facility
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were to close, may be a predictor of survival.

If

budget allocations are indeed an incremental process,
then a small institution becomes a more tempting target
for elimination than larger programs.

It does appear

that in a budget crisis, research and high quality
treatment become lower priorities for DMH decision
makers.
Another factor worth exploring is leadership.

It

has been mentioned that Gottlieb was an "entrepreneurial" leader, taking advantage of circumstances that
benefited the institution, even during crises.

Perhaps

one additional aspect that should be considered is the
"institutionalization" of Gottlieb's position within the
system.

Formal appointments to powerful positions with-

in the University and within the Department of Mental
Health lent credibility and strength to his interactions
with important agency constituents.

This unique rela-

tionship undoubtedly impacted on facility survival.
It would also be useful to look beyond the issue of
survival in the mental health field.

This study reveals

the inherent political nature of decision making
surrounding public institutions serving the mentally
ill.

Perhaps the policy ladder is most applicable to

the political sphere.
be the case.

However, that is not expected to

The strength of the framework would be

enhanced by consideration of a different type of policy
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problem in a different decision-making arena.
Boulter (1983) might argue that the elaborate
procedures followed in this study to identify leaders
and determine public opinion are unnecessary.

The

policy ladder is designed as a working tool that rests
upon a firm foundation of knowledge: knowledge by the
decision maker of his or her constituents, of the
problem, its background and the system in which it is
embedded.

As a result, an analysis can be performed

without the depth of research provided here.
That argument runs counter to much of the previous
discussion about the weaknesses of Boulter's (1983)
policy ladder.

Nevertheless, it is an idea that should

be explored, if for no other reason than to reveal the
need for further quantification of the framework.
In line with this thinking, one way to simplify the
process and deal with the predictive potential of the
decision ladder is to consider briefly a number of
current issues.

Then, based on statements in such

public forums as the Kiplinger Letter, Gangwer and the
press, establish tally sheets of support.

Boulter

(1983) would tend to argue that they will reveal much
the same type of decision outcome as any more elaborate
research.

However, accurate, consistent results would

be unexpected and would negate the major strengths of
Boulter's (1983) decision ladder: its ability to incor-
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porate a mass of data and a variety of theories.
There remains considerable room for future
research.

The most critical areas of interest lie in

additional quantification of the methodology and a focus
on the heuristic abilities of the framework.

Without

these steps, it is questionable whether different
researchers studying the same issues would be consistent
in their ratings and evaluation of outcomes.

Even an

elaborate gathering of background information will not
assure uniformity.

Systematic application of the

framework, development of objective ratings and cutoff
values for support outcomes, standard measures of power
and strength of support would more readily assure the
framework's utility as well as its use by administrators
on the front line.
Conclusions
What has been gained by this study of decision
making in the mental health field?

While we did not

expect environmental, contextual and historical perspectives to differ much around a given agency, there was
evidence of differing levels of constituency support.
During its four years in operation, support for MIMH
slowly eroded among almost all attentive groups.
Support for Lafayette Clinic programs also dropped, but
then seemed to stabilize at the lower level.
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Sometimes high levels of public attention can be
good, particularly when resources are scarce and programs can vividly demonstrate utility, efficiency and
effectiveness.

But, it has been argued that the differ-

ences between an agency that remained open and managed
to entrench programs during a time of cutback management
and one that was closed is not a result of inherent
differences but, rather, one of changing perceptions of
utility and value as manifested by support groups.

The

decision to close or retai~ a facility appeared to be
politically, rather than programmatically, motivated.
Through the use of a framework and several alternative
methods of gathering and verifying data, an understanding and appreciation of this process occurred.
Although these particular findings may have only
limited generalizability, the policy ladder itself
offers considerable potential for further development.
It allows us to explore thoroughly a public sector
decision in a systematic tashion, highlighting the
complexity of the process.

While lacking the elegance

of a full-fledged model, it permits incorporation of
several intermediate level theories that now predominate
in political science and thus, represents a useful step
forward.
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APPENDIX A
NEWSPAPER CLIPPINGS
Paper

State Journal 1/15/73
Detroit News 1/28/73
Free Press
2/01/73
Detroit News
2/04/73
State Journal 2/09/73
~t:ro~ t: News
L./20/73
Free Press
2/24/73
Free Press
2/26/73
State Journal 3/04/73
3/13/73
Free Press
State Journal 3/13/73
Free Press
3/14/73
Free Press
3/16/73
State Journal 3/20/73
State Journal 3/23/73
3/28/73
Free Press
Detroit News
4/06/73
Detroit News
4/06/73
Detroit News
4/08/73
Detroit News
4/20/73
State Journal 4/23/73
Detroit News
5/01/73
Detroit News
6/01/73
Detroit News

6/03/73

Free Press

8/14/73

State Journal
Free Press
Free Press
Detroit News
Free Press
Detroit News
Free Press

Article

Date

8/20/73
10/14/73
11/04/73
11/08/73
12/06/73
12/10/73
12/11/73

Free Press
12/18/73
State Journal 12/26/73

Mental Health care Pact Signed by State, Gratiot
Mental Institutions' Names are Revamped*
Transfer Program Cheats Mental Patients
How We Can Reclaim
'Respite Care• Home Ok'O
Audit ReveaLs Thett of ~~ntal Patients' Funds
Senate Probes •Brain Control' (Al) *
Crisis Center Has Crisis - A Pay Feud (A3)
Ionia Hospital Changes Explained by Director
Brain Experiment Already Dead? Judges Hear Case*
Brain Surgery Case Opens*
CUt Sought in Clinic's Budget*
3 Judges to Rule on Brain Test*
Mental Health Board Urged to Pay
Tri-county Mental Health Seeks $5.4 Million Budget
Psychosurgery Goes on Trial With Ionia's John Doe*
Mental Patient John Doe Ordered Freed*
Psychosurgery Called Partial Euthanasia*
'John Doe' Threatened With Murder Trial (A3)
Murder Charge Asked Against John Doe
care Centers Fight Zoning Crackdown
Mental Health Reform Underway
Brain Research of Future at Stake in John
Doe Case (Al6) *
Can You cut OUt Hate With a Knife: The Story of A
Tortured Mind by John Doe*
State to Ease Secrecy Rule on Residential care
Centers (A2)
Nursing Homes Cater to Retarded
Mental Health Chief Chafes Under Fire (A3)
How Much Freedom for Mentally Ill?
Arts Conservatory for Retarded Sought in Oakland (B2)
Health Records Denied Despite Court Order
Detroiters to Control Mental Health Unit
City Fights Concentration of Homes for Mental
Patients
Ex-Mental Patient May Face Trial*
Johnny Sees Himself Anew (Bl)

* This article mentions Lafayette Clinic
# This article mentions Michigan Institute for Mental Health

354
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Free Press
1/12/74
State Journal 2/07/74
Free Press
2/08/74
Detroit News
2/10/74
Detroit News
State Journal
State Journal
State Journal
State Journal
Free Press
Free Press
Detroit News
State Journal
Free Press
Free Press
State Journal
Free Press
State Journal
Free Press
State Journal
State Journal
Detroit News
Free Press
State Journal
Free Press
State Journal
State Journal
State Journal
State Journal
Free Press
Free Press

2/20/74
2/20/74
2/24/74
3/07/74
3/07/74
3/14/74
3/22/74
4/21/74
4/30/74
6/04/74
6/05/74
6/09/74
6/18/74
7/14/74
7/24/74
9/01/74
9/12/74
9/13/74
9/13/74
9/13/74
9/22/74
10/01/74
10/10/74
10/11/74
11/01/74
11/02/74
11/17/74

Free Press
Free Press

12/19/74
12/24/74

Citizen's Group Wins Records
Dr. Yudashkin Will Depart Mental Health Job on June 1
State's Director of Mental Health Quits Under Fire
Lawyers Fight Experiment on Girl, 7, in Test
Case (Bl3)*
Accord Reached on Mental Patient Experiments*
'Help' is Answered (B3)
Yudashkin Farewell 'Biting Fun'
Group for Retarded Seeks New Image
Youth Home Hits Snags
Mental Program Criticized
State to Exarrdne Psychosurgery (A3)
Sterilization of Patients Under State Inquiry
Mental Health CUts Affect 11 Programs
Judges Upset Mental Conmi tment Law (A3)
Ruling Broadens Mental Patient Rights (A3)
Revised Mental Code Urged
Mental' Care Programs Face New Strain (A3)
Mental Health Code Passed
Youth Clinic Denied License, Accreditation
State Mental Research Controls Reviewed*
Controversial Youth Clinic May Remain Open
State Relicenses Clinic Named in Probe
Civil Insanity Test a Must in Crirranal Cases
Controversial Center's License Renewed
Mentally Ill Trapped in Health Care Maze
State Mental Research Controls Reviewed*
Mental Health Officials Await Decision (B8)*
Where Will Adult Retarded Go?
u.s. Suit Claims Retarded Slighted
Doctor OUt of Jail, Quits Job
Psychiatric Unit swamped by Lay-off Related
Crime (A3)
Law Idles Mental Patients Craving Work (A3)
Judge Won't Send Mentally Ill to Jail (A3)
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State Journal
State Journal
Free Press
State Journal
Detroit News
Free Press
State Journal
Free Press
State Journal
State Journal
State Journal
Free Press
State Journal
Detroit News
State Journal
State Journal
Detroit News
Detroit News
Detroit News
Free Press

1/05/75
1/05/75
1/10/75
1/12/75
1/14/75
1/16/75
1/20/75
2/08/75
2/09/75
2/11/75
2/16/75
2/18/75
2/18/75
2/20/75
2/20/75
2/23/75
3/05/75
3/05/75
3/16/75
3/24/75

Free Press
Free Press
Free Press
Detroit News

3/26/75
4/15/75
4/24/75
4/26/75

Detroit News
State Journal
Free Press
State Journal
State Journal
Detroit News
State Journal
Free Press
Free Press
Free Press
Free Press
Free Press
~·ree Press
Detroit News
State Journal
Free Press
Free Press
Free Press
State Journal
Detroit News
State Journal
Free Press
Free Press
State Journal
Detroit News

5/09/75
6/12/75
6/15/75
6/16/75
6/19/75
6/20/75
6/22/75
6/29/75
7/06/75
7/09/75
7/10/75
7/13/75
7/14/75
7/26/75
8/01/75
8/03/75
8/03/75
8/08/75
8/30/75
9/11/75
10/16/75
10/27/75
11/02/75
11/26/75
12/09/75

Mentally Ill Blocked (Bl)
Freeing Crirrdnally Insane Stirs Livingston Debate
1954 Slaying Trial Ordered*
Prosecutor Seeks Changes in' state Mental Laws
New State Mental Code Stirs Fears (All)
The Issue: What's Insanity? (Al)
Wide Range of Health Services Offered (B8)
Mental Health Code Blasted at Hearing
Same Mentally Ill Confined to Jail
Mental Health Code Blasted
Mental Health Studied (Bl6)
State to Release 3,000 Mentally Ill (A3)
State's Plan to Release Mentally Ill Rapped (B5)
'Warehousing' of Mentally Ill is Protested
State can't 'Free' 3,000
Insanity Plea Tougher Under New House Bill
~tment on Insanity Plea Fought
Mental.Health Chief Outlines Patient Policy
Mental Facility Tour Jolts State Officials
New Mental Health Code has Court System in a
Turm:>il (Al)
Striking OUt a Future for Disturbed
Judges to Rule on Mental Health Guardianships (B3)
Mental care Bills Praised, Opposed (Al)
Legislators Will Seek to Close Loopholes in Mental
Health Law
Bargain Days Cost State Researcher His Job (A3)
License Loss Requires Hearing (Bl2)
Freedom Didn't Help Ex-Patient
'Dangerous Man' Free; Mental Code Gets Blame
New Restraints on Mentally Ill Advance in Senate
Alien Psychiatrists a Mental Care Problem (A3)
State 'Fighting Walking Time Bombs' (Al)
Patient Dies in Bath; Probe Set
Reporters Locate 7 Mental Escapees (Al)
Officials Tighten Up On Mental Escapees
3 Fleeing Mental Patients Caught (A3)
Suit Demands Mental Care
The Escapes by Patients -- Whose Fault
Tougher Law on Insanity is Approved
Mental Health Leaders Resign
Life With Our Unhappy Wanderers (Cl)
Just Don't Have Enough Money, Agencies Say (Cl)
Police Arrest 2nd Escapee (A3)
State Hospital Director Fired
Office to Guard State Patient's Rights
Mental Director Named
Mental Health Nominee is Backed -- But Not By All
Slayer Sparks Mental COde Tug-of-war (A3)
Confirmation Now Likely (B4)
Freedom Sought for 'Dangerous' Mental Patient
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Free Press
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Parents Battle Son's Lawsuit (B3)
Patient is Ruled Threat to Society
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A New Hope for St. Mary's?
2d Mental Hospital is in Jeopardy (A3)
Southfield Clinic's Psychotherapy Called
Destructive (Al)
Retarded Students Give Lesson in Love (Dll)
Steps Taken to Stop State Hospital CUts (B2)
Mental Patients W--it in Hallways (A3)
Chaos? Suit Charges Hospital Beatings, Escapes (Al)
Judge Refuses to Halt Clinton Valley Center
Layoffs (B2)
Mental Health in Fiscal Straitjacket (A3)
Judge Takes Court to Mental Patients (Al)
Legislators Find Filth at Hospital (A3)
Hospital Concerns Officials (Dl)
Ed: A Boon to Public, Patients (B6)
Mentally Ill Need Hames (Dl)
Other Sites Proposed for Riverside Transfers (A3) #
Ed: The Chaucey West Case: A Tragic Failure to
Ccmnunicate (E8)
More Area Men Accept Mental Counseling (B5)
Dr. Robey Drops Suit in SWap for Back Pay (AS)
Retarded to Vie in Ice Olympics (B3)
Challenge to State's Mental Act Broadened
Excess Use of Behavior Drugs on Mental Patients
Charged (A3)
Mentally Ill Victimized, Report Says (Dl2)
'CUre' for Schizophrenics Now in Hands of FDA*
Bills Push Neighborhood Care Facilities
Macanb-oakland Agency Developing New Programs (B3)
13 Given Mind-Altering Operations (Al)
'Someone to Listen' Need of Disturbed Youth (Dl)
Teen Problem Solving Under Test in Schools (01)
Mental Patients to Jarvis Acres? #
Senate Votes $48.3 Million (Fll)
Mental Health Code Change Urged (Al6)
Pontiac Mental Facility May Lose Accreditation (Al0)
Pontiac Mental Hospital to Lose its
Accreditation (A3)
Mental Code Reconsidered After Assault (A8)
Ed: Mental Health Code Change Urged (G8)
Foster Home Scandal Stirs Probe (A15)
Ed: Protecting Patient and Community (B6)
CUtbacks in Mental Care Seen (A3)
Mental Patients Might Share Jarvis Acres #
Federal Funding to Help State Expand Mental Health
Care (Bl6)
Mental Health SWitch Rapped (B8)
Eaton Fighting Mental Health Center #
Piston Scores From Heart (Cl)
Abuse Claims Probed (Al)
Milliken Plans to Inspect Mental Institutions (B2)
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Parents of Retarded Offered Hope (Bl)
Jarvis Acres Controversy Splits Board #
State to Appeal Hospital cases (Dl3)
Prison care of Psychotics 'Lousy', Doctor
Testifies (A3)
State Use of Jarvis Acres #
wyandotte Plant Has Pride (B3)
Mental Aftercare In a Shambles, Legislators Say
State's Mental Aftercare Program Called a
Disgrace (B6)
Board Delays Use Decision #
Study Paints Sad Picture of Mental care in State
State is Urged to Probe Mental Health Funding (A6)
Mental Patient Returning to State Beats Youth, Shoots
Cop on Jetliner (Al)
Hospital Studied For Mental Facility (Bl)
Inmate can Sue On Brain Operation
Hospitals Edgy on Accreditation Ruling
Planning Board Again Rejects Mental Care Facility
Planners OK Use of Jarvis #
Ex~ental Health Chief Denies Kickbacks (B6)
Jarvis Acres SWitch OK'd #
Center for Mentally Ill O~'d #
Neighborhoods Block Adult care Homes
Too Many Mentally Ill Live Alone (MAG6)
Village Sued in Home's Use by Retarded (Bl)
Judge Voids Guilty-But-Ill Verdict {A3)
Mental Health Aid at Stake {ClO)
Bloomfield Care Home May be Shut (Al)
Warren Mongoloid's Adoption is Cleared (Al)
Hepatitis I~olates 250 at Hospital (Al)
State Mental Facility's Accreditation Restored (Al2)
Northville Hospital Hepatitis Outbreak Seems
Over (A26)
Brain SUrgery SUit Filed Against Providence (B2)
Suit Challenges Quicky Hearings for Retarded
Self-Respect is Part of Their Job's Pay (D22)
Hope Healed a 'Handicap' and Give Patient the Best of
Christmas Gifts (F3)
Retarded Find Warmth, Hope at New Center (B2)
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Converted Ionia Center Ready for First Inmates (Bl)
Blues Rules Ask Community Involvement (A7)
Old Redford Home Allows Retarded to Live on Own (Bl)
Controversial Psychologist OUsted by State
Association (A3)
State Sued on Mental Care Right (A3)
Horticultural Therapy Helps Mentally Ill (BD4)
Demotion Plan at Plymouth Facility Fought (BWl)
Mother's Plight Prompts Move For Respite Center (BEl)
State Home Chief's OUster Sought (BE3)
Add 270 to Staff, Plymouth Told (Al)
Mental Health Spot Hard to Fill - Milliken (A3)
Inner City's Mentally Ill to Get New Facility (BDl)
Northville Hospital Regains Mental Unit
Accreditation (A8)
Sentenced as Mentally Ill -- But Vet Can't Get
Treatm:mt (Al)
Foster-Grandparents Buoy Handicapped (BE2)
Jean: Phone Link to Sanity (Cl)
Rocky Econany Boosts Mental Health Load (Bl6)
Shiawasee Students Abused?
Mentally Handicapped Are Fitting In To Society (GD6)
Respite Care: A Real Break for Parents of Special
Children (CDS)
State Is Urged to Study Chemistry of Insanity (B2)
300 Rally in Michigan House to Urge More
Mental-Health Funds (A20)
A Proud Young Man Dem:mstrates 'New Era' in Chance
for Retarded (BNl)
Persons, Not Patients, At Macomb-oakland Center (A3)
Caring Atmosphere Stressed
Foster Home Giving Retarded Woman Zest (BEl)
Faster Transfer of Mentally Ill Prisoners Ruled
Out (BD6)
Ypsi State Hospital Denied Accreditation (A17)
Retiree Gives and Gets Love With Retarded Kids (BN2)
Gov. Milliken Signs Increased Budget for State Mental
Health (BN2)
'Farrdly' Zoning Ruling is Upheld (BD2)
Patients Stood in for Spies in Tests
'Primal' is a Screaming SUccess in Ann Arbor
Court Plan for Retarded Stirs Debate (Bl)
Regional Center Seeks Those Who Will Open Homes to
Retarded (BN2)
u.s. to Aid 3 State Mental Facilities (E7)
School Aide Reveals Abuse of Retarded Children at
State Center (BN2)
survey Eyes Mental State
Pickets Hit Suspensions At Lapeer Mental
Hospital (B2)
Lapeer Abuses Probed (Al)
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OK for Force is Asked in Handling Mental Cases (B3)
suspensions Jar Mental Facility (A3)
2 supervisors Disciplined at Mental Facility; Abuse
of Patients is suspected (B6)
3 Lapeer Center Aides Fired; 11 Cleared by Abuse
Report (08)
Home for Handicapped Opens Doors to Talent (DD8)
Illinois Man Named Chief of Mental Health
Center (A17)
Retarded Oakland Youngsters Find Hockey Excitement in
Floor League (BNl)
Investigators COnfirm 2 cases of Abuse at Center for
Retarded (A17)
Therapists Re,olt on State Quiz (A3)
Center Sues State OVer Questionnaire
Checklist on Mental Patients Halted (A3)
Judge Halts State Use of Forms on Retarded's Sex,
Toilet Habits (BDl)
In and out of Mental Hospitals (Al)
woo Gets Mental Care and Why (Al >*
Sanity cases Leave Scars (Al)
Little Crimes Can Be a Cry for Help (Al)
Its 'Northville Shuffle' for Mentally Ill (Al)
Inside a Good Foster Home (Al)
'l'rying to Find Sanity on the Streets (Al)
Healing An Ailing System #
Meridian Has Surprise: •oasis' Opponents Don't
Show Up
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New Hares for Retarded Win Praise but 'Monwrental'
Problems Remain (Bl)
Mental Hospital Seen From Inside (A3)
Mental Health Staffing Assailed
Children Tortured; State Center Covers Up (Al)
Plyroouth Hare Inquiry Slated (Bl)
Court Aid Urged for Retarded (Bl)
Retarded 'Trained' With Abuse (Al)
Parents Feel Helpless Against Abuse
Abuse is Obvious - Reasons Aren't (Al)
Mental Facility Chief OUsted (Al)
Abuse Probers Find System of Coverup (A3)
Plyroouth Center Director is OUt
Stalling in Lansing Let Abuse Go On
Top Health Aide Out in Center Scandal (Bl)
Center Criticized to No Avail (Al)
Wayne Board Asks Probe Into Abuse
Mentar Hospitals Get Flak at Public Hearing (A3)
Panel Will Watch care of Patients (Al)
Area Mental Aide OUt (A4)
Milliken: Halt Any Abuses of Retarded (Al)
Plyroouth' s Boss: From Kindly Dad to a General (A3)
Milliken Outlines Mental Health Reforms
9 Fired in 1977 For Abusing Retarded (Bl0)
Lawmaker: Misers Gyp Retarded (Bl)
Center Fires Worker: He Cared Too Much (Al)
Attendants Tell of Abuse By Retarded (Bl)
Attendants Rally to Deny Abuse (Bl)
Reports of Patient Abuse Not Lirrdted to Plymouth #
Retarded Receive Poor Medical Care (A3)
Britten Avenue Residents Rush to Protest Foster
Hare (Bl)
Attendant Stands Mute on Assault Charge (B6)
Most State Horres Have Abuse Cases (Bl) #
Panel Gets Stalled on Hospital Inquiry (Bl)
Critics Call Mental Chief Unqualified (Bl)
Mental Facility Case Will Go to Grand Jury <A3)
Grand Jury Seen as Crucial to Plymouth Center
Inquiry (B3)
State to Add Staff at Unit for Retarded (Al)
Dr. Smith Was Told of Abuse in 1976
Health Chief Denies Inaction on Abuse (Al)
Ed: Doing Sorrething About Plymouth (Al4)
How Mental Health Chief 'Resigned' (Al)
Mental Health Chief Quits (Al)
Milliken Expands Abuse Inquiry (A3)
Special Jury Probe on Retarded Barred (Bl)
Mental Health Inquiry Gets 4 New Members (Bl)
Acting Mental Health Chief Vows Reforms (A3)
Mental Health Gets Old Pro as New Boss (A3)
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Plymouth: How Years of Complaints Grew Into Political
Response (Al)
Ex-Plyrnouth Center Bosses Still Get Pay (Al)
Care Center suspends 7 for Abuses (Al)
7 suspended at Plyrnouth Center (A3)
senate Panel OKs FUnding of Advocates for RP.tarded
Patients (Cl3)
More Investigation at Plymouth Center; 7
Suspended (B8 >
Visits to Home Contrast Starkly (Bl)
Patient Abuse Probes Starting (A3)
Senate Passes Patient Abuse Plan (B2)
New Plan to Protect Workers From Hostile Mental
Patients (Al4)
State Hospital Chief Back on Job (Al4)
Mental Health Spot Hard to Fill - Milliken (A3)
Panel Naired to Watch, Report on Plyrnouth (A4)
Warnings Preceded Care Crisis (Al)
9 at Mental Hospitals Charged with Illegal Medical
Practice (A3)
Plymouth Probers Want Ex-Directors (A3)
Hospital Adds Unit for Mentally Ill Kids (A3)
Ex-Mental Health Chief Blames Press
Mental Health Workers Get to Vote on a Union
Plymouth Staff Cuts Feared Harming Care (D3)
'Rest Break' For Parents of Retarded (B2)
Coldwater Hospital Gets New Chief (C6)
Parents of Retarded Kept Off Panel (Al7)
Mental Patient Abuse Bill Wins House Approval (B6)
Tough Boss Matches Job: Woman Trying to Clear
Plymouth Center Mess (Al)
3 Doctors Quit Jobs at Plymouth Center (B4)
Steps Set to Prevent Abuse of Retarded (Al)
Plymouth Ex-chief Lashes 'Untrue' Stories (B3)
Probe of Abuse Should be Wider, Womack Asserts (A3)
Task Force to Widen Abuse Probe (A3)
Plymouth Panel Told of Abuse, Lies (A3)
Attendant Faces Trial for Abusing Patient (B2)
Staff Shortage, Uproar Seen at Plymouth (Al)
SUggestions for Plyrnouth Kept A Secret (A3)
State Unit Hit Again (B6)
Lawsuit Protests Adult Care Home (Bl)
Plymouth Center Worker Faces Sentence in Beating (A9)
2 More of Center' s Employees are Fired (A3)
Plymouth Employee Found Guilty in Patient Abuse
Trial (A3)
State Finds Abuse at Plymouth (Al)
Center Prober Seeks CUre for Patient 'Abuse,
Neglect' (BD4)
WOIIack is told: Quit or Be Fired
After 10 Years, He Wins Bias Fight (E7)
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6/25/78
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Attendant Convicted of Abuse (E7)
Panel Denies Patient Abuse Hushed (BD2)
No Cover-up at Plyroouth - Task Force (Al)
Wbmack Calls Plymouth Abuse Report Biased and
Inaccurate (A8)
Hane Operator Says Abuse Charges Are Ex-workers
Lies (A8)
Plymouth Center Director Takes HEW Job (A8)
Abuses Spur Mental Health Moves (BD8)
Hospital Bills Seek to Clear Abuse Rules (BD3)
2 SUburbs Seek to Bar Hames for Retarded Adults (BE4)
Psychologist Claims Victory in Hospital Disrrdssal
Suit (BW3)
Plymouth Still Gets Bad Marks (A3)
35 More Suspended at Plymouth (A3)
Plymouth Center Suspends 35 More (Bl)
Mental Unit's New Director Maps Reform (Bl)
Mental-Health 'Breaks Ice'
Panel's Goal: New Mental Health Chief (A8)
Judges, Psychiatrists Rack Brains OVer Rights of
Mentally Ill (Cl7)
Keeping Up: The Gist of the News (A2)
Lapeer Center Rates Poorly But Better Than
Plymouth (A3)
Southfield Objects to Men Trying to be Good
Neighbors (Al)
Study Criticizes Mental Facility (BD2)
Woman Gets Probation in Beating (Bl)
Association Stalls Bid to Exclude Retarded (A3)
Neighborhood Welcomes Retarded 'Family'
Report to Milliken Assails 'Armed Truce' at
Lapeer (BE3 )
A New Harne for Retarded Men
More Cash for Mental Health ( 3)
swat on the Rear Seals Plea in Plymouth Abuse
Case (3)
Foster Care Homes Replacing Mental Hospitals
Mental Health Fee Increase to be Aired
SUit Attacks Isolation of Retarded (Bl)
Judge Rules OUt Survey of Patients
Court Ruling Ends State's Snooping on the
Retarded (A3)
They'd Do Dishes, Floors for Jobs (C3)
Michigan Closes Suburban Home for Retarded Men (BN7>
Transfer of Five From Home OKd Pending Sex
Probe (A20)
Care for Retarded Inadequate State Director
Admits <Al3 >
State Severes Ties at Horne for Retarded (B8)
Mental Aid Plan Gains Support of Psychiatrist (BDl)
State Plans to Hire 130 at Plymouth (BD2)
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11/17/78
12/01/78
12/03/78
12/05/78
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News
News
News
News
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Home for Retarded Faces State Charges (BN2)
M:!ntal Health Funds Get OK (Al2)
Home for Retarded Men Denies Neglect Charge (BW8)
25 SUspended at Plyrrouth Sue to Get Jobs Back (B3)
Taylor to Get First Homes for Retarded (Bl)
Retarded Heme Sues Agency (BE4)
Progress Slow at Plyrrouth: Rosen (B9)
Judge Delays Mental Ruling (BN2)
Senator Claims Milliken Ignored His Call For Patient
Ab.lse Probe (BW8)
24 r-Dre Are Fired at Plyrrouth (A3)
Extensive Patient Abuse Found in State
Facilities (Bl)
Plyrrouth Better, But Far to Go (Al)
Ed: Sarre Mental Health Story: Patient Abuse and
Neglect (A20)
Retarded in St. Clair to Get Aid (BE3)
Dorm Chief Got Ax at Plymouth (Bl)
State Boosts Mental Health Funds (Al9)
Revised Mental Code Open for Review (BN2)
Poor Care Blamed for Plyrrouth Deaths (Al)
Plynnuth Health Care 'Poor' (B6)
Plan Helps Find 'Special Sitter' (BE2)
8 Mental Hospitals Win Recertification (BW4)*
Panel Hears of Ab..lse in Care Homes (B8)
State to Hire 55 Workers for Mental Aid
Facilities (BW20)
Hospital Escape Try Fails (Al)
Mental Care Angers Fitzgerald (C23)
State Tried to Put Lid on Plynnuth (Bl)
12 Guards Bolster Staff at Ypsilanti Mental
Hospital (Bl)
Big Mental Institutions Criticized (BD2)
Holly-Area Developers Sue to Bar Disabled Adults From
Subdivision (BD3)
Builder's Suit Stalls Home for Retarded
Retarded-Home Approval Awaits Ruling by Court (BN2)
22 Get Jobs Back at Plynnuth (B6)
Plymouth Rehirings Face a Test (Al)
Union Offers Defense for Health Aides (Bl)
Workers Ask State to Begin Pact Talks (A2)
Ed: Mental Illness (A18)
Group Homes for Retarded Rouse Fears (Bl)
Plymouth Panel Reports 'Modest' Gains at Center (Bl)
TV Debate Revives Questions About Plymouth Center
Death (A3)
House Passes Rules for Mental Patients (BD4)
Child Home Aide Gets Suspension (BD2)
Panels Try To Fill Mental Health Jobs (B8)*
The 'Hot Line' to Help (D4)
Ed: Plynnuth Center Gains (A22)
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COurt Orders 2 Men to Testify on Abuse (A9)
'Children Held OUr Hands, Wouldn't Let Go' ( Cl)
Plyxoouth Center: In 10 Months, Drastic Changes (Cl)
Mental Health Budget Won't Be CUt - Milliken (B9)
State to Review Patient Abuse Report (Ali)
Report Blasts Mental Institutions (Al)
Ex-con Bids for Nursing Care License (Bl)
Task Force Takes Aim at Hospital 'Fat' (Bl)
Kelley Upsets Child Adndssion Rule (BW6)
Ousted Plymouth Director Fights for Job,
Reputation (A3)
COurt Drops Immunity for General Hospitals (BN3)
Even ~rcism Fails to CUre Him
Emptying the Warehouse •••
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Detroit News
Free Press
Detroit News
Detroit News
Detroit News
Detroit News
Free Press
Detroit News
State Journal
Free Press
Detroit News
Free Press

1/10/79
1/12/79
1/23/79
1/24/79
2/02/79
2/03/79
2/03/79
2/06/79
2/06/79
2/17/79
2/22/79
2/25/79

Free Press
2/28/79
State Journal 3/12/79
Detroit News
3/23/79
Detroit News
3/24/79
Detroit News
3/25/79
Detroit News
3/25/79
Detroit News
3/25/79
Detroit News .3/26/79

Detroit News
Detroit News
Detroit News

3/26/79
3/27/79
3/28/79

State Journal
State Journal
Detroit News
Detroit News
Detroit News
Detroit News
Detroit News
Detroit News
Detroit News
Detroit News
Detroit News
Detroit News
Detroit News
Detroit News
Detroit News
Detroit News

3/29/79
3/29/79
3/30/79
4/04/79
4/05/79
4/15/79
4/15/79
4/16/79
4/17/79
4/24/79
4/27/79
4/29/79
5/01/79
5/06/79
5/06/79
5/08/79

Detroit News
Detroit News
Detroit News

5/08/79
5/09/79
5/16/79

Detroit News

5/17/79

State Panel to Revise Mental Health Set-Up {BN2)
Long Waits Chronic In Mental Unit (A3)
Panel Cites Neglect in Mental Care (Bl)
Hare's Use by Retarded Approved (Bl)
Turnover Hurts Plymouth Hom:! (Bl)
Ed: Mental Illness <AlB)
Court Hears of New Al::uses At Plyroouth (Al)
Plymouth Center Deadline (Bl)
Plymouth Center Gets Ultimatum (B9)
Patient Rights Cases Pile Up (A3)
Plyroouth to Hire 300 Attendants (Bl)
How Captivity Since Birth Left Jack, 54, a Mental
Cripple (Al)
Money Bind May Disrupt Cases of Mentally Ill
Aid Here Inadequate for Mentally Ill Youth (Bl)
Judges Assail Mental Health 'Waste' (A3)
Ypsi Hospital Kitchen Filthy, Workers Say (Al)
Hospital Tour Backs Employees (Bl)
Jackie's Victory- He's OWn Man
Now, a 'Last Emancipation' (A3)
(Full page set of 3 stories) A Home From Both Sides
of the Street: 'It's Not as Bad as I Thought' -A
Neighbor; 'On Your Own, a Little Scared,' Says
Resident; The Battle: Clamor Subsides (Cl)
State Plans Food Check at Hospital (Bl)
Mental Hospital Scrubs for Visit (Bl)
(Full page set of 3 stories) Retarded Work Here: Why
Not?; State Pays Big Money to Train Retarded; Job
Brings Dennis OUt of His Shell (Gl)
State Mental Care Report Sympathetic (Bl)
Mental Center Still Troubled (B2)
Hospital Suspends Dietician After Tour (Bl)
Chief Quits At Mental Hospital (Bl)
Mental Unit Improving, Judge Says (Bl)
Fired Center Chief Ordered Reinstated (B2)
Mental Center Proposal Dies (B2)
Bretton Square: Hope for Retarded
Lawmaker Urges Fight on Womack (B4)
State Fights the Rehiring of Womack (BD4)
Poetry: Therapy With a Pen (Dl)
Mental Facility Will Keep New Boss Busy (Bl)
When Someone cares (DlO)
Bullets 'WelcOm:!' Horne For Retarded (B2)
State Starts Kitchen Repair in Hospital (B9)
200 in Troy Discuss Gun Attack on Disputed Home for
Retarded (Bl)
Alpena Home Gives Retarded New Hope (Bl)
Felony Asked in Mental Aid Abuse Case (BD2)
Task Force Blames Mental Facility Staff for Patient's
Death (Al)
Study Told of Trouble in Hospitals (Bl)
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Detroit
Detroit
Detroit
Detroit

News
News
News
News

5/19/79
5/22/79
5/25/79
5/27/79

State Journal 5/27/79
Detroit News
State Journal
Detroit News
Detroit News
Detroit News
Detroit News
Detroit News
Detroit News
Free Press
Free Press
Free Press
Detroit News
Detroit News
Detroit News
Detroit News
State Journal
Detroit News
Detroit News
Detroit News
Detroit News
Detroit News
Free Press
Detroit News
State Journal
Detroit News
Detroit News
Detroit News
Detroit News
Detroit News
Detroit News
State Journal
Detroit News
Free Press
Free Press
Detroit News
State Journal

5/29/79
5/29/79
6/10/79
6/21/79
6/22/79
6/24/79
6/24/79
6/28/79
7/02/79
7/12/79
7/17/79
7/20/79
7/21/79
8/07/79
8/21/79
8/29/79
8/31/79
8/31/79
9/02/79
9/19/79
9/21/79
9/21/79
10/10/79
10/10/79
10/21/79
10/23/79
10/26/79
10/26/79
10/31/79
11/06/79
11/16/79
11/30/79
12/01/79
12/18/79
12/19/79
12/20/79

Detroit News 12/28/79

Jobs Went to First - But Not Best (A8)
Ed: Clinton Valley Center (A20)
Mental Health Chief (Bl)
Opportunities Knock at 'Clubhouse' for
Ex-Patients (CE8)
Patients Protected from Abuse; Who Protects
Attendants #
New Official can Handle Crisis (B4)
Patients First with Mental Health Norrdnee (Bl)
Dirty Linen Hits The Road (Al)*
High Court CUrbs Rights of Juveniles {Al)
M:>re State Hospital Workers? Maybe (Bl)
Decision on State Hiring Delayed (B4)
Ed: Parental Rights (A20)
Suit Calls Commitment Plan Illegal (Bl)
Many Fired Plym:mth Aides Rehired (Al)
Plyroouth Attendant Accused (A3 >
Battered Parents: Victims of OUr Tirres (Cl)
Crirre, Morale Crises Plague State Hospital (Al)
Clinton Valley Problems Await New Health Chief (A8)
Milliken Vetoes 3 Projects (BD2)
Complaints Skyrocket at Mental Units (Bl)
Mental Patients May be Moved Into Apartments
Drug Laxity Loses Rating for Center (Bl)
Plyroouth Center Closing Ordered (Al)
Court Plan For Retarded Stirs Debate (Bl)
Hospital Rapped on Drugs (B5)
U.S. Judge Names 2 to Phase OUt Center (C2)
Plymouth Center is 'Disastrous' Court is Told
Fired Official Gets New Job (BDE6)
Industrial Mental Health Aid Readied
Sexual Abuse Inquiry Moves Slowly (B2)
End Patient-Rights Office, Senator Asks (Bl)
Abuse Case Goes to Prosecutor (BN2)
Fire Destroys Troy Home For Retarded (Bl)
Ed: Terrorism in Troy (Al2)
State Gets Mental Health Aid (BN2)
State Opens Probe of Treatment at Adolescent Home
Metropolitan Psychiatric Unit to Close
Psychiatric Hospital Is Unsafe and Will Close
Lafayette Clinic Chief Blocked (B8)*
State can Use Donations for Gifts to Patients (Bl4)
Chosen for Clinic, Australian Waits for House
Action (Bl2)*
Patient Abuse Complaints Rise (Bl)
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Detroit News 1/16/80
Detroit News 1/21/80
State Journal 2/04/80
Detroit News
2/05/80
State Journal 2/12/80
State Journal 2/14/80
Detroit News 2/19/80
Detroit News
State Journal
Detroit News
Detroit News
Detroit News
Detroit News
Detroit News
State Journal
Detroit News
Free Press
Detroit News
Detroit News
Detroit News
Detroit News
Detroit News

2/20/80
2/20/80
2/22/80
2/23/80
2/26/80
2/27/80
2/27/80
2/28/80
2/29/80
3/02/80
3/04/80
3/16/80
3/24/80
3/25/80
3/26/80

Detroit News
4/02/80
State Journal 4/04/80
4/18/80
Detroit News
State Journal 4/24/80
Detroit News
5/13/80
Detroit News 5/13/80
Detroit News 5/15/80
Detroit News 5/17/80
Detroit News 5/18/80
State Journal 5/21/80
Detroit News 5/23/80
Free Press
6/07/80
News
News
News
News

6/11/80
6/12/80
6/17/80
6/23/80

Detroit News
Free Press
Detroit News
Detroit News
Free Press
Detroit News
Detroit News
Detroit News
Free Press

6/25/80
6/25/80
6/29/80
6/30/80
7/05/80
7/06/80
7/07/80
7/07/80
7/09/80

Detroit
Detroit
Detroit
Detroit

State Post Challenges Psychiatrist (BD2)
Neighbors Oppose Home for Retarded (BN8)
Fencing of Mental Unit Asked #
Panel Proposes Shift in Patient Abuse Cases (Bl)
Riverside's 'Open Door' Policy Arouses Concern #
Windsor Has Eye on Riverside #
'Mickey Finn' Death of Boy Sparks Inquiry of Wayne
Center for Retarded (Bl)
Frustrated Kids Learn to Cast Off Hang-ups (Gl)
Michiganians Weigh 'Brother's Keeper' Role
Nothing But Winners: Winter Special Olympics (Al)
State Limited in Takeover in County - Kelley (Al0)
State Acts in County Crisis (BDE2)
State Seeks to Take OVer County Unit (BDE2)
Teen Center Faces Loss of State License (Bl >
Jarvis Walkaways Upset Windsor Board #
Probe Finds Violations at Foster Center (Bl)
Where the Words 'Violently Ill' Take on New Meaning
State Charges Abuse at Private Mental Home
Michigan Had 3,000 Sterilized in 1929-50
Sterilization Victim, 63, Still Asks 'Why'
State Harasses Center, Doctor Says
Court Rules on Prisoner Transfer to Mental
Hospital (C2)
Mental-Patient Housing (BW2)
Fencing of Mental Unit Asked #
Psychiatric Hospital to Be Closed (Al)
Mental Facility Aides Say Layoffs a Danger (B6) #
News Series Wins Anti-Bigotry Award (A3)
Judge Lifts Ban on Layoffs by the State (BD2)
SUburbs See Peril to Dream (Al)
70-Year-old Man Among 8 Foster Parents Saluted (B2)
Born Mongoloid, And It Doesn't Matter (Cl)
Jackson Slayer Wins Quick Release
Hospitals Notify Staffs of CUtbacks (All)
Retarded Patients Win Their Fight Against
Eviction (A3)
Handicapped Woman Turns the Tables (Al)
Foster Horne Program Hit (BDW2)
Man Beats 'Retarded' Label
Kelley to Battle Blues: Michigan Wants State Mental
Hospitals Paid (Al)
Slump Breeds Mental Ills
Judge Puts Brakes on Mental Case Processing (A3)
Doctors Ask Delay on Pay Raises (BOll)
Fight Looms on Retardeds' Rights (BD6)
Child Slayer Skips Mental Center, May be Free Man
Coffeehouse Caters to Needs of Retarded
Mental Hospital Escapee Found (BW2)
Panel Seeks to End Mental Care Dispute (Bl)
New Aid for Retarded Works - But Not For All
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State Journal 7/24/80
Detroit News
Detroit News
Detroit News
Free Press
State Journal
Detroit News
Detroit News
Detroit News
State Journal
Detroit News
State Journal
Detroit News
Detroit News
State Journal
Detroit News
State Journal
Free Press
State Journal
State Journal
State Journal
Detroit News
Detroit News
Detroit News
Detroit News
Detroit News
Detroit News
Detroit News
Detroit News
Free Press
Detroit News
Detroit News

8/01/80
8/05/80
8/05/80
8/05/80
8/10/80
8/12/80
8/14/80
8/21/80
8/24/80
9/12/80
9/14/80
9/23/80
9/24/80
10/03/80
10/09/80
10/12/80
10/13/80
10/14/80
10/14/80
10/16/80
10/26/80
10/26/80
10/28/80
10/30/80
11/03/80
11/04/80
11/05/80
11/07/80
11/07/80
11/13/80
11/16/80

Detroit News
Detroit News
Detroit News
Detroit News
Detroit News
Detroit News
Detroit News
Detroit News
Detroit News
Detroit News
State Journal

11/23/80
11/23/80
12/05/80
12/06/80
12/09/80
12/10/80
12/11/80
12/13/80
12/18/80
12/21/80
12/28/80

Mental Health Workers Eye Public-Private
Cooperation (B6)
State Officials Warn Against Budget Cuts (BW2)
Mental Health Director Protests Cuts in Budget #
Budget Cuts Imperil Mental Health Units (Bl)
Mental Health Cuts Will Hurt, Says Chief (A3) #
Care Aides 'Afraid for Their Lives' (Bl) #
Hames Lose License \BW2)
'Incanpetency' Voids Marriage (B8)
More Housing Sought for Retarded (BEll)
Missing Reports Cloud Details of 10 Deaths (Bl)
Mental Health Dollars Sought (AlO)
MSU Med Chief Joins Probe (Bl)
Probe Brings Firing (BW2)
State Warns of Threat to Retarded (BDE2)
Mental Health Cuts Set
Judge Disrrasses Lawsuit (BD19)
Hillcrest Report Said Incomplete
Injuries Up at Mental Institutions (A3) #
Mental Health Faces Another Cut #
Cutbacks Increase Danger (B5)
'Fiddling' to Davis, Service to Nash #
Mom SUes to Sterilize Daughter(B4)
Scanner Provides Peek Inside Brain (B5)*
Hearing on Sterilization (BD2)
Court Ruling Due on Sterilization Plea (BN2)
Harne for Handicapped Torched (BN4)
Harne's Torching Shocks Neighbors (Al)
Arsonists Were Meticulous (B8)
Buzz and Jean' s Love Can't Beat the Courts (Al)
Lafayette Clinic Seeks Old Luster (Cl)*
Milliken Seeks Another Big Slash in Spending <Al>
A Mixed Welcome: Group Homes Slowly Blend Into
Canrmmity (Al)
Wonder Woman: She Works Magic With Retarded (Bl)
Ed: Unfounded Fears
Fire Hits Home Slated for Retarded Adults (BDN2)
FBI to Investigate Fire At Home for Retarded (Bl)
Ruling Delays Group Home (B5)
Tough Blow to Retarded (Bl)
Mental Health Cuts Force Layoffs (Bl3>
Ideas On Setting Up Homes for Retarded (A3)
Gifts of Love Cheer Handicapped (B7)
Group Home Faces Suit By Dearborn
States Belt Tightening Will Squeeze Everyone (Bl) #
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State Journal
Detroit News
Detroit News
Detroit News
Detroit News
Detroit News
State Journal
Free Press
State Journal
Detroit News
State Journal
Detroit News
Detroit News
Detroit News
Detroit News
Detroit News
Detroit News
Detroit News
Free Press
Free Press
Free Press
Detroit News
Detroit News
Detroit News
Detroit News
Free Press
State Journal
State Journal
Detroit News
Detroit News
Detroit News
Detroit News
Detroit News
Detroit News

1/02/81
1/03/81
1/05/81
1/08/81
1/10/81
1/16/81
1/18/81
1/26/81
1/26/81
1/27/81
1/28/81
1/30/81
2/01/81
2/03/81
2/05/81
2/06/81
2/06/81
2/06/81
2/08/81
2/09/81
2/10/81
2/12/81
2/13/81
2/13/81
2/18/81
2/23/81
2/24/81
3/09/81
3/15/81
3/19/81
3/20/81
3/23/81
3/23/81
3/24/81

Detroit News
Detroit News
Detroit News
State Journal
Detroit News
Detroit News
Detroit News
Detroit News
Detroit News
Detroit News
Detroit News
Detroit News
Detroit News

3/25/81
3/25/81
3/27/81
3/27/81
4/02/81
4/02/81
4/15/81
4/16/81
4/21/81
4/22/81
4/22/81
4/23/81
4/30/81

Detroit News

4/30/81

1, 500 Mental Health Layoffs Rescinded <Al>
Mental Health Layoffs Are Canceled (08}
Mental Health Staff Cut. Is Retained By State (BD2}
Hare for Retarded Gains (B4}
Group Hames for Mentally Ill Face Hard Fight CAl>
Health Unit Cuts Raise New Fears (Al}
Mental Health System Sl.arrne:l (Bl >
Strange Behavior, But No Recourse (Al}
Hillcrest Probe Offers Institutional Reforms (Bl}
No Negligence Found At Center (Cl8}
Economic Woes Force Hospital Closing #
Agency Transfers Spur Talk On Future of Chief (Bw""2}
Ochberg Asks Inquiry In Files' Use (B2}
Cuts Peril Mental Facilities (Bl>* #
Audit Adds Fire to State Debate on the Retarded (Bl}
Center Director Beaten (BD2}
Court Upholds Mental Hospital I.ayoffs (B5}
Pact Near on cuts at Plymouth (Bl}
On the Boulevard, Empty Days of Despair <Al>
State Mix-Ups Can Be Fatal to Residents (Al)
Shots, Fires Greet Retarded at New Hone
Center Agrees to Staff Cuts (B3}
Hypnotized Against Her Will, State Aide Says (Bl}
More Layoff Suits Possible (BE02}
SUburb Plans Fight On Home for Retarded (E3)
Judging Insanity: A Maddening Dilerma (A3)
Ochberg Urges Business Help
Mental Patient Probed in 2 Rapes (Al}
State Agrees to Costly Lease for Foster Home (B3}
Budget Slashes Worsen Woes of Psychiatric care (Bl}
More Mental Health Layoffs Assailed (BDW2}
Do Mentally Ill have Role In Society? (Al}
She Spent 10 Years in Mental 'Prisons' (Al)
Ailing Health Care: Clinic State Layoffs Shortchange
the Mentally Ill (Bl)
Counties Lack Facilities to Handle Hospital Exodus
Trying to Find His Way Back (El2)
Foster Care Home Leases Face Inquiry (Bl}
Mental Health Budget Still in Air
Group Hone Foes Lose (BD2}
State Faces Encounter With Volatile Situation (C20)
Mental Health Shift Criticized (B9}
Challenges Rise Against Group Homes (Bl}
Court Limits Rights of Retarded (A4}
Court Puts Limits on Retarded (Al}
Hane' s OWners May sue (Bl >
Study Reports Jails Hold Mentally Ill (Bl}
State Justice Urges Treatment, Not Jail for the
Mentally Ill (BOD14}
Unusual Heroine: Group Home Resident Saves Man's
Life (Bl}
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Detroit News
Free Press
Detroit News
Detroit News
Detroit News
Detroit News
Detroit News
Detroit News
Free Press
Detroit News
Detroit News
Detroit News
Detroit News
Detroit News
Detroit News
Detroit News

5/06/81
5/06/81
5/10/81
6/04/81
6/08/81
6/11/81
6/11/81
6/12/81
6/18/81
6/19/81
6/24/81
6/24/81
6/26/81
7/13/81
7/17/81
7/18/81

Detroit News
Detroit News
Free Press

7/22/81
7/23/81
7/23/81

Detroit News
Detroit News

7/24/81
7/24/81

Detroit News
Detroit News
Detroit News
Free Press
Detroit News
Detroit News
Detroit News
State Journal
Detroit News
Detroit News
State Journal
State Journal
Detroit News
Detroit News
Detroit News
Detroit News
Detroit News
Detroit News
Free Press
State Journal
Detroit News
Detroit News
State Journal
State Journal
Free Press
Detroit News

7/25/81
7/26/81
7/29/81
8/02/81
8/03/81
8/03/81
8/04/81
8/05/81
8/06/81
8/06/81
8/06/81
8/06/81
8/09/81
8/11/81
8/14/81
8/17/81
8/20/81
8/21/81
9/11/81
9/13/81
9/14/81
9/15/81
9/15/81
9/15/81
9/16/81
9/22/81

Hearing Set on Layoffs, Job Shifts of 11 Blacks (BD2)
CUts in Mental Health Peril Richards' Liberty (A3)
SUit Spurs Inquiry Into Foster Hames (B5)
Retarded Tot' s Parents Also Learn to Cope (B4)
Group Home Ordered Closed (BN02)
Sinai Psychiatric Unit: Stereotype smasher (Al)
State Audit Report to Cite Waste (Bl)
Legislators Seek Foster Home Quiz (Bl)
Road to Mental Health is Tough on Warren (Cl)
Psychiatrist Ordered to Pay $500,000 (Bl)
Ed: Cashing in on Group Homes (Al2)
' I 'm Not Scared Anyrrore' (Gl)
Comnunity Placerrent Zeroed (Ail)
Jobs Set Up for Impaired (Bl)
Ochberg's Expenses Questioned (Bl)
Ochberg Disputes Criticism That He Travels Too
Much (B2)
Mental Health Director Quits Under Pressure (Al)
Legislator Wants Babcock for Post (B2)
Ochberg: He noved rrental care in directions the
state should continue to pursue
Dr. Ochberg' s Departure
State Pay Deal For Ochberg Stirs Legislator's
Ire (BW2)
Audit Lists Placement Home Waste (B3)
Audit Cites Mental Staff Travel Costs (Bl)
Ochberg to Repay ~ney to the State (B20)
Help is Hard to Find (Dl)
New Chief Backs Group Home Policy (A3)
Ochberg Out, Group Homes Stay
New Mental Health Chief Appoints 3 (BW6)
Directors Promise an End to Abuses
Judge Voids Group Home Lease (BD5)
Placements of Patients Win Support
Area Mental Health Board to Ask for $16.5 Million
Audit Finds Problems at Center (B8)
Groups Say Mind Drugs Kill Patients (Bl)
Size Bars Home for Retarded (Al)
Judge Bars Homes for 'Mentally Ill' (A3)
3 Target of Ethics Inquiry (A3)
120 Died in State Hospitals in '80 (BE14)
Boss Doubts High Mental Death Rate (A3)
Separate Agency Urged to Oversee All Group Homes (Al)
State Firms Mental care Rule (Al)
Paper Reports Doctor Quit in Hospital Deaths (BW6)
Mental Unit in Trouble, Official Says (A3)
He Won' t Walk in Ochberg' s Shoes
Hillcrest Awaited Bad News
Group Horne Issue: A Case in Point (A3)
Parent Is sue in Son Is Baffling Death (A3)
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Detroit News

9/22/81

Detroit News

9/23/81

Detroit News
State Journal
Detroit News
State Journal
Detroit News
Detroit News
Detroit News
Free Press
Detroit News
Detroit News

9/25/81
9/28/81
9/29/81
10/04/81
10/07/81
10/13/81
10/14/81
10/14/81
10/18/81
10/29/81

Detroit News 11/08/81
Free Press
11/10/81
Detroit News 11/25/81
Detroit News 12/07/81

Battles for Job: She Says 2 Home Patients Got
Drug OVerdoses (A3)
No Charges Are Expected in Mental Patient's Death
(BW14)
State Fails to Relocate 216 Plymouth Patients
Ex-Patient Will 'Star' at Coldwater (Al)
Parents sue in Northville Death (Al8)
Mental Health Sends Budget Warning (Bl)*
3 Hospital Deaths Bring Reprimand (BW6)
Mental Health Chief Pleads for Bigger Budget (BD8)
Group Hames Fight Lost by Township (A3)
Group care Homes Win Lawsuit on Zoning
A Rewarded Job for caring People (B7)
Senate COnfirms Walker as Director of Public
Health (Cl8)
Retarded Folks Get Home OUtside Hospital (BE8)
Young, Black Lives ••• Forever Lost (Bl)
Tears and Triumph in Jarrde's World (Bl)
A 't-brmal' world is a Faraway Place (Cl)
WOman
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Detroit News
Detroit News

1/03/82
2/03/82

Detroit News
Detroit News
Free Press
Free Press

2/10/82
2/27/82
2/28/82
3/04/82

Detroit News
Detroit News
State Journal
Detroit News
State Journal
Detroit News
State Journal
Detroit News
Detroit News
Detroit News
Detroit News
Detroit News
Detroit News
State Journal
Detroit News
Detroit News
State Journal
Detroit News

3/08/82
3/12/82
3/19/82
3/20/82
3/24/82
4/11/82
4/15/82
4/28/82
4/30/82
5/04/82
5/04/82
5/05/82
5/07/82
5/09/82
5/12/82
5/13/82
5/16/82
5/19/82

Detroit News 5/21/82
State Journal 6/02/82
Detroit News 6/05/82
Detroit News
Detroit News
Free Press
Free Press
Detroit News

6/10/82
6/11/82
6/11/82
6/11/82
6/17/82

Detroit News 6/19/82
6/20/82
Free Press
Detroit News 6/22/82
Detroit News 6/22/82
Detroit News 6/27/82
8/05/82
Detroit News
Detroit News 8/06/82
State Journal 8/06/82
State Journal 8/06/82
State Journal 8/10/82
Detroit News 8/18/82
8/18/82
Free Press
Detroit News 8/24/82

Child Separate After 60 Caring Years (Bl)
Many State Mental Care Units Lack Accreditation
(AD12)
Retarded Child May Aid a Marriage, Study Finds (F4)
Judge Rules Psychiatrist Killer Insane (AS)
Michigan Mental Care 'On Ledge' , Chief Says (A3)
Breaking Point: A Bare Minimum Isn't Enough for
Mental Care
Milliken's 'Liberal' Sticks With His Beliefs (A3)
Talk Cites Boy's Plight in Bid to Keep Services
Laws Delay Help for Mentally Ill (B3)
Ruling Blocks Canton Hames for Mentally Ill (A5)
Is Placerrent Really A Bail OUt? (Dl)
The New Neighbors (MAG12)
Community Placement Plan Saving Mental Health Funds
Training Program Serves Special Needs (ED6)
Arson Hits House Planned for Retarded (A3)
Bill's Got a Good Life Now (Al)
Treating Schizophrenia 'Bargain Basement' Way (Al7)
The Mentally Ill Are Dispossessed (Al5)
Handicapped Yes; Retarded, No (Al5)
Gentle Justice Goal for Patients' Voice (Dl)
W<xren SUe State Over Layoffs (C2)
Victims of the System (Al9)
Groups Fight 'Mental Patient' Tag (Dl)
The Retarded Child: Acceptance First, Then a Terrible
Decision: Horne or Institution Care (Fl)
State Budget CUts Hit Schools, Cities (Al)
Mental Health Code C<Xl"plaints Aired (B5)
God' s Children: 'I.Dve is the Message We Want to Teach
Them' (Al7)
Official Links CUts to Northville Woes (BW15)
Woman Wins Sex Bias Suit (A8)
Judge Blocks Men Only Job at Mental Unit (A3)
Mental Health Workers Decry Layoffs (A3)*
Should the Insanity Plea As a Defense Be
AOOlished? (Al9)
High Court Boosts Rights of Retarded {Al)
Michigan's Insanity Verdict Under Fire (A3)
'Bumping' Will Hold Up State Layoffs (A3)
Mentally Ill Get New Friends (Al3)
U.S. Constitution Now Embraces the Retarded (Al3)
Mental Health CUts Take Toll (BW14)
U.S. Could CUt Funds for Mentally Disabled (A3)
New DMH Placement Airing No Threat, Babcock
Insists (B4)
Mentally Handicapped Face CUts (B4)
All Hillcrest Residents in New Homes (B3)
Milliken Maps Bid to Save Hospital (BN6)
Aid Sought for Mental Care Centers
Study Rips Mental Health CUts (BOlO)
lot:rn,
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State Journal
Detroit News
Detroit News
State Journal
Detroit News
Free Press

8/24/82
8/26/82
8/26/82
8/26/82
8/27/82
8/29/82

Free Press

8/29/82

Detroit News
State Journal
Detroit News
Detroit News
Detroit News
Detroit News
Detroit News
State Journal
State Journal
Detroit News

9/01/82
9/01/82
9/06/82
9/10/82
9/13/82
9/30/82
10/07/82
10/14/82
11/07/82
12/08/82

Detroit News 12/17/82
Detroit News 12/17/82
Free Press
12/18/82

Mental care Worsening
Northville's Unsolved WOrry (OWl)
Fight Erupts OVer Mental Health Job
Hundreds Plead for More Mental Health Funds (Bl)
Mentally Ill Not Forgotten (Al3)
Kids in Depression from Cherrdcals in Brain Get Some
Help*
Self-Esteem Grows Along With the Flowers and
Vegetables (F3)
500 Mental Patients Protest Budget CUts (BW6)
Mental Health CUts Protested (Bl)
Ex-Mental Patients Aid Others (Al)
Reforms Sought in 'Room and Board' Hares
Mental Laws Assailed in Slaying Case (BW4>
SUit Seeks Higher Pay for Mental Hospital Aides (BH5)
Rehiring is Upheld on Appeal (BW4)
Hillcrest Center Awaits Buyer
Hospital Deaths Puzzling (Bl)*
Relatives, Friends of the Mentally Ill Need Caring,
Too (Dl)
Milliken Orders 40-Point Plan in Drive to Help
State's Needy (Al)
U.S. Probes Hospital At Northville (A3)
U.S. to Check How Patients are Treated at
Northville (A3)
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State Journal 1/02/83
Free Press
1/10/83
Free Press
1/10/83
Free Press
1/11/83
Free Press
1/12/83
Free Press
Detroit News
Detroit Ne11s
Free Press
Free Press

1/12/83
1/23/83
1/2S/83
1/26/83
1/28/83

Free Press

1/31/83

Detroit News
Detroit News
Detroit News

2/02/83
2/03/83
2/08/83

Detroit News
State Journal
Detroit News
Detroit News
Detroit News
Detroit News
Detroit News
Detroit News
Detroit News
Detroit News
Detroit News

2/14/83
2/lS/83
2/24/83
3/0S/83
3/06/83
3/10/83
3/14/83
3/lS/83
3/17/83
3/20/83
3/23/83

Free Press

3/23/83

Detroit News

3/27/83

Detroit News
Detroit News
Free Press

3/27/83
3/27/83
3/27/83

Detroit News

3/28/83

Detroit News

3/29/83

Detroit News
Free Press
Detroit News

3/30/83
3/30/83
3/31/83

Detroit News
Detroit News
Free Press
Detroit News
Free Press

3/31/83
4/03/83
4/0S/83
4/07/83
4/22/83

Abbott Offers Mentally Ill a Chance at Life (Bl)
A Mind Lost In the Maze (Al)
Whose Fault? Enough Blame for Everyone (Al)
Mental Patient's Death Ruled Accidental (A3)
Ed: Mental Code: Sorrehow the System Failed Beuford
Walton and His Family (A8)
Retarded Or Not? Man Can Sue State (A3)
Ex-Legislator Narred to State Post (BDS)
Hypocrites and the Homeless (Al7)
Simmons Hired for State Job at $S3,SOO (A3)
Ed: Insanity Plea: Even Psychiatrists Find Flaws in
the System (A6)
Too Much Mothering? She Did Everything for Jimmy,
But Now She's Gone (A3)
Planned Mental Health Cuts Draw Fire (CD7)
Cuts in Mental Health Assailed {CDS)*
Babcock Stays As Mental Health Chief - It's His 4th
Agency {B6)
The case Against 'Guilty But Ill' CAll)
Mental Health Cuts Held Down
State's Mental Health Program is in Bad Shape <B8)
'Group Hames' Pose Dilemma {A3)
Last Chance Family - Love For Disabled (El)
Patients Find Special Friend {BNl)
Fire Kills S in Foster Care Home (Al)
Dead Teen Drugged, Kin Charge (A3)
Mother Asks Probe of Juvenile Center {A3)
Deaths Don't Reflect on Center - State Aide CBS)
Group Can Point With Pride Over Its Help For The
Retarded {GD6)
Long on Patience: Her Job is Teaching the Mentally
Handicapped {A3)
Ab..lse, Neglect and Death: A Mental Hospital's
Struggle {Al)
Body Parts Taken Without Approval (A4)
Hospital Staffers Also Are Victims {A4)
Ed: Mental Care: Patients Pay Severe Price for
Cutbacks {B2)
Hospital, Families At Odds Over 'Unexplained'
Deaths CAl)
Rapes, Assaults on Patients Rarely End in
Prosecution {Al)
Did Misuse of Drugs Cause Deaths? {Al)
'Mentally Ill' Plea Not Working {Al)
Foreign Doctors Get Blame for Northville Culture
Gap {Al)
Lawmakers Clear Blanchard's Cuts {Al)
State Offers 4-Point Plan for Northville {Bl)
Plan Would Bolster Mental Health {B4)
Benefit Cuts Hit Mentally Ill {A9)
Resolving Troubled Fates {Al)
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Detroit News
State Journal
Free Press
Free Press
Detroit News
Detroit News
Detroit News

4/26/83
5/01/83
5/02/d3
5/03/93
5/05/83
5/15/83
5/22/83

Free Press

5/23/83

Detroit Ner.vs
State Journal
Detroit News

5/25/83
6/03/133
6/06/o3

Detroit News
Free Press

6/10/83
6/10/83

Detroit Neils
Detroit NE!'IJS
Detroit News
Detroit News
State Journal
Detroit Ne,o~s
State Journal
State Journal
State Journal

6/12/83
6/15/83
6/22/83
6/22/83
6/26/83
7/14/83
7/24/83
7/29/83
7/31/83

Detroit Ne;vs
Free Press
Detroit Ne•..;s
State Journal
Detroit Ne.vs

8/04/33
8/11/83
8/23/d3
8/25/83
8/28/83

Detroit Ne...;s
Detroit News
Free Press

9/01/83
9/Uo/33
9/17/83

State Journal
State Journal

9/18/83
9/13/83

State Journal
Detroit Ne.vs
Detroit News

9/25/83
9/29/83
9/29/83

Detroit Ne.Ns
State Journal
Detroit Ner,..;s
Detroit News
Free Press
Detroit News
Detroit News
Detroit News

10/01/33
10/02/83
10/04/33
lU/US/83
11/08/83

ll/05/::i3
ll/17/~3

ll/23/o3

Journalists S9Qtlighting Misery of Mentally Ill (Al7)
for 'Sore' LP-ads to Suicides?
Despair 'l'akes Its ·roll: 11 SUicides in Four Days (A3)
LSD: A Help For the Mentally Ill? (Al)
Ne.v Hope for Mental Patients (BNl)
La•NYers Still Rely on Insanity Plea (A3)
Group Points Proudly to Its Help for ~~e
Retarded (HN6)
·ro Have or Have .Not As Witnesses for Insanity
Defense (A3)
Ed: Deinstitutionalization, Part II (AlO>
State Joins Disability Benefits Battle
Indecision: Debate Delays Plynnuth Center
Shutdown (A3)
Group Hane Septic Failure Stirs Alarm (AD12)
Ed: Mental Health: FwKling Cuts Cripple Promising
Program (AlO)
State Plans More Cash for Northville (AJ)
Panel Shapes Bill on iw1ental Care (BE7)
Plynnuth Center Plan Called For By July 1 (BD7)
State Withholds County's Revenue-Sharing ~.Ioney (3D7)
Hillcrest Center Now in Shambles
Ply.muth Center in Last Days U"'Wl)
Cut Price Sought For Hillcrest (83)
Relocation Plan Delayed by .'1ental Health Board
Mental Health Director Plans Few •'1idnight Staff
i'<teetings (o2)
·reacher Begins Firm for Students (GEl)
"I 'l'hin~ I Need Heli?, But ••• " (dl)
Co.-np Case Insanity Plea Denied (1:306)
Judge Denies Union Bid For Layoff Block (.b2)
P.:;ychologists Liiud Heroine of Battle for Retarded
Kids Uu>
County Agency Moves to Northville (BW2)
Plyrrouth Center to Remain Open (EIJ2)
Ed: At Home: Retilrded Persons Have Another Reason to
Hope for M0re Useful Lives (A6)
Babcock iw1oves to Protect Patients (B8)
Probe May Provide Clues to i•lenta 1 Patients
Deatl1s (Bl)
Stabenow ~uld Bolster Mental Health Aid to Kids (81)
Sexual Assault Revives Group Homes Dispute (A3)
Sanebody Cares: Volunteer HonoreJ, But I'Jants More for
Mental Patients (~2)
Rape Prompts Study of Policy at Group Homes (A2)
Mental Health Boss Optimistic (B3)
Retarded iv1an Faces .Sex Case 'l'cial (Ai.'Jl4)
Ed: t-1en tal Health L~is takes ( AlO)
Mental State is a Key in Kidnap !'rial
Appeals Court Upholds Benefits for Mentally Ill (Cl4)
AttacK Sp.Irs Care Horre 'I'all<s (B('Jl)
Right to Life Witll Dignity (All)
Waitin~
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Detroit News

11/25/83

Detroit News
State Journal
Detroit News
Detroit Nev1s
Detroit Ner,o~s
Detroit News
Detroit News

11/30/83
12/01/83
12/15/83
12/16/83
12/20/83
12/22/83
12/23/83

'Decade of tl1e Disabled': Mental Hospital 'Graduate'
Pursues A Dream (A3)
Kelly ru1d Friends ••• A Love Story (Dl)
Ner~berry Center Seeks ~~ner (B7)
New Clinic Offers Mental Health (EOl)*
Law Will Subsidize Handica~ped Kept Home (B6)
Ypsilanti Hospital Probe Set (A3)
Pets Offer Therapy to Old, Ill (Ewl)
Split Over Allen Park Group Home Widens (BD3)

* ·rhis article rrentions Lafayette Clinic
# This article mentions Michigan Institute for Mental Health

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

MICHIGAN MENTAL HEALTH CHRONOLOGY
1832

Wayne County General Hospital (Eloise, Walter A.
Reuther) opens as Wayne County "Pest House" for
cholera victims.

1834

Wayne County establishes the first Board of
Superintendents for the Poor, converting the
Pest House to a Poorhouse accepting "lunatic
persons".

1841

Wayne County Poorhouse receives the first person
in Michigan adjudged legally insane.

1848

The Michigan legislature provides for establishment of a state asylum for the insane.
However,
no money is appropriated.

1859

Michigan Asylum for the Insane in Kalamazoo
(Kalamazoo Regional Psychiatric Hospital)
accepts its first patients.

1873

The Michigan legislature appropriates money for
the Eastern Michigan Asylum (Clinton Valley
Center) at Pontiac.

1878

Eastern Michigan Asylum opens with a bed
capacity of 400.

1881

The legislature approves Northern Michigan
Asylum (Traverse City Regional Psychiatric
Hospital).

1883

Legislature authorizes establishment of a
facility for violent criminals and sexual
offenders.

1885
Sept.

Michigan Asylum for Insane Criminals (Ionia
State Hospital) opens.

1885
Nov.

Northern Michigan Asylum opens with its first
445 patients.

1895

The first facility for "feebleminded and
epileptic 11 (Oakdale Center for Developmental
Disabilities, Lapeer) opens.

1895
Nov.

Upper Peninsula Asylum for Insane (Newberry
Regional Mental Health Center) opens in Traverse
City.
379
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1906

State Psychopathic Hospital at the University of
Michigan (Ann Arbor Neuropsychiatric Institute)
is established. Michigan becomes the first
state to provide special facilities for
instruction of medical students in treating the
mentally ill.

1906

Mechanical restraints are abolished in state
facilities.

1911

Legislation changes the names of asylums to
state hospitals.

1914

Michigan Farm Colony for Epileptics is
established in Wahjamega (Caro Regional Center).

1916

Three Michigan outpatient clinics are
established.

1920

County Departments of Social Services are
developed.

1923

The first State Hospital Commission, an advisory
board, is authorized within the Welfare Department. Public Act 151 attempts to consolidate
the mental health care system and laws
organizing state hospitals.

1929

The Hartmann Act provides $19,517,200 for
hospital construction during the next four
years.

1931

Construction program is reviewed and funds cut.
Ypsilanti State Hospital (Ypsilanti Regional
Psychiatric Hospital) opens.

1933

Hartmann Act repealed; construction stops.

1935

Coldwater State Home and Training School
(Coldwater Regional Center for Developmental
Disabilities) opens.

1937

Public Act 104 separates the State Hospital
Commission from the State Welfare Department. A
Central Office with authority for operating
state hospitals is 1937, November es~ablished.
Joseph E. Barrett, M.D. is appointed the first
Director of State Hospitals.
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1938

Federal Public Works Administration grants are
made available for hospital construction.

1939
Mar.

A change in statutes abolishes the position of
Director of State Hospitals and creates that of
Executive Secretary, to which Charles F. Wagg is
appointed.
A central department to direct the state mental
health program is developed.

1941

Michigan Writer's Project is sponsored by the
State Administrative Board and the Federal Works
Project Administration.

1945
Sept.

Act 271 abolishes the State Hospital Commission
and establishes a Department of Mental Health
(DMH) which must be headed by a psychiatrist.

1946

The u.s. Congress passes the National Mental
Health Act and offers federal assistance in
supporting community services, research and
training of mental health professionals.

1946
Mar.

Charles A. Zeller, M.D. becomes Mental Health
Director.

1947
July

Charles F. Wagg is appointed Acting DMH
Director.

1948
Jan.

R.L. Dixon, M.D. Superintendent of the Caro
State Hospital is appointed Acting DMH Director
while continuing to serve as facility
Administrator.

1949
June

Charles F. Wagg is again appointed DMH Director
after the legislature changes statutes governing
qualifications.

1950

DMH Director Wagg presents the legislature with
a comprehensive plan for expanding facilities by
more than 14,000 beds during the next ten years.

1952

Northville State Hospital (Northville Regional
Psychiatric Hospital) opens.

~954

Act 217 establishes Lafayette Clinic as a
combined psychiatric hospital and research
facility.

1955 .

Lafayette Clinic opens.

Jacques Gottlieb, M.D.,
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is appointed Director.
Nationwide, state hospital populations reach
their peak. u.s. Congress passes the Mental
Health Study Act which forms a Joint Commission
on Mental Illness and Mental Health.
Psychotropic drugs are introduced for the first
time on a large scale basis.
1956

Hawthorn Center, Northville is completed. The
legislature appropriates funds for the Plymouth
State Home and Training School, Northville
(Plymouth Center for Human Development).
Seventeen children's and five adult community
mental health clinics serve approximately 8,000
persons state-wide •.

1959
Jan.

A Citizen's Mental Health Inquiry Board is
appointed to investigate charges of abuse of
patients in the State's mental institutions.

1960

Plymouth Center officially opens with 1,000
beds. Alpine Regional Center for Developmental
Disabilities, Gaylord, opens.

1960
Dec.

The final report of the Citizen's Mental Health
Inquiry Board is submitted, recommending
centralization of DMH administration. The
Federal Joint Commission on Mental Illness
releases the findings of its six-year study and
calls for greater utilization of community
programs.

1963
Feb.

President John F. Kennedy calls for a more
comprehensive, community-based approach to the
care of the mentally disabled. The U.S.
Congress passes the Mental Retardation
Facilities and Community Mental Health Centers
Construction Act (P.L. 88-164) which creates a
funding mechanism for community mental health
centers.

1963

The Michigan legislature passes the Communitv
MPntal Health Services Act (P.A. 54) which
provides for development of community mental
health boards as agencies of couaty government,
responsible for developing local mental health
services and funded on a 75% state, 25% local
matching basis.
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1964

Robert A. Kimmich, M.D. is appointed DMH
Director.
$1.5 million is appropriated to the five
established community mental health boards.

1965

DMH is granted National Institute of Mental
Health funds for comprehensive mental health
planning. Two reports "Michigan State Plan for
Construction of Community Mental Health
Facilities" and "The Development of a
Comprehensive Mental Health Program in Michigan"
are developed in collaboration with the
Department of Health.

1966

Vernon Stehman, M.D. is appointed Acting DMH
Director.
Legislation is adopted to establish a center for
forensic psychiatry.

1967

A House committee recommends gradual phase-out
of Ionia State Hospital and treatment of
criminally insane patients at other state
agencies.
William Anderson, M.D. is appointed DMH
Director.

1967
Aug.

A comprehensive State Health Planning Commission
is created by Executive Order to serve as the
official state long-range health planning
agency, under the federal Partnership for Health
legislation.
It is chaired by the Director of
the Department of Public Health, with the DMH
Director as a member.

1967
Sept.

The first state mental health plan is filed in
compliance with Section 314(d) of P.L. 89-749.

1967
Oct.

Departments of Corrections and Mental Health
officials request permission to build a joint
facility at Ypsilanti for the criminally insane.

1968
May

Michigan State Employee's Union holds a meeting
in Pontiac where the decision is made to set the
Department of Mental Health as a target for
union organization, with Pontiac to be the first
facility struck.
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1968
May 10

"The Department is under constantly increasing
pressure to complete its transition to the PPB
system. Governor Romney has told his department
heads that he considers them to be responsible
for the efficiency of their agencies and that he
believes PPB qives them both the means and the
authority to carry out this responsibility"
(Minutes of Superintendent's meeting).

1968

DMH Director, William Anderson, M.D. submits to
Governor William G. Milliken recommendations for
a major legislative program that would rewrite
Michigan's mental health laws.

1969
May

The Mental Health Program and State Review
Commission is established by Executive Order.

1970

E. Gordon Yudashkiri, M.D. is appointed DMH
Director and establishes deinstitutionalization
as a DMH program goal.

1972
Mar.

Mental Health Program and State Review
Commission submits its report to the Governor,
including an integrated mental health code.

1973

Act 194 Michigan's Mandatory Special Education
Law is passed.

1973

The Special Senate Committee to Study and
Investigate the Programs and Policies of the
Department of Mental Health is established by SR
353.
Psychosurgery concerning patients at Lafayette
Clinic becomes a media issue.

1973

The Social Security Act establishes provisions
for Medicaid reimbursement to states for
developmentally disabled patients residing in
state institutions.

1974
Feb.

The Office of Health and Medical Affairs issues
a report, "Community Placement Program, an
Examination of the Process and Outcomes of
Community Placement of Adults and Children from
Mental Health Institutions in Michigan."

1974
June

Dr. E. Gordon Yudashkin resigns under fire and
Donald C. Smith, M.D. is appointed Acting DMH
Director.
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1974
Aug.

The State Legislature passes Act 258, "The
Mental Health Code," which is signed into law by
Governor William G. Milliken. Chapters 4, 5 and
8 concerning admissions and discharges take
effect November 6.

1974
Oct.

David A. Ethridge, M.D. is appointed Ionia
Riverside Superintendent after serving as Chief,
DMH Bureau of Operational Planning.
·

1974

Michigan's Adult Foster Care Licensing Act is
passed.

1975
Aug.

The majority of Public Act 258 of 1974 goes into
effect.

1975

Michigan's 1975-76 Fiscal Year is extended from
June 30, 1975 to September 30, 1976 to create a
15-month budget year.

1976

DMH publishes the first "Michigan State Plan for
Comprehensive Mental Health Services", an HEW
requirement under P.L. 94-63, for awarding grant
monies to states.

1976
Aug.

Regionalization of the mental health system
occurs through the 1976 DMH reorganization plan.
The first two Regional Directors are appointed
by Dr. Donald C. Smith.

1976

A Staffing Needs Assessment Process (SNAP) is
established by DMH to provide objective
standards for comparing facility staffing
levels.
DMH issues Program Policy Guidelines
(PPG) to be used in formulating service
requirements for the 1977-78 Fiscal Year.

1976

First year Medicaid payments for Michigan
institutional services for the developmentally
disabled reach $80 million.

1977
Mar.

The first patients are admitted to the New
Riverside Center, Dimondale (Michigan Institute
for Mental Health).

1977
June

Final regulations for Medicaid Intermediate Care
Facilities for the Mentally Retarded (ICF/MR)
payments to states go into effect.

1977

Macomb-Oakland Regional Center is opened.
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1977
Nov.

Oakdale Center for the Developmentally Disabled,
Lapeer comes under investigation regarding
allegations of patient abuse.
Several staff are
fired.

1977

The requirement that hospital superintendents be
physicians is eliminated.

1978

Vern Stehman, M.D. is appointed Acting DMH
Director.

1978
Feb.
Mar.

Allegations of abuse surface at Plymouth Center
for Human Development. The Detroit Free Press
begins a series of exposes of the Center. Dr.
Vern Stehman resigns.

1978

Michigan Institute for Mental Health (MIMH)
receives one year JCAH accreditation. Lafayette
Clinic receives two year accreditation.

1979
Jan.

In his State of the State message, Governor
Milliken appoints a committee, chaired by Acting
DMH Director Stehman, to study unification of
the public mental health system stating, "The
Michigan Mental Health code provides for the
delivery of service through two separately
administered systems at the state and county
level, but requires that the Department of
Mental Health coordinate and integrate these two
systems."

1979

Frank Ochberg, M.D. is appointed DMH Director.
Community homes in the Detroit area are under
considerable fire.
DMH initiates a System Assessment Scheme,
Service Objective Matrix to assist providers in
analyzing their mix of service elements so that
state-wide planning can be based on local
information.
DSS relinquishes responsibility for home
finding. DMH does not receive legislative
funding to pick up this function.

1979

St. Clair, Alger-Marquette, Washtenaw and
county community mental health boards are
to participate in a pilot study as "full
management boards" responsible for caring
all county residents in need
(regardless
their placement) through a lump sum grant

Kent
chosen
for
of
of
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annual operating funds.
In pilot counties money
is no longer directly appropriated to state
institutions.
1979
Aug.

Plymouth Center is ordered closed by the court.

1979
Oct.

MIMH receives two year JCAH accreditation.

1980
Jan.

Samuel Gershon, M.D. is selected as Lafayette
Clinic Director.

1980

The Governor's Committee on Unification of the
Public Mental Health System presents its final
report and recommendations.

1980

DMH Director Frank Ochberg, M.D. proposes
"domiciliary care" because of increasing budget
cutbacks.

1980
July

Dr. Ochberg resigns as DMH Director.

1980
Oct.

Governor William Milliken orders Michigan
Institute closed during a televised budget
address.

1981
Mar.

The Global Assessment Scale is selected as a
Departmental tool for classifying clients
needing services.

1981
Apr.

Michigan Institute for Mental Health is closed.

1981

An Auditor General report of the Department of
Mental Health finds evidence of mismanagement
and possible fraud in the community placement
program.

1981

A legislative committee is established to
investigate allegations of improper management
and misspent monies within the Department of
Mental Health. The Governor appoints an
Interagency Council to work with the committee
in response to the legislative inquiry.

1981
Sept.

c.

1982

The Regional Director system is discontinued.

Patrick Babcock is appointed DMH Director.
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1983

The Family Support Subsidy Act, an entitlement
program for families of developmentally disabled
children cared for at home, amends the Mental
Health Code.

1984

The State Legislature amends the Mental Health
Code to include a separate chapter 4A for
mentally ill minors, adding protections and
defining suitability for hospitalization.

1984

Within the state there are a total of 55
community mental health boards and 25 state
hospitals, divided into six geographic regions.
Twenty five of the CMH boards are full
management.
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